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CHAPTER I 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: DECENTRALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY: THE UNCERTAIN LINK 
 
 
Why does decentralization contribute to the consolidation of some national and sub-
national emerging participatory democracies while placing others at greater risk of democratic 
decay? The puzzle behind this question can be illustrated by two neighboring towns located 
within Argentina’s borders, Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay, which took very different 
paths on their way to democratization. Both Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay inherited 
the legacy of Spanish colonial rule. Both share common borders. Both are located on the shores 
of the Uruguay River. Both have remarkably similar income levels, populations and area sizes. 
Both towns function under the Constitution of the Province of Entre Rios. Both have experienced 
significant decentralization reforms, following Argentina’s transition to democracy in 1983. Yet, 
one transited to a relatively pluralistic, open democracy and the other remains today a single-
family politically dominated town.    
 What produced this sharp difference in the impact of decentralization? More broadly, 
when does decentralization help to consolidate participatory democracies, when does it not and 
why? The case studies mentioned above are part of a larger inquiry about the effects of 
decentralization on Latin American participatory democracies that this project intends to respond. 
This dissertation rests on the key proposition that the success or failure of decentralization is 
based on the choices made by local political elites with respect to how to incorporate 
decentralization reforms into their political survival strategies, and the corresponding response 
made by citizens, who as principals find themselves newly empowered but also potentially more 
vulnerable to agency loss.  
I view the choices made by both elites and masses regarding to their responses to 
decentralization reforms, and thus the likely impact of those reforms on participatory democracy, 
as a function of (a) the degree of citizen support for decentralization policies; (b) the degree of 
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political support for participatory democracy; (c) the size of local elite coalitions and the 
consequent disposition to either exclude or include potential emerging competitors in municipal 
decision-making (i.e. the degree of political democracy already in place at the time of the 
decentralization reforms); and (d) the design and implementation of local municipal regulations by 
local political elites and other actors.   
Emerging from a thirty-year period of highly centralized, authoritarian regimes, and 
resting on a centuries-long tradition of state centralization, the decentralization movement that 
began in the 1970s in Latin America and took off in the 1980s was wrongly perceived as a 
panacea for all of Latin America’s democratic failings. Advocates overstated the power of 
decentralization by stating that it would bring about strong, consolidated democracies by 
promoting social capital and citizen participation in politics. It was certainly reasonable to claim 
that, by bringing government closer to the people and empowering local government with 
meaningful governance tasks, citizens would have a greater stake in government, hold their 
officials accountable, and in the process, gain such democratic qualities as interpersonal trust 
and tolerance – a la Tocqueville, Rousseau, Putnam and company (Grindle 2007; Montero and 
Samuels 2004). Other proponents of the decentralization strategy viewed it as a way to 
strengthen the grassroots bases of political parties, increase government transparency, and 
improve governance across the many emergent democracies of Latin America (O'Neill 2005). In 
short, by the end of the 1990s, a description of a prior “New Federalism” movement in the United 
States during the late 1960s rang equally true for Latin America in the 1990s, “Decentralization is 
rapidly replacing God, Country and Motherhood in popular favor” (Furniss 1974: 958).  
 In the years that have followed the initial decentralization push by government officials 
and development specialists in the 1990s, one thing has become abundantly clear – the strategy 
has had dramatically different outcomes, not only across different countries, but within the same 
country as well. Surprisingly, we still have very little systematic work on understanding these 
variations in the outcomes of the decentralization strategy. The question has the qualities of a 
classic natural experiment – a similar set of policies implemented during the same time period in 
countries within one region of the world have produced vastly different outcomes with respect to 
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the democratic goals set forth by proponents. This question is even more amenable to a natural 
experiment design when considering the often times wildly different outcomes that have occurred 
as a result of the exact same policy implementation within a single country. This manuscript 
presents the results of a research project that takes advantage of the natural experimental design 
qualities of the decentralization trend in an effort to contribute to our still limited understanding of 
the mixed effects of decentralization reforms.  
 On the negative side, what are the potential pitfalls of decentralization with respect to 
democratic consolidation? Some authors warn that if decentralization is carried out in non-
democratic settings, it may consolidate sub-national authoritarianism as a result of the increased 
ability that leaders in these authoritarian enclaves have to prevent the effective extension of 
political rights to the entire population (Fox 1994). Such authoritarian enclaves are more likely to 
consolidate power in territories where political parties are weak or absent, or simply fail to 
represent the interests of groups that oppose the incumbent. Democracy can also be undermined 
when fiscally empowered sub-national governments use their resources to implement clientelistic 
networks in order to guarantee their political survival, either by exchanging goods for votes or by 
providing “jobs for the boys” (Garcia-Guadilla and Perez 2002, Prud’homme 1995). Finally, when 
decentralization is carried out with the purpose of defusing ethnic conflicts, it may unintentionally 
strengthen local groups’ capacity to demand unlimited autonomy, exacerbating separatist 
sentiments between the populations (Treisman 2006).  
Drawing upon this controversy, this dissertation develops and tests a theory of political 
survival of local elites to explore the question of why it is that state decentralization can contribute 
to the consolidation of democratic citizenship in some cases, while in others it can be at least 
partly responsible for the emergence and strengthening of anti-democratic values and behaviors. 
This theory argues that rational local leaders face incentives to implement decentralization such 
that its outcomes do not pose a risk large enough to challenge their chances to hold on local 
power. In the following chapters, this manuscript intends to show that decentralization can 
increase the capability of local politicians to implement institutional changes that promote 
widespread citizen participation and respect for opposition rights. But the very same strategy can 
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also empower local officials to strengthen authoritarian practices that benefit only a selected few 
to the detriment of the rest of the society. The influence of civic history, the daily life of municipal 
governments and the structure of intergovernmental relations are of course important explanatory 
factors as well. However, this dissertation contends that after these factors are taken into 
account, the way in which local elites implement the strategy remains the single, most powerful 
explanation for the diverse degrees of democracy at the local level. At large, local elites may 
either concentrate the power they receive as a result of decentralization, or they may share it with 
the citizenry, groups of citizens and other local political actors. 
To test this theory, this study uses an unprecedented collection of mixed-method data 
sources obtained at both country and municipal levels through qualitative and quantitative 
techniques. At the national level, this dissertation carries out a comparative analysis of survey 
data obtained from the 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries included in the 
AmericasBarometer carried out by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) in 2008. 
These data allow identifying patterns of effects of decentralization on participatory democracy 
across the hemisphere. At the municipal level, this dissertation reports on a sub-national 
comparative analysis of survey data obtained by the Programa de Auditoría Ciudadana (PAC) in 
46 Argentinean municipalities between 2003 and 2008. While the country level data are useful to 
identify general macro-consequences of decentralization, the municipal level data are helpful to 
take into account some of the unobserved country-specific variables. Together, LAPOP and PAC 
data sets provide responses from more than 55,000 individuals to questions related not only to 
decentralization, but also to democracy and citizenship.  
The quantitative data above prove to be efficient for bringing to light some of the 
associations between state reform and core democratic values. However, the mechanisms 
behind these associations become clearer only with the employment of qualitative methods. For 
this purpose, this dissertation analyzes qualitative data obtained through focus groups and elite 
interviews. Focus groups data are effective for understanding what individuals think when they 
talk about the concepts of and relationships among decentralization, recentralization, democracy 
and authoritarianism. Elite interviews, on the other hand, are useful to uncover what makes 
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decentralization fail or succeed with regards to the objective of democratic consolidation. While 
PAC gathered focus group data in all 46 Argentinean municipalities, I collected views and 
opinions of 24 councilors, historians, lawyers and journalists in Gualeguaychú and Concepción 
del Uruguay, through semi-structured elite interviews.   
This dissertation is relevant for researchers and policy-makers alike. For those interested 
in theoretical aspects, this investigation intends to contribute to the reform of the state literature 
by establishing a clear association between decentralization and democratic consolidation. 
Although the focus of this study is Latin America and the Caribbean at the national level and sub-
national Argentina at the municipal level, I believe that the theory presented here and the findings 
of this study are relevant to many other regions of the world where significant decentralization 
reforms are taking place. For those interested in how local institutions can be designed in order to 
enhance the benefits and avoid the pitfalls of decentralization, this research can offer them a 
profound evaluation of how individuals regard local democratic governance under a selection of 
normative municipal provisions. In sum, this dissertation provides new evidence for scholars, 
governments, and society in general, on how the degree of decentralization shapes the prospects 
of democratic consolidation.     
 
Decentralization to the Rescue of Democracy? 
 During the “second reverse wave” from democracy in the 1960s, most Latin American 
countries heavily concentrated political power in the central offices of authoritarian regimes. 
Centralized decision-making was widely implemented by force rather than consensus, and 
human rights were systematically violated. Secret intelligence cross-border systems, such as 
Operation Condor, were established in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru 
and Uruguay to repress, torture and execute political opponents, including dissidents and leftists, 
students and teachers, union leaders and intellectuals, and purported guerillas. Conservative 
estimates show that centralized state terror may have rendered some 60,000 individuals killed 
and tens of thousands seized and tortured during military operations (McSherry 2002).  
 These atrocities contributed to unleash a large array of social, economic and political 
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pressures to bring about the breakdown of centralized authoritarian regimes. In the 1970s and 
1980s, Latin America entered the “third wave” of democratization and several constitutions were 
drafted limiting the power of executive offices in order to guarantee civil liberties and political 
rights of citizens, and to prevent new episodes of human rights violations. One of such 
constitutional provisions was the transfer of decision-making from central to regional and local 
levels of government. This process, broadly categorized under the rubric of decentralization, was 
widely expected to help consolidating democracy (Diamond and Tsalik 1999).  
 By “bringing the government closer to the people” advocates argued, citizens could exert 
greater control over governmental decision-making. Decentralization was expected to increase 
electoral accountability, because citizens become better informed about local than about central 
governmental practices, especially in places far away from the national capital. Also, 
decentralization was deemed important for increasing citizen participation and cultivating civic 
virtue, which in turn would minimize the risks of democratic decay. And most importantly, 
decentralization could empower local officials to prevent abuses from central governments and 
protect citizen political freedoms and civil liberties. 
 For these reasons, decentralization started to be not only earnestly implemented by policy-
makers in country after country, but also generously funded by international development 
agencies. Today, calculating precisely the total investment on decentralization is difficult –if not 
impossible- but since the last democratizing wave, estimates show that it has run into the billions 
(Treisman 2007). Decentralization programs are among the most widely spread and resource 
intensive of all democracy and governance programs funded by multilateral and bi-lateral donors, 
especially in countries transiting to democracy (Goldstone et al. 2008). In 1980, sub-national 
governments around the world collected on average 15% of revenues and spent 20% of 
expenditures. As a result of decentralization, those figures had risen to 19% and 25%, 
respectively, and had even doubled in some regions by the late 1990s (Falleti 2004).  
 Even though decentralization increased political, fiscal, and administrative powers at the 
sub-national level, its implementation also brought headaches and dilemmas. After decades of 
state centralization, intermediate and local governments had to cope with their new 
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responsibilities in terms of budget administration, economic development, and the provision of 
goods and services. Institutions for local decision-making that were weakened and even 
dismantled after years of authoritarian rule had to be reinstalled in order to take on complex tasks 
(Gindle 2007). New organizations implemented to provide local services needed to be created, 
human capital needed to be strengthened and the rules of the “new game” had to be put into 
effect. Local public administration became more demanding as citizens learned that public 
officials could be appealed to, rewarded or blamed if they overpromised but under-delivered. 
These issues raised critical concerns not only for policy-makers seeking to negotiate the 
promotion of successful democratic regimes, but also for academics trying to understand the 
mechanisms under which state decentralization promotes citizen support for democratic 
consolidation. 
 
The Scholarship on Decentralization and Democracy 
 The literature on state decentralization and democracy provides important insights for 
understanding the perils and promises of this reform. On the benefits, the literature can be traced 
as far back as Aristotle and other Greek philosophers who thought that, “living a life of excellence 
requires that one take active part in the process of government” (Treisman 2007:157). Rousseau 
and others later revived this argument during the Enlightenment, suggesting that freedom is best 
exercised by participating in the decision-making process of legislatures. But since direct 
involvement was increasingly limited in a nascent nation-state that counted with tens and even 
hundred of thousands of inhabitants, how could such direct participation be possible? Alexis de 
Tocqueville (1961 [1835]) described how power was broken down into fragments in the American 
township, so a maximum number of people could play a role in public affairs. The attachment of 
the New Englanders to their township, he thought, was a product of strong independency and 
capacity that they had, within their scope, to rule society.  
 De Tocqueville’s views of local public affairs were also backed by John Stuart Mill (in 
Treisman 2007, 1961 [1861]), who thought about decentralization as a way to extend 
opportunities for political participation. Mill stated that local government was a “school for political 
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capacity and general intelligence” (Tresiman 2007:158). With these views, decentralization 
moved quickly to be an important tool for direct participation in democracies of “the first wave” 
(Huntington 1991) and the scholarship about this state reform experienced an explosion. In the 
decades to follow, proponents of civic virtue and social capital viewed local arenas as perfect 
environments where citizens could engage in communitarian activities, learn to trust each other, 
and tolerate different opinions regarding the administration of public affairs (Almond and Verba 
1963; Grindle 2007; Montero and Samuels 2004; Putnam 1994). Culturalists, regarded this 
collection of civic values that may result from state decentralization as the basis for the 
consolidation of durable democracies (Inglehart 1997; Seligson 2008).  
 As democracies struggle to become more efficient, culturalists argue, participatory local 
democracy empowers citizens to become more effective at rewarding or punishing local public 
officials. As a result, rational politicians have “political survival” incentives to be responsive to 
local needs and concerns (Grindle 2007). This mechanism is associated with the “accountability 
argument” that has flooded the decentralization literature. According to this argument, while it can 
be difficult to monitor politicians at the national level, “voters face lower costs when they seek to 
gather information about how local politicians are making use of governmental resources” 
(Connerley, Eaton and Smoke 2010:4). By bringing the government closer to the people, citizens 
should be better informed to reelect officials who perform well and to replace those who fail to 
perform as expected (Przeworski et al.1999; Falleti 2005).  
 The benefits of decentralization have also been studied from the institutional perspective. 
Disappointed with the outcomes of the “dual transition” during the 1980s and 1990s at the 
national level, reformers contemplated decentralization as way to deepen democracy by opening 
local spaces for public contestation (Hiskey 2010). Precisely because authoritarian enclaves 
survived transitions to democracy, decision-makers viewed decentralization as an instrument to 
transfer power from national to local spheres in order to prevent the potential renaissance of 
authoritarianism (Diamond and Tsalik 1999; Bland 2004; Norris 2008). To strengheten institutions 
of political representation, decentralization is also capable of reallocating power to areas where 
the incumbent and its party allies are more likely to win in future electoral contests (O’Neill 2005).  
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Thus decentralization has been seen as a strategy, not only for political parties with relatively long 
time horizons, but also for the emergence of political representation institutions of traditionally 
excluded minorities. Van Cott, for instance, shows three factors that are most likely to foster local-
level political innovation in excluded communities: “a legal and political context that facilitates 
bottom-driven decentralization… effective mayoral leadership; and support from a cohesive, 
organic political party rooted in civil society” (2008:211).  
 Other important positive consequences of decentralization, in addition to democracy, have 
been studied in other disciplines of the social sciences. The social movement literature has been 
particularly interested in studying the spaces that decentralization opens up for the empowerment 
of non-governmental interests in decision-making. This work focuses on the effects that NGOs 
have on local governments, and on the deepening of democratization (Keese and Freire 2006; 
Yashar 1999).  The economics literature also deems decentralization significant because it is 
capable of boosting local development by increasing effectiveness on the allocation of resources 
(Oates 1972; Escobar-Lemmon 2003). These authors claim that multi-tier governments make it 
possible to satisfy citizens’ demands for public goods and services more precisely and cost-
effectively, due to their proximity to citizens. In a similar vein, students of public management 
suggest that in decentralized settings, those responsible for the provision of goods and services 
are local, thus citizens have greater motivation to complain and demand for improvements 
(Campbell 2003). Since management of public funds by government officials is easier to monitor 
at the local than the national level, some scholars argue that there is a negative association 
between fiscal decentralization in government expenditure and corruption (Fisman and Gatti 
1999). Finally, others have studied the effects of decentralization on poverty alleviation, the 
environment, and the provision of health and education (Grindle 2007; Sepulveda and Martinez-
Vasquez 2010; von Braun and Grote 2000).  
 Not surprisingly, these high expectations were likely to be disappointed when reforms 
where put into practice. As Grindle puts it, “practice rarely lives up to theory” (2007:8). Some 
started to see that decentralization could empower “bad” local governments as well as “good” 
local governments (Fox 1994). In other words, when carried out in non-democratic settings, 
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decentralization strengthened some of the authoritarian enclaves it was supposed to eliminate 
(Arze and Martinez 2004; Prud’homme 1995). In some instances, sub-national populist 
governments could use the machinery available to them to consolidate clientelistic practices that 
reinforced their privileged positions (Diamond 1999; Prud'homme 1995). This machinery was 
made available, on purpose or not, by the provision of central government subsidies, where sub-
national governments had a weak tax link with local citizens and businesses (Gervasoni 2010). 
These arguments are part of a larger assesment of the impact of decentralization on corruption. 
Treisman (2000) and Gerring and Thacker (2004) find that federalist countries have higher rates 
of corruption than unitary countries. The logic behid Treisman’s finding is that in decentralized 
political systems the potential corrupter needs to influence a smaller segment of the government 
than in centralized settings, and because in a fragmented system there are fewer centralized 
institutions to enforce honesty. This view of decentralization and corruption is particularly harmful 
for democracy, if local leaders are aware that they may exchange goods for votes more easily 
than national leaders (Garcia-Guadilla and Perez 2002).  
 Another group of scientists has studied the mixed impact of decentralization on democratic 
governance. Hiskey and Seligson (2003) find support for the contention that decentralization can 
increase the levels of democratic system approval, however, they do not discard the possibility 
that the emphasis on local government can also exert more negative effects on the political 
system, when local institutions fail to satisfy citizen expectations. For governments, the effects of 
decentralization can be mixed too. Eaton (2004) and Falleti (2010) find that decentralization can 
actually increase the power of central governments while decreasing the power of local 
governments, depending upon the sequence and timing of the decentralization reforms. This is 
why other studies have also placed into question the citizen empowerment and increased equity 
benefits that decentralization is supposed to bring about. When analyzing the effects of 
decentralization on ethnic conflicts, Treisman states that “local governments may socialize ethnic 
politicians into cooperation – or they may turn into schools of intolerance and ethnic hatred” 
(2007:14). Thus, decentralization can defuse ethnic conflicts by satisfying limited demands for 
autonomy, but it also may strengthen local elite’s capacity to press for unlimited demands of 
 11 
autonomy.   
 Additionally, decentralization could be responsible for generating fiscal imbalances. In 
some cases, local government debts had to become the responsibility of national governments in 
countries where municipalities were no able to repay their loans (Campbell 2005). In other cases, 
politically strong local governments undermined fiscal and macroeconomic discipline by 
pressuring the central government for unlimited aid (Treisman 2006; 2007). For these reasons, 
those responsible for fiscal and macroeconomic discipline had to put in place some mechanisms 
to tighten up national level oversight of intergovernmental transfers and expenditures (Grindle 
2007). Economists who advocated for fiscal decentralization became soon disappointed because 
many local governments increased their demands on central governments for more revenue 
sharing instead of expanding the robustness for local taxation (Prud’homme 1995).  
 In the light of all these mixed results of a promissing theory, scholars and decision-makers 
modified their expectations but did not abandon their hope for stronger democracy as a result of 
state decentralization. In fact, the transfers of political, administrative and fiscal powers from the 
center to the periphery continued during the first 10 years of the XXI century, and are likely to 
continue. Many more sub-national politicians are now elected than ever before. Sub-national 
expenditures as percentage of total government expenditures continue to rise. Municipalities all 
over the world are becoming responsible not only for street maintenance and garbage collection, 
but for a larger provision of health, education and clean environments. Political parties are paying 
much more attention to grass-roots organizations as local politicians see increased opportunities 
for political careers. And citizens too seem to have developed greater trust for institutions of the 
local government (Montalvo 2008; 2010). It is vitally important, therefore, to learn as much as 
possible about the mixed effects of decentralization on democracy. When does decentralization 
help to consolidate democracy, when does it not and why?  
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A Theory of Political Survival of Local Elites 
 
Conceptual Definitions 
In this dissertation, I define state decentralization as the dynamic transfer of power and 
decision-making from national to sub-national levels of government. Since the main focus of this 
research is the local (as opposed to regional, state or provincial) level of government, I am most 
interested in the transfers that usually occur in political, fiscal and administrative dimensions from 
the national and intermediate to the municipal levels government.1 Political decentralization 
empowers individuals to directly elect municipal officers that are otherwise appointed by a higher 
level of government. Fiscal decentralization empowers municipal governments to generate their 
own revenues, usually through taxes and intergovernmental transfers. Finally, administrative 
decentralization empowers municipal governments to manage and implement public policy. 
Decentralization differs from devolution, where the national government transfers funds and 
responsibilities to appointed sub-national officers; delegation or privatization, where the national 
government sell off state functions; and from deconcentration, where the executive transfers 
decision-making powers to a series of secretaries and institutions at the national level. 
A preliminary and straightforward linkage between decentralization and democracy can 
be found at the epistemological level. Etymologically, the word democracy comes from the Greek 
word d!mokratía that means the power to the people. This definition is remarkably similar to the 
common knowledge purpose of decentralization that is empowering citizens by bringing the 
government closer to the people. For this reason and in contrast to the Schumpeterian minimalist 
conception that favors competitive elections over other elements of democracy (Przeworski 
1999), this dissertation emphasizes the concept of participatory democracy to refer more broadly 
to the effects of institutions in increasing individuals’ control over the determination and 
development of democracy as a whole (Warren 1992). In this view, participatory democracies 
                                                      
1 The chief objective of decentralization is “to bring the government closer to the people;” hence, in this dissertation I 
choose the level located closest to the citizenry in the majority of Latin American countries: the municipal government.  
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encourage individuals to have a greater stake at processes of decision-making; thus increasing 
the opportunities for democratic consolidation. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
This manuscript presents the synopsis of an ongoing research agenda intended to 
explain why decentralization contributes to the consolidation of participatory democracies in some 
places, while placing others at greater risk of decay. Drawing upon the works of Ames (1987) and  
Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (2003), the mixed consequences of decentralization are explained here 
through a theory of political survival of local elites.  According to this theory, local leaders may 
seek to implement decentralization in such a way that its outcomes do not decrease their relative 
power at the local level. In order to best explain this theory, this study advances at least four 
major hypotheses. These hypotheses center on citizen support for decentralization, political 
support for participatory democracy, size of local political elite coalitions, and municipal 
regulations for democratic governance. Each provides a distinct but interrelated potential 
explanation of the factors that promote or discourage participatory democracies under different 
degrees of state decentralization.   
 
Citizen Support for Decentralization. If one of the major purposes of decentralization is 
furnishing common citizens with a greater stake in decision-making, it may appear natural to ask 
them whether or not they agree with this policy in the first place. For it may be also natural to 
think that citizen participation levels will depend upon the degree of political legitimacy of 
decentralization. Ironically, the study of citizen support for this policy has been, to my knowledge, 
largely absent from the decentralization literature. Most of the work has focused on the study of 
decentralization as a result of neoliberal reforms, international factors, political system reforms, 
and institutional and socio-structural factors (Montero and Samuels 2004). In this dissertation, I 
intend to explain under which contextual and individual conditions citizens manifest support for 
state decentralization in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
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Drawing upon the seminal work of Claudio Véliz (1980) “The Centralist Tradition of Latin 
America,” it may be expected, on average, that citizens in the region tend to favor strong central 
governments. Véliz suggests that the factors that make Latin America “centralist” in character are 
the absence of the feudal experience from the region’s tradition, the absence of religious non-
conformity and the resulting centralism of the dominant religion, the absence of any circumstance 
that can be taken as a counterpart of the European industrial Revolution, and the absence of the 
ideological, social, and political developments associated with the French Revolution. In other 
words, in the Latin American region principal citizens have traditionally struggled with centralist 
government agents in a lesser scale in comparison to their European counterparts. Véliz’s theory, 
however, falls short with respect to explaining the wide variation in support for decentralization 
across countries. In this dissertation, I argue that this variation is partly due to the different levels 
of human development among Latin American nations.  
The work of Seymour Martin Lipset (1981) suggests that countries with high levels of 
health, education and general wealth nest individuals who show greater support for 
decentralization and power-sharing systems. In contrast, societies with lower education, 
economic insecurity and low human development are likely to breed individuals that support 
strong, centrally led systems that, in the words Lipset, “tend to produce… political 
authoritarianism.” (1981:114). In this view, citizens in the region who tend to support greater 
control over fiscal resources and larger provision of goods and services by the national 
government should reside in rather underdeveloped contexts. In contrast citizen support for 
decentralization should be greater in contexts where citizens have fulfilled their basic 
developmental needs. This contrast may be due to the fact that less well-off individuals regard the 
national government as an important provider of the basic elements needed for human 
development.  
 It is not my intention to state, however, that low human development always leads to a 
centralized form of government or that all centralized governments are relatively more 
authoritarian. In fact, the empirical evidence shows that countries with high levels of both human 
development and democracy, such as Costa Rica and Uruguay, are indeed relatively more 
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centralized than other countries in the region. In theory, wealthier individuals may also prefer the 
status quo to any state reform, in order to maintain their privileged positions. Nonetheless, in this 
dissertation I concur with and refine Lipset’s statement that of “low education, low participation in 
political or voluntary organizations of any type, little reading, isolated occupations, economic 
insecurity and authoritarian family patterns” (1981:476) both at the contextual and individual 
levels are some of the most of important factors contributing not only to authoritarian, but in my 
view, to centralist predispositions.   
 
Political Support for Participatory Democracy. Local elite support for or opposition to 
citizen participation is at the heart of this dissertation. Here, I develop and test a theory of political 
survival of local elites. This theory contends that the transfer of political, fiscal and administrative 
powers from national and intermediate levels of government to municipal governments increase, 
in general terms, the ability and capacity of local government agents to exercise control and 
authority over citizen principals. In terms of relative power, full decentralization2 may endow local 
political elites with more political, social and economic powers compared not only to higher levels 
of government, but also to the citizenry. Thus, in contexts of empowered municipal governments, 
local political elites may struggle more fiercely with political competitors in order to maintain and 
endure in their privileged positions.  
As a result, local agents in relatively more decentralized territories have greater 
incentives to dissuade or discourage citizen participation in institutions that may pose a threat 
large enough to challenge their continued control over resources and decision-making. 
Institutions of political representation, such as political parties and movements, are arguably the 
citizen organizations that pose the largest threats, since in a democracy, which is the case of 
most if not all the Latin American countries studied here, these institutions seek to influence 
government policies usually by nominating their own candidates with the purpose of seating them 
in political office. The threat of replacement may originate in either antagonist political parties or 
                                                      
2 Full decentralization is opposed to sequential decentralization because the former will more likely lead to an increase in 
power while the latter may actually decrease it.  
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from emerging local competitors within the incumbent’s party. Hence, in this project I expect to 
find a negative association between the degree of state decentralization and citizen participation 
in institutions of political representation and other organizations that can credibly challenge the 
political survival of local elites. In short, I claim that agency loss dulls citizen empowerment in 
more decentralized settings 
There are at least three alternatives that in my view, citizen principals can opt for as a 
consequence of the decrement in their relative power and autonomy after the implementation of 
decentralization policies. First, they could increase their demand-making on municipal offices for 
public and private goods and services. Second, if their voices are not heard and their complaints 
and needs are not met, they could try to engage in institutions of political representation to 
replace the incumbent government in the next electoral period. Third, if neither alternative fulfills 
their expectations, they could turn to mobilized modes of participation, such as public protests, 
demonstrations and riots (Seligson 1980).      
  This study recognizes that local elites, or groups of elites, are not the only ones 
responsible for formulating and implementing local policies. Other important actors generally 
involved in these processes are higher levels of government, international organizations, NGOs, 
private firms, and the like. However, political elites in decentralized settings have greater leverage 
over other actors to implement institutions that guarantee their political survival, for at least two 
reasons. First, decentralization can empower local elites with political, fiscal and administrative 
resources that put them in a relatively better bargaining position for the design and 
implementation of their preferred institutions. Second, decentralization transfers autonomy to 
settings that usually have less horizontal checks and balances than the national level, and 
therefore local power concentration deterrence heavily rests on vertical mechanisms only, such 
as sub-national elections. Thus concentration of power is more difficult to control, I argue, at the 
local than the national level. In this context, local elite behavior may be better explained from an 
office-maximizing rather than a pure vote-maximizing perspective 
 
 17 
Size of Local Political Elite Coalitions. Even though the hypothesis above explains the 
general expectation about the role of local elites in encouraging or discouraging citizen 
participation at different decentralization degrees, it fails to explain why some territory dyads, or 
twin towns as I call them, have remarkably similar decentralization levels and dramatically 
different outcomes. This hypothesis suggests that, holding decentralization constant, levels of 
participatory democracy depend upon the size of local political elite coalitions. To further explain 
this claim, I adapt the selectorate theory put forward by Bueno de Mesquita and others in 2003, to 
sub-national levels of government. Leaders, all of whom face emerging challengers who wish to 
remove them from office, maintain their collation of supporters by providing them a mixture of 
public and private goods and services. When leaders depend on a “small” group or elite coalition 
to survive in office, they engender loyalty by providing them with access to ample personal, 
private goods and services they would not otherwise receive if they were not in the elite. Family-
ruled towns are a good example of small elite coalitions. In this context, alternation in power is 
less frequent and citizen participation in dissension institutions is highly discouraged. In contrast, 
contexts where many supporters demand for rewards, the costs of private benefits required to 
keep their loyalty is just too high. Instead, those leaders who rely on a “large” elite coalition to 
remain in office emphasize the provision of goods and services that benefit everyone in the 
society. In this framework, democratic alternation of power is more frequent because coalition 
members can defect to a rival since they do not enjoy of private benefits. As a result, in large 
coalition contexts citizen face less restrictions to participate in institutions of political 
representation. 
But how large or small local elite coalitions are formed? In this dissertation I argue that 
the characteristics of these coalitions depend on the historical dynamics of the groups that 
worked to bring about decentralization. The literature in this regard distinguishes between “local-
up” dynamics, in which decentralization is forced on national decision-makers from pressures 
exerted by sub-national officials, and “national-down” patterns, in which national actors, operating 
in an strategic mode, decide to decentralize (Eaton 2004; Falleti 2010; Grindle 2007; O'Neill 
2005; Tulchin and Selee 2004) In my study, I introduce a third element to explain identity 
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formation: the “citizen-up” dynamics. In this dynamic, I argue that large local coalitions were 
socially constructed in towns where civil society rather than sub-national politicians exerted the 
most significant pressures for the transfers of power to their municipal government. In contrast, 
towns where “local-up” processes were exerted by a local caudillo (or family of caudillos), 
institutions are designed in such a way that they tend to favor the concentration of power among 
a small local elite, instead of extending political rights and civil liberties among the citizenry. The 
“national-down” dynamic only reinforces the size of pre-established local political coalitions.   
 
Municipal regulations for Democratic Governance. While the previous set of hypotheses 
out an emphasis on human development and local elites to explain citizen support for 
decentralization and participation in democratic institutions, this final hypothesis focuses on the 
effects of local municipal regulations, as designed and implemented by local political elites, to 
understand citizen views about local democratic governance. For this purpose, this research 
studies citizen evaluations and perceptions of municipal performance under Tulchin and Selee’s 
assertion “that the success or failure of the relationship between civil society and the state at sub-
national levels will be central to the construction of democratic governance in Latin America in the 
coming decades” (2004:1). With this premise, I expect to find better citizen evaluations and 
perceptions of municipal performance where local lawmakers have implemented municipal 
regulations that allow for mechanisms of both direct democracy, such as referenda, public 
audiences and/or mandate recall; and accountability, such as mechanisms for municipal 
evaluation, complaint registries and/or access to public information.  
Conversely, municipal regulations that mostly rely on elections for holding public officials 
accountable may be less efficient as a tool to improve democratic governance. If sub-national 
elections are constrained to fixed calendars, voters may need to wait until the following electoral 
period to witness changes on municipal performance. The timing of national and sub-national 
electoral contests, citizen rights to cut their ballots, rules permitting the arbitrary removal of sub-
national elected officials by the national government, etc. are also factors that may weaken 
electoral accountability (Connerley, Eaton and Smoke 2010).  
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An Incomplete Theory of Elite Behavior. This dissertation begins with a simple, basic 
theory in the hope that further research will bring to light certain issues that are not covered here 
due to the lack of time and space. For instance, the study of intergovernmental relations, such as 
the interaction among the national, provincial or state, and local levels of government may prove 
to be essential to advance the understanding of strategic elite behavior. This behavior may also 
be constrained to whether local politicians struggle for political survival at the municipal level or 
intend to advance their political careers in a higher level of government. The theory put forward in 
this dissertation neither takes into account local elite political ideologies nor distinguishes 
between presidential and parliamentarian institutional designs. This dissertation, nonetheless, is a 
step along the way –not an end- to explain how strategic decision-making at the local level can 
further or reverse the consolidation of participatory democraticy, with the expectation that others 
also find it of sufficient interest to elaborate and build upon it.   
 
Selection of Countries, Municipalities and Citizens 
These four hypotheses develop an intellectual agenda designed to explain the mixed 
effects of decentralization on participatory democracy. In order to test these hypotheses, this 
dissertation employs two unprecedented public opinion data sets obtained through survey 
research in order to measure core democratic values and behaviors. Additionally, this study 
makes use of secondary data to capture the political, fiscal and administrative dimensions of 
decentralization, both at the national and local levels of analysis. These secondary data are 
complemented with a quantitative and qualitative assessment of local municipal regulations 
designed to the implementation and functioning of local institutions. Finally, this research makes 
extensive use of focus groups and elite interviews to explain the mechanisms behind the 
statistical correlations that are arise from a multiple selection of Hierarchical Linear Models. 
    The AmericasBarometer is one of the two public opinion data sets that will be analyzed 
in this study. This data set is obtained every two years through survey research by the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University, in nearly all countries in the 
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Americas. In my dissertation, I make use of the 2008 round of the AmericasBarometer to be able 
to compare citizens’ perceptions of and experiences with various elements of democracy in 22 
Latin American and Caribbean countries at different decentralization degrees. Map I-1 and Table 
I-1 show the countries selected for this study. These countries were carefully selected for two 
reasons. First, the region has undergone significant decentralization since 1980, triggered in most 
cases by the national democratic transitions that took place during the same decade (Daughters 
and Harper 2007). Second, most of the primary data is readily available in the 
AmericasBarometer database. These data were gathered by carrying out 37,035 face-to-face 
interviews in Latin America and the Caribbean.   
In order to collect the data, LAPOP uses a common survey sampling technique with the 
purpose of facilitating comparisons across countries. Samples are designed using probability 
methods with household quotas. After stratification and clustering the average sample size is 
1,500, with the exception of Bolivia (n = 3,000); Ecuador (n = 3,000); and Paraguay (n = 1,200).   
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Map I-1. Selected Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean  
(Source: Mapsof.Net) 
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Note: Freedom House Index inverted scale goes from 0 (low) to 12 (high). 
Sources: The World Bank www.worldbank.org ; Freedom House www.freedomhouse.org ; LAPOP www.lapopsurveys.org ; 
Daughters, Robert, and Leslie Harper. "Fiscal and Political Decentralization Reforms." In The State of State Reform in Latin 
America, by Eduardo Lora, 213-61. Palo Alto and Washington: Stanford University Press, 2007. 
 
Table I-1: Key Indicators in Latin America and the Caribbean 
Country n 
Land Area 
N (Sq. 
Km) 
Population 
2008 
(1,000) 
GNI per 
capita 
2008 
(PPP) 
GINI 
Coef. 
2008 
Freedom 
House 
2008 
(inverted) 
Year of 
Democratic 
Transition 
Argentina 1,486  2,766,890   39,746   14,000  51.3 10 1983 
Belize 1,552  22,966   294   5,940  n.a. 11 1981 
Bolivia 3,003  1,098,580   10,028   4,140  60.1 8 1982 
Brazil 1,497  8,511,965   195,138   10,080  57 10 1985 
Chile  1,527  756,950   16,770   13,250  54.9 12 1990 
Colombia 1,503  1,138,910   46,702   8,430  58.6 8 1958 
Costa Rica 1,500  51,100   4,550   10,960  49.8 12 1949 
Dominican 
Rep. 1,507  48,730   9,890   7,800  51.6 10 1966 
Ecuador 3,000  283,560   13,801   7,780  53.6 8 1979 
El Salvador 1,549  21,040   7,224   6,630  52.4 9 1984 
Guatemala 1,538  108,890   13,677   4,690  55.1 7 1985 
Guyana 2,514  214,970   736   3,030  44.6 9 1966 
Haiti 1,536  27,750   9,762   n.a.  59.2 5 n.a. 
Honduras 1,522  112,090   7,322   3,830  53.8 8 1982 
Jamaica 1,499  10,991   2,728   7,370  45.5 9 1962 
Mexico 1,560  1,972,550   107,677   14,340  46.1 9 1917 
Nicaragua 1,540  129,494   5,677   2,620  43.1 8 1990 
Panama 1,536  78,200   3,391   12,630  56.1 11 1989 
Paraguay 1,166  406,750   6,230   4,660  58.4 8 1989 
Peru 1,500  1,285,220   28,214   7,950  52 9 1980 
Uruguay 1,500  176,220   3,342   12,550  44.9 12 1985 
Venezuela 1,500  912,050   27,912   12,850  48.2 6 1958 
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The second public opinion database to be used in this study was created by harmonizing 
and merging 46 data sets obtained through survey research by the Programa de Auditoria 
Ciudadana (PAC) at the “Subsecretaría para la Reforma Institucional y Fortalecimiento de la 
Democracia” in Argentina. The Argentinean government designed this program with the purpose 
of improving citizens’ democratic life. Two years after the 2001 economic and political debacle in 
Argentina, the government decided to implement a program that could help rebuild the levels of 
trust in core democratic institutions that were lost during a long period of crisis. This program 
started by carrying out a continuous assessment of what they considered to be crucial elementals 
for the reestablishment of a full, liberal democracy. These elements can be summarized in the 
following aspects: (a) civic culture, (b) citizen participation, (c) governance, and (d) accountability.   
To assess these four elements, PAC carried out a series of public opinion surveys in 46 
Argentinean municipalities between 2003 and 2008. Three waves were necessary to conclude 
the data gathering.3 Each wave consisted of face-to-face public opinion interviews of 18,583 non-
institutionalized individuals, with a sample design that allows reaching conclusions at the 
municipal level. Respondents were selected by the probability method, and the sample design 
included area stratification and clustering. At the household, individuals were finally selected 
using sex and age quotas, taking only into consideration respondents of at least 18 years of age. 
The error margins oscillate between +/- 2.9 and +/- 4.8 depending upon the dispersion of the 
variable, with a confidence interval of 95 percent.   
Towns and cities in this study were non-randomly selected by the initiative of either 
national or local public officials. The 46 municipalities chosen for this research are distributed 
across 16 Argentinean provinces, and comprise more than 10 percent of the total Argentinean 
population. Map I-2 shows the provinces of this study and Table I-2 summarize some of the 
characteristics of the localities that will be analyzed throughout this dissertation.    
                                                      
3 A fourth wave was being implemented in early 2009, however, the current administration decided to terminate the 
program for undetermined reasons. 
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Map I-2. Provinces that Group the 46 Municipalities Selected for this Study  
(Source: Geology.com) 
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Table I-2: Provinces and Selected Argentinean Municipalities 
Province Municipality n 
Municipal 
Population N 
2001 
Municipal 
Budget 2007 
(Pesos/pc) 
Pergamino 401  99,193  467.49 
Olavarria 400  103,961  913.90 
Junin 400  88,664  795.04 
Morón 400  309,380  614.01 
Bragado 410  40,259  2078.78 
Villa Gesell 408  24,282  1795.45 
Balcarce 419  42,039  832.56 
General Belgrano 417  15,381  657.68 
General Pueyrredón 400  564,056  1083.23 
Bahía Blanca 400  284,776  625.05 
Buenos Aires 
San Fernando 400  151,131  721.23 
Catamarca San F. del Valle de Catamarca 400  141,260  725.09 
Monte Caseros 400  24,671  720.84 Corrientes Curuzú Cuatiá 408  36,390  333.66 
Chaco Roque Saenz Peña 400  88,164  1792.11 
Chubut Comodoro Rivadavia 462  137,061  1544.84 
Gualeguaychú 400  76,220  716.93 
Crespo 400  18,296  874.73 
Concepción del Uruguay 400  67,474  673.59 
Diamante 400  19,545  1688.41 
Villaguay 400  32,027  533.92 
Cerrito 400  4,653  530.57 
Concordia 400  141,971  524.76 
Entre Ríos 
Libertador San Martín 400  5,273  1409.25 
Formosa Pirané 400  19,124  820.29 
Jujuy Palpala 400  48,199  726.16 
La Pampa General Pico 400  53,352  1680.22 
Lujan de Cuyo 400  104,470  765.77 
Lavalle 400  32,129  399.24 
Godoy Cruz 400  182,977  495.43 
Las Heras 400  182,962  765.19 
Malargüe 400  23,020  3623.50 
Mendoza 
Guaymallén 400  251,339  676.38 
San Martín de los Andes 400  23,519  1936.51 
Villa La Angostura 400  7,526  3408.00 Neuquén 
Neuquén 459  203,190  2039.70 
Rawson 400  107,740  422.11 San Luis Rivadavia 400  76,150  512.15 
Rafaela 400  83,563  968.16 
Rosario 400  909,397  830.80 
Firmat 400  18,294  588.31 
Las Rosas 400  12,793  1100.43 
Santa Fe 
El Trebol 400  10,506  999.39 
Tucumán Yerba Buena 399  50,783  866.43 
Salta Coronel Moldes 400  4,194  3912.48 
Córdoba Villa Gral Belgrano 400  5,888  1718.02 
Sources: 2001 Census, municipal WebPages and Ministry of Interior www.mininterior.gov.ar   
 26 
While these public opinion databases provide powerful resources to find some of the 
correlates of decentralization and participatory democracy, the use of quantitative methods is less 
powerful for discovering the causal mechanisms behind these correlations. For this reason I 
carried out 24 semi-structured interviews during the spring of 2010, with the purpose of 
developing a second, qualitative phase of this dissertation. These interviews included councilors, 
historians, jurists and journalists that were crucial in my efforts to explain some of the 
mechanisms that connect political elite behavior with local participatory democracy. They also 
allowed me to collect information about how decision-making is carried out and implemented, 
what are the deadlocks in the process, and what is the generalized perception of local political 
elites about opposition groups and emerging competitors. 
Two Argentinean municipalities were selected for the semi-structured interviews: 
Concepción del Uruguay and Gualeguaychú. These two municipalities were carefully chosen 
using the Mill’s Method of Difference for comparison. This method involves choosing 
municipalities that are similar in ways that are treated as parameters but dissimilar with regard to 
the dependent variable. This method also allowed me to locate alternative explanatory variables 
(Mill 1970). Concepción del Uruguay and Gualeguaychú are two middle size towns located in the 
Province of Entre Rios, that share not only borders but also similar histories, population sizes, 
and levels of economic development. In spite of their remarkably similar socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics, these towns have produced dramatically different political 
outcomes. 
While Gualeguaychú enjoys high levels of citizen support for democracy, political 
participation, tolerance and interpersonal trust, a tradition of public apathy, little institutional and 
interpersonal trust and high levels of dissatisfaction with the way democracy works at the 
municipal level characterize Concepción del Uruguay. These facts suggest that even though 
these two towns share important characteristics, they have chosen different paths on their way to 
democratization. In this dissertation I bring to light some of the most plausible causes of these 
contrasting cases. Concepción del Uruguay and Gualeguaychú are shown in Map I-3.     
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Map I-3. The Contrast of Two Similar Cities: Concepción del Uruguay and Gualeguaychú  
(Source: Portal Oficial de Turismo de Concepción del Uruguay) 
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A Note on Hierarchical Linear Models 
This dissertation is mostly concerned about how context affects individual attitudes, 
opinions and behaviors. My primary objective is to determine whether or not the likelihood of 
developing a democratic citizenry is influenced by the degree of political, fiscal and administrative 
decentralization in the nations and municipalities selected for this study. This type of “hierarchical” 
theoretical construct requires of statistical techniques that are also hierarchical in order to avoid 
potential problems. Two of the most common problems that arise from failing to do so are 
ecological fallacy and atomistic fallacy, where “relationships observed in groups are assumed to 
hold for individuals” in the former, and “inferences about groups are incorrectly drawn from 
individual-level information” in the latter (Luke 2004:5).  
Statistically, disaggregating group-level information to the individual level to overcome the 
above pitfalls may also prove problematic. First, the un-modeled context information can end up 
in the individual error term, and because individuals nested within a context presumably have 
correlated errors, this may violate one of the basic assumptions of regression analysis. Second, 
by ignoring context, the model assumes that regression coefficients apply in the same way to all 
countries and municipalities. Finally, by including a fixed effect in the model to take into account 
the grouping of individuals (i.e. dummy variables) can lead to an over-specified model with low 
power and parsimony, in addition to ignoring the random variability associated with group-level 
characteristics (Luke 2004)  
The use of hierarchical linear models in this research allows then incorporating the 
effects of national and municipal factors on individual outcomes, which in the absence of 
multilevel statistical techniques would be difficult to assess. Standard errors are, moreover, more 
appropriately estimated by adjusting for the dependence among individual responses within 
countries and municipalities. This adjustment also permits “incorporating into the statistical model 
a unique random effect” for each level of analysis (Raundenbush and Bryk 2002). To give an 
example, in this dissertation I am interested in examining how voter turnout is influenced by 
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individual characteristics (e.g. age) as well as constitutional type of the individual’s country of 
residence (e.g. federal vs. unitary).  
This basic two-level arrangement can be modeled using the following system of 
equations: 
 
Equation I.1  
  Level 1: 
! 
Yij = "0 j + "1 j Xij + rij  
  Level 2: 
! 
"0 j = # 00 + # 01W j + u0 j
"1 j = #10 + #11W j + u1 j
 
 
Where we assume that 
! 
rij  is randomly distributed with homogenous variance across 
countries, that is 
! 
rij~ N(0,
! 
"2). These equations above not only show all of the independent and 
outcome variables, but also depict the hierarchical structure of the model. The level-1 equation 
above is similar to a standard OLS model; however, the subscript j indicates that a different level-
1 model is estimated for each of the j level-2 units (countries). In this example, each country can 
have a different average level of voter turnout (
! 
"0 j ) and a different effect of years of age on voter 
turnout (
! 
"1 j ). Hence, this model allows varying intercepts and slopes across countries; a 
variation known in statistical language as means and slopes as outcomes of level-2 independent 
variables (Luke 2004; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). 
Level-2 components of Equation I.1 show how each of the level-1 parameters are 
functions of level-2 independet variables. Thus 
! 
"0 j  is the individual-level intercept in country j; 
! 
" 00  is the mean value of voter turnout when system type equals 0; 
! 
" 01 is the voter turnout 
difference between federal and unitary systems; and 
! 
u0 j  is the unique effect of country j on voter 
turnout, holding 
! 
W j  constant. The second portion of the equation in the level-2 model predicts 
the effects on the slope of 
! 
Xij . In this portion, 
! 
"1 j  is the individual-level slope in country j ; 
! 
"10  is 
the mean value of the individual-level slope controlling for 
! 
W j ; 
! 
"11 is the effect of constitution 
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type on the individual-level slope; and 
! 
u1 j  is the unique effect of country j on the years of age 
slope holding 
! 
W j  constant.  
This system of equations can be specified in the following mixed-effect model: 
Equation I.2 
 
! 
Yij[" 00 +"10Xij +" 01W j +"11W jXij ]+ [u0 j + u1 j Xij + rij ] 
fixed        random 
 
This basic structure of the hierarchical linear model presented in Equation I.2 is the one 
that will be used to analyze the multilevel correlations in the data sets for Latin American in 
general and Argentina in particular. Of course, some model variations may be possible according 
to the hypotheses to be tested and the model to be specified. For instance, fully unconditional 
models can be specified with no predictors at level 1 or 2, in order to identify the intra-class 
correlation coefficient. This coefficient is useful to determine the proportion in the variance of the 
outcome that is to be explained across level-2 units. Another hierarchical linear model can be 
fitted assuming that level-1 intercepts vary across level-2 units, but not the level-1 slopes. Other 
model types can be specified when the outcome variable is dichotomous or categorical. 
Regardless of the specification of the hierarchical structure of the model, this dissertation makes 
extensive use of HLM to corroborate what has been repeatedly said in the social science 
literature: “context matters.”  
 
The Dissertation in Brief  
 To summarize, given the extant efforts and capital invested on decentralization, it is 
imperative to take a closer look at the mixed effects that these reforms can inflict on the young, 
and sometimes fragile Latin American democracies. For this purpose, this dissertation brings to 
light a portrait of citizen views, opinions and behaviors about some core elements of advanced 
democracies, such as democratic participation, legitimacy and governance at different degrees of 
state decentralization. Thanks to the wide variety of contexts, each Latin American and 
 31 
Caribbean country can be regarded as a natural “treatment,” where citizens are exposed to a 
multiplicity of institutional arrangements in the national-local continuum. Citizens are then 
evaluated to determine the effects of context on their levels of democratic citizenship.  
 Each of the chapters that follow provides some lessons but also suggest that this area of 
research is still underdeveloped. Chapter II shows that if citizens had been given the option to 
choose from decentralization or recentralization in 2008, Latin Americans would have leaned 
towards a recentralization of fiscal and administrative powers between the national and local 
levels of government. This finding challenges, to some extent, both policy-makers and 
international organizations’ expectations of a wide support for state decentralization. Additionally, 
these citizen preferences are partly responsible for some of the diverse outcomes of 
decentralization that will be analyzed in greater detail in Chapters III, IV and V.  
 But what are the factors that impede a wider support for decentralization among the 
citizenry? A main finding is that individuals who reside in countries with higher levels of human 
development tend to be more supportive of decentralization policies. In contrast, those individuals 
residing in countries with lower average levels of economic wealth, health, and education tend to 
prefer a centralized management of public funds as well as a national instead of local provision of 
goods and services. In sum, Chapter II finds that the “centralist tradition of Latin America” holds 
true for countries where governments fail to provide the essential elements of social welfare.  
 The literature on political institutions has continuously attempted to make robust 
generalizations like the ones put forward in Chapter II. However, some scholars convincingly 
argue that generalizations like these are very difficult to formulate in the decentralization domain 
because it is so rich in context that cases must be evaluated individually. Others argue that part 
of the decentralization literature suffers from poor definitions and operationalizations of the 
concept and scarce cross-national statistical data sets. A more pessimistic group even suggests 
giving up research efforts altogether, due to the irrelevance of decentralization as a means to 
consolidate democracies (Treisman 2008).  
 In this dissertation, however, I make use of two large public opinion data sets to present in 
Chapters III and IV, some local, national and even hemispherical inferences about the effects of 
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decentralization on some elements of democracy. Chapter III looks at the correlations between 
state reforms and citizen participation in 22 countries in the Americas, whilst Chapter IV carries 
out a similar analysis in 46 Argentinean municipalities. These chapters find two contrasting 
outcomes: On the one hand, relatively higher degrees of state decentralization are associated 
with lower levels of citizen participation in political parties and movements. On the other hand, as 
territories become more decentralized, citizens tend to engage more often in public protests 
demonstrations and riots. In this regard, the empirical evidence presented here corroborates my 
theory of political survival of local elites; where empowered local elite agents discourage citizen 
participation in institutions of political representation, and citizen principals, as a result, engage in 
mobilized forms of participation. Two other findings suggest that in the 46 Argentinean 
municipalities selected for this study, higher decentralization degrees are related to lower voter 
turnout, but also to higher rates of demand-making on municipal offices. 
 If the findings above were true, how can we explain that two territories with remarkably 
similar degrees of state decentralization can still produce dramatically different outcomes? To find 
a plausible answer, Chapter V carries out a comparative historical analysis of Concepción del 
Uruguay and Gualeguaychú in Argentina. Arguably, no other dyad in this study could provide 
more leverage in order to control for all possible causal factors, and at the same time provide 
such extremely different outcomes with respect to democratic citizenship. Resting heavily on 
Collier and Collier’s “critical juncture” (2002), Chapter V brings a key element to our 
understanding of decentralization: the size of local political elite coalitions. This chapter then 
determines how agency was delimited and how political actors made contingent choices upon the 
design and consolidation of current municipal governments in both cities. Chapter V makes an 
illuminating discovery.  
 Decentralization proves to be more successful with regards to goal of strengthening 
participatory democracy in towns where local civil society rather than local political elites or 
national leaders exert the most significant pressures for the transfers of power to their municipal 
government. In towns where “bottom-up” dynamics are exerted by a reduced group of political 
elites, institutions can be designed in such a way that sub-national power is concentrated in the 
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hands of a few instead of extending political rights and civil liberties among the citizenry. This 
finding corroborates my hypothesis that the structure of small local elite coalitions enables the 
establishment of institutions that restrict participatory democracy to political survival. In this 
sense, if small coalitions discover groups that could emerge as possible political competitors or 
are simply formed to oppose the incumbent’s process of decision-making, elites will choose 
actions to avoid citizen participation or even eliminate such groups. On the contrary, the structure 
of relatively larger elite coalitions that results from “citizen-up” decentralization dynamics forges a 
wide, stronger participatory democracy. Thus, participation can mean a masquerade used by 
undemocratic leaders to exert fiscal pressures in some territories, but it can also mean a true path 
to sub-national democratic consolidation. But how can we discern between the success and 
failure of decentralization?  
 Part of the answer to this question is shown in Chapter VI. In this final chapter I use an 
unprecedented set of citizen assessments of Argentinean local governments to build three 
indicators of decentralization success. These indicators comprise the following citizen 
assessments: (a) Perception of Municipal Performance; (b) Perception of Municipal 
Administrative Efficacy; and (c) Perceptions about Municipal Freedom from Corruption. All four 
indicators relate to a greater concept of Democratic Governance. Results in this policy-oriented 
chapter show, once again, that municipal provisions that favor direct democracy and increase 
public accountability have mixed impacts on democratic governance. Some of the municipal 
regulations evaluated in this chapter are the public entities in charge of processing citizen 
complaints, specific mechanisms for the evaluation of municipal performance, rules that allow the 
accountability of public officials, registries of public official behavior, referendums, public 
audiences, mandate recalls, and the like.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
II. CITIZEN SUPPORT FOR STATE DECENTRALIZATION 
 
Decentralization brings the government closer to the people; however, do people want to 
be closer to the government? Decentralization advocates and skeptics have historically disagreed 
upon the impact that such reform has on society. What they do seem to agree with, however, is 
the fact that governments, policy-makers and international organizations have enthusiastically 
supported decentralization without regard of geography, political ideology or regime type. In post-
Communist Eastern Europe, Latin America, post-Apartheid South Africa and even China, 
institutional reforms have modified in some way or another how power is allocated across 
different governmental levels. More provincial and municipal leaders are being popularly elected, 
more transfers of responsibilities for health care, education and the environment are being 
transferred, and more municipalities are collecting and spending fiscal resources than ever 
before. These changes have been particularly evident in the Latin American region, where 
international development agencies, such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development 
Bank and the United States Agency for International Development have turned decentralization 
into the most widely spread and resource intensive of all democracy and governance programs 
(Falleti 2010; Goldstone et al. 2008; Treisman 2007). 
Along with democracy, decentralization in Latin America has come to be seen not only by 
development agencies but also by policy-makers as a cure for a remarkable range of political and 
social ills. When the government is closer to the people, proponents argue, leaders should be 
able to satisfy with more precision territorially different citizen needs. Also, citizens should benefit 
from the increased competition between local governments to attract investors that results from 
decentralization. Even ethnic conflicts should be reduced because decentralization can be 
designed to satisfy limited demands for autonomy. But do people want to be closer to the 
government? In spite of the wide political support and the alleged benefits reported in the 
literature, few studies, if any, have been conducted to explore what citizens think about 
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decentralization. If this reform is intended to improve the relationship between the government 
and the citizenry, it may be crucial to understand not only the political support but also the citizen 
will to bring about decentralization. In other words, the degree of citizen support for 
decentralization may provide some of the answers to the question regarding the mixed effects of 
decentralization on democracy, which is the main topic of this dissertation.   
In this context, do Latin American citizens prefer decentralization or recentralization? 
That is, should more obligations and more money be assigned to the municipality, or should the 
national government be allowed to assume more municipal obligations and services? Is citizen 
support for decentralization/recentralization symmetrical across Latin American countries? If not, 
what factors can explain this asymmetry? This chapter shows that despite governmental 
pressures and the efforts of international agencies to bring about decentralization, Latin American 
public opinion remains divided, and even a little inclined towards state recentralization. Some of 
the factors that explain these “light centralist preferences” are: (a) Country levels of human 
development; (b) Social capital and democratic governance (i.e. experiences with local 
governments); and (c) Socio-economic and demographic variables.  
In the following section, I will argue that the most common causes of decentralization 
mentioned in the literature make little, if any reference to the study of citizen support for this state 
reform. I will discuss next that even though Latin American public opinion remains slightly in favor 
of recentralization, there is wide variation in citizen support for decentralization not only among 
individuals, but also across countries. The subsequent section hypothesizes about the factors 
that can explain these variations. After explaining my approach to instrumentation, I will explain 
the statistical procedures that will be used to assess my theory of light centralist preferences in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Based on the works of Véliz (1980) and Lipset (1981), this 
theory argues that Latin American citizens tend to favor strong central governments, due to the 
historical construction of their societies that lack fundamental elements, such as feudal 
experiences, religious non-conformities, and the ideological, social and political developments 
associated with the industrial revolution, in comparison to their European counterparts. However, 
there should be an ample variation of citizen support for state decentralization across Latin 
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American countries that should be especially associated to levels of human development. 
Specifically, societies with relatively lower education levels, higher mortality rates, and economic 
insecurity should be more likely to breed individuals that support strong central governments, due 
to a self-recognition of the limited abilities that citizens have to fulfill the duties decentralization 
brings with it. In contrast, as the levels of health, wealth and education increase, citizens start to 
feel they are better equipped to exert closer control and oversight over public decision-making.   
Finally, the last section of this chapter concludes by showing the implications for theory and 
practice of the study of citizen preferences of state decentralization/recentralization.     
 
Finding Support for State Decentralization    
 A large section of the decentralization literature has been dedicated to the study of the 
theoretical ideas of decentralization as the most adequate form of organization for the exercise of 
democracy. Most of these theories can be nested in three large dimensions: (a) The economic 
dimension; (b) The political dimension; and (c) The administrative dimension. Governments and 
international organizations alike have used these theories to base their decisions about 
decentralization or recentralization. However, a direct assessment of citizens’ willingness to favor 
or oppose decentralization reforms remains, in my view, largely absent form the literature. The 
study of public opinion on decentralization is relevant because the development of “effective 
democracy” depends in important ways on the recognition of the citizen will by political elites. In 
this section, I will first review the often-cited scholarship on the causes of political support for 
decentralization, and then explain some of the potential causes behind the diverse degrees of 
Latin American citizen support for decentralization. 
 One of the political thinkers that pioneered the study of decentralization was Alexis de 
Tocqueville. This author envisioned the need for local governments by noting that even if 
individuals are equally capable to govern themselves, they submit to society not because of 
inferiority, but because they think and know it is useful, and such union cannot exist without a 
ruling power (de Tocqueville 1961 [1835]). The “almost natural” primary form of this ruling power 
would be the community, where people directly gather to decide what should be collectively 
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addressed, what should be contributed, and who should be responsible for carrying out the 
collective mandate. Communitarian society exists in all towns, independently from their customs 
and laws. Only at the community, thanks to direct democracy, people can exercise their self-
government rights; but among all liberties that of the community is precisely the most exposed to 
power invasions, and to successfully defend it, it is necessary that communes have fully 
developed under broader national ideas and customs. For Tocqueville, the community was a sort 
of “laboratory for democracy.”  
 According to this observer, the daily needs of New Englanders were resolved at the 
community level. The county and the state had legislative powers but their decisions needed to 
be made through the (elected) community officers. Citizens elected representatives at higher 
levels of government only to solve those problems that basic organizations did not or could not 
resolve themselves. This logic was the basis for the federal organization of the United States  
(Finot 2001). Tocqueville also observes, however, that the United States represents a unique 
case of political organization only sustained in democracy. This could have been possible only 
because the founding fathers were originally wealthy, had advanced education levels, shared 
order and morality habits, and migrated with their women and children. These observations 
constitute the basis for modern scholarship on decentralization. Scholars nowadays base the 
study of decentralization on its fiscal or economic, and political and administrative dimensions. In 
the following lines, I will present the highlights of each dimension and discuss how they relate to 
the political support for such reforms of the state. 
 
The Economic Dimension   
Modern scholarship on the economic dimension of support for decentralization is 
explained through at least 4 theories: (a) Fiscal federalism; (b) Public choice; (c) The principal-
agent model; and (d) Neo-institutionalism and social capital. Proponents of fiscal federalism 
argue that decentralization can be implemented to partly solve the allocation of public goods 
dilemma. Paul Samuelson (1954) was one of the first authors to note this dilemma. While the 
market system allows both recognizing with more precision individual preferences and satisfying 
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them with private goods, provision of public goods responds to aggregate instead of individual 
preferences, creating an efficiency problem. For this reason, in those territorial arrangements 
where the allocation of public goods fails to satisfy individual preferences, tax evasion should be 
higher.  Years later, Charles Tiebout (1956) stated that this efficiency problem could be mitigated 
if a large number of public goods are locally provided; in this case, consumers could vote “with 
their feet,” that is, they could move to the community that best responded to their preferences 
(this idea was later elaborated upon by Hirschman in 1970). Based on these views, governments 
started to decentralize but they soon encountered problems. Demand for public goods did not 
necessarily coincide with the jurisdiction of each governmental level and it was unfeasible to 
change the size of the jurisdictions to solve this problem, since optimum sizes proved to be 
different for each type of service (Finot 2001). Nevertheless, decentralized processes were still 
more efficient than their centralized counterparts because local governments were still better 
endowed to recognize territorially differentiated demands.  
With the purpose of lessening efficiency problems that markets alone cannot solve, 
Dennis Mueller (1979, 1984) developed a second economic dimension of support for 
decentralization in his public choice theory. According to this theory, the quest for individual 
satisfaction is not enough to reach an optimum where improving an individual’s situation is 
impossible without worsening somebody else’s situation (Pareto optimum). Indeed, trying to 
exclusively improve individual’s welfare may conduce to steal rather than exchange, producing 
the worst scenario; that is, people producing and consuming less because they would have to 
invest large amounts of resources to take care of their properties.  
Public goods, as a result, are basically cooperative solutions to the problem mentioned 
above (or at least the second best option), because they are more efficient when competitive 
solutions fail. In principle, these agreements are more efficient in small communities because in 
those cases, individuals can internalize the costs of complying and enforcing agreements, that 
otherwise have to be covered by the government through taxes (Coase 1960). As communities 
grow larger, there is an increasing need for representation and public administration to enforce 
agreements. However, neither politicians nor public officials are immune from the quest of 
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individual, private gains. For this reason, the provision of public goods and services is thought to 
be more efficient in small, decentralized settings, not only because specific individual needs can 
be more accurately satisfied, but also because political and administrative intermediation is less 
necessary. Thus the ideal solution would be one in which citizens directly decide what local public 
goods they will use knowing beforehand the costs of doing so. 
A third way to explain the economic dimension of decentralization is through the 
principal-agent model. In this model, governments, as well as individuals, give certain degrees of 
freedom to bureaucracies to produce public services (Heymann 1988; Hiskey 2010). As Finot 
notes, the principal-agent model is appropriate to explain decentralized states, because local 
governments work both as the “heads of autonomies” and as “national government agents” 
(2001:31). In the former case, citizens (principals) “theoretically gain more leverage over those 
agents [local governments] most directly responsible for such critical areas as basic service 
provision “(Hiskey 2010:30). The latter would be a case where a national government defines a 
policy but encounters that it would be more convenient if its execution were decentralized. Even 
though local governments have more information about local realities, they also have their own 
priorities. Thus, if local leaders use national resources based on their priorities rather than 
national priorities, the principal-agent model could be at risk. To avoid this potential problem, 
national governments and citizens should elaborate detailed contracts and complex follow-up and 
evaluation systems that would not be necessary in the absence of such conflict of interests (Finot 
2001).  
Finally, the neo-institutionalism and social capital theory argues that even though the 
neoclassic approach is fundamentally right, the correct functioning of the economy is only 
possible through the establishment of the appropriate norms and mechanisms (North 1995). Such 
institutions may be either formal or informal, but the decisive component to their correct 
functioning is actors’ behavior. A seminal contribution to the decentralization literature is the study 
of decentralization in Italy.  Putnam’s exploration of why after a symmetric change in the rules of 
the game in Italy (i.e. decentralization) some regions progressed more than others, found that in 
the most progressive regions there was a strong tradition of reciprocity and a culture of horizontal 
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cooperation (1994). In this way, Putnam’s reasoning contributed to the concept of “social capital” 
that basically explains the capacity of a society to develop cooperative solutions to common 
problems. This characteristic may be a product of a large process of social constructivism, but 
John Durston (1999) shows that it might also be possible to create it even in places where social 
capital has been traditionally incipient. The problem, however, is that trying to create social capital 
in places with low civic traditions may exacerbate pre-existing conflicts, generating as a result 
negative outcomes to the socialization process (Armony 2004). 
The four theories advanced in this section employed to explain the economic dimension 
of support for decentralization make little reference about the response that the alleged 
beneficiaries would give to an attempt of vertically relocating fiscal powers. In this chapter, I argue 
that the degree of citizen support for fiscal decentralization is contingent upon the capacity that 
principals believe to have to control the use of public monies by governmental authorities or other 
agents. In this view, individuals residing in countries with higher averages of education, wealth 
and health should feel better equipped to exert closer control over the tax structure of those 
countries. In contrast, relatively less developed principals should be more comfortable letting the 
“experts” in the nation’s capital city take care of the national budget and the allocation of public 
monies. Moreover, principals in less developed contexts should be more concerned with the 
satisfaction of their individual basic needs instead worrying about the collective decision-making 
processes of public economic resources.    
 
  The Political and Administrative Dimensions  
In general terms, the political and administrative dimensions of decentralization see 
support for decentralization as a function of (a) Electoralist Approach; (b) The Role of 
Demographic Forces; (c) Decentralization as a Result of Democratization; and (d) International 
Factors. The electoralist approach studies the incentives politicians have to decentralize, usually 
as a result of the structure of electoral institutions, the internal structure of political parties and 
politicians’ strategic competitions to advance their careers (Montero and Samuels 2004). Such 
approaches suggest that the incentives political leaders have to either decentralize or recentralize 
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depend upon the chances they have to win in electoral contest, paying careful consideration to 
the importance of whether elections are national or sub-national, and the relative importance that 
elections have for career advancement. As Montero and Samuels argue “these approaches 
assume both that existing political hierarchies exert a path-dependent effect on politicians’ 
choices and politicians are strategic and forward-looking and may attempt to redesign existing 
institutions to serve an expected future political goal” (2004:21). In other words, politicians may 
support decentralization if it helps to fulfill their political objectives (i.e. vote-maximizing or office-
maximizing behaviors). 
The role of demographic forces explains that support for decentralization is related to the 
increasing urbanization levels that alter municipal leaders’ incentives to pressure for state reforms 
(Samuels 2004). In particular, high levels of urbanization increase the costs of providing local 
services from the central level of government. As a result, decentralization is seen as a tool to 
increase efficiency in the management and delivery of public goods and services. The 
demographic forces approach has also proven useful to explain the limits to decentralization. In 
poorer territorial settings, for instance, decentralizing revenue authority clearly cannot help 
governments to develop local economies. In contrast, wealthier sub-national units may pressure 
for an increasing fiscal autonomy because they want to be able to control more of the locally 
generated revenues. In this case, national legislators may face contradicting pressures to 
decentralize or not. For this reason, governments have to apply complex formulas for both 
revenues assignments and administrative distributions. 
Part of the literature on support for decentralization has focused on democratization to 
explain such reform. The logic behind this association is that decentralization opens up local 
spaces for public contestation and electoral participation at the sub-national level (Beer 2004). 
Thus several scholars have suggested that decentralization aids democratic consolidation 
because citizen pressures increase the demand for more responsive governments (Nickson 
1995; Souza 1997). However,  Montero and Samuels (2004) convincingly argue that correlation is 
insuffiecient to establish causation, because several studies show that in some territories, 
democratization preceded decentralization. It is important to note, however, that democratization 
 42 
is important to determine how policy authorities and resources ar decentralized. For this reason, 
as scholars suggest, “we require more nuanced hypotheses to tease out the complex linkages 
between regime change and decentralization” (Montero and Samuels 2004:18). In sum, the 
works advanced to explain the linkage between decentralization and democratization require 
additional efforts to collect times series data or make qualitative comparative historical analysis in 
order to best determine causation.  
Finally, the international factors approach discusses decentralization reforms as a result 
of market economy openness to foreign investments, the trans-nationalization of production, and 
the advocacy of international financial institutions for structural adjustment programs. However, 
the empirical evidence shows mixed supportive evidence for such claims. For instance, the 
privatization wave occurred during the late 1980s and early 1990s involved in some places sub-
national governments, it did not accompany the pre-1990 episodes of decentralization, and even 
in some cases such as Argentina and Brazil, financial liberalization followed fiscal and 
administrative decentralization. Foreign direct investment (FDI) created opportunities for 
municipal governments to attract international capitals, however, not all countries have taken 
advantage of this opportunity in the same way and even in some cases, empirical evidence for 
the association of FDI and decentralization is scant. Lastly, in an assessment carried out by 
Falleti (1999), the author found little evidence backing the claim that international financial 
institutions recommended fiscal decentralization as part of the broader set of policies found in the 
“Washington Consensus”  (see also Montero and Samuels 2004).   
Just as the study of support for decentralization’s economic dimension, citizens’ 
willingness to either approve or reject the political and administrative dimensions has been 
understudied. A crucial hypothesis in this regard is that individuals living in relatively more 
developed contexts should be better endowed to closely monitor and shape the behavior of their 
agents. As a result, principals should be willing to support a move towards decentralization in 
contexts of greater development. Conversely, principals living in underdeveloped contexts should 
be able self-recognize their limited ability to play a more preponderant role in the political and 
administrative decision-making that decentralization reforms bring with them.    
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Citizen Support for State Decentralization in Latin America or Centralism Déjà vu?  
As previously suggested, the aforementioned causes of decentralization make only 
implicit associations between decentralization and the citizen’s will to support the strategy. This 
author has not found, however, any comprehensive regional or global study of citizen preferences 
in the allocation of fiscal and administrative responsibilities between the national and local levels 
of government. Since the congruence between what people feel and how governments behave is 
quintessential in a democracy, it may very well be the case that the current degree of 
decentralization in the Latin American region is at least partly related to citizen preferences for it. 
For if rational elected public officials in charge of decentralization policies pursue political survival, 
they should be connected, in one way or another, with the elector’s opinions about who should 
manage public funds and who should be responsible for the provision of public goods and 
services. Drawing upon the theories put forward in the previous section, I present in the following 
lines five hypothesis that I think best collectively explain different degrees of citizen support for 
state decentralization in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
 
The Centralist Inheritance. This first hypothesis is based on the seminal work advanced 
by Claudio Véliz in “The Centralist Tradition of Latin America” (1980). In this work, Véliz 
essentially argues that Latin American societies will remain centralist for some time because they 
have not experienced northwestern Europe’s social constructivist factors. These factors are: a) 
The absence of the feudal experience from the Latin American tradition; b) The absence of 
religious unconformity and therefore the presence of a dominant, centralist religion; c) The 
absence of the circumstances circumscribed to the Industrial Revolution; and d) The absence of 
the circumstances circumscribed in the French Revolution that so dramatically transformed the 
European society. In this sense, Véliz suggests that the proliferation of centralist, authoritarian 
regimes is not a product of aberration; rather, it is a “manifestation of a style of political behavior, 
a secular disposition of Latin American society that under different forms… will be with us for 
some time yet” (1980:3).  
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Therefore, if Véliz is right, there should be some empirical evidence to corroborate his 
assertions that Latin Americans favor centralism over decentralism. Although Véliz wrote his 
piece 30 years ago, his assertions may hold true today because “centralism has had a most 
powerful and specific impact on the behavior of Latin Americans” during the past five centuries 
(1980:6). In this dissertation, I thus expect to find, on average, greater support for the idea that 
the national government in lieu of the local government, should manage more public funds and 
administer more governmental responsibilities. However, a cautionary note must be introduced: 
Even though I expect to find, on average, a slight preference for recentralization, Véliz’s theory 
falls short to explain why there is so much variation on support for decentralization not only 
across countries but also among individual principals. The following four hypotheses are 
designed in such a way as to take into consideration that Latin American countries and 
individuals within countries may also differ with respect to their degree of support for state 
decentralization.   
 
Human Development. The factor that I think best explains the expected wide variation of 
support for decentralization within and across Latin American countries is human development. 
Within countries, factors such as individual education, income, and the geographical location of 
residence should be associated with the degree of citizen support for decentralization. This 
expectation is based upon Saymour Martin Lipset’s seminal work Political Man, in which he notes 
that low education, low participation in political or voluntary organizations of any type, little 
reading, isolated occupations, economic insecurity and authoritarian family patterns” (1981:476) 
are some of the most of important factors contributing to centralist, authoritarian governments. If 
Lipset’s claim were true, I would expect then to find that less well-off individuals regard strong 
central governments as important providers of the basic elements needed for human 
development.  
In this view, less developed individuals in terms of health, wealth and education should 
feel ill equipped to carry out the duties and responsibilities that come associated with 
decentralization processes, and may prefer to leave these actions to the connoisseurs at the 
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national capital. Moreover, these individuals should be more concerned about satisfying their 
basic needs instead of thinking about how to exercise more control and how participate more 
actively in collective decision-making at the local level. In contrast, I anticipate that wealthier and 
more educated individuals prefer to have greater control over their contributions to society 
(usually fees and taxes), and hence show greater support for decentralization. In other words, 
once individuals think they have satisfied their basic needs, they may feel ready to participate 
more actively in decision-making and oversight activities that result from the empowerment of 
local governments.  
 This logic may also hold across countries. As Lipset and many others have argued “the 
average wealth, degree of industrialization and urbanization, and level of education is much 
higher for the more democratic countries;” (1981:33) where power is shared instead of 
concentrated in authoritarian, central offices. As a result, citizen support for state decentralization 
or recentralization should vary according to the average country levels of health, wealth 
education. In this research, I expect to find that in countries with higher average levels of human 
development dwell individuals who show greater support for decentralization and power-sharing 
systems. In contrast, centralist opinions should be evident in countries with lower average levels 
of health, wealth and education.  
  
Social Capital. Lipset’s Political Man also notes that “low participation in political or 
voluntary organizations of any type” is associated with an increasing support for centralist, 
authoritarian leaders. Much of the literature on social capital has focused on its impact on 
democracy and democratic governance. The main argument is that individuals who participate in 
communitarian activities or voluntary associations learn to voice their needs and complaints, and 
at the same time increase their tolerance towards those who oppose the majority’s will. 
Externally, these associations allow individuals to organize and express their interests and 
demands on government, while at the same time protect them from abuses of power by their 
political leaders. In short, participation and civic engagement develop the individual 
characteristics necessary to promote democratic self-government, since in these “schools for 
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democracy” citizen learn to run meetings, speak in public, organize projects, write letters and 
debate public issues  (Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1994).  
If social capital were positively related to the concept of self-government, I then anticipate 
that those individuals who participate more often in political or voluntary associations of any type 
show greater support for state decentralization. In this view, civically engaged citizens would 
rather be “closer” to public funds and administrative responsibilities as to be able to manage them 
by themselves. In contrast, I expect that people divorced from communities, occupations and 
associations show greater support for recentralization. Low levels of civic engagement may be 
due to intrinsic individual factors such as dissatisfaction with life, or extrinsic factors such as low 
levels of interpersonal trust. Whatever the most plausible reason is, or a combination of both, 
citizens in scenarios of disconnection with their communities should prefer that the national 
government manage more funds and responsibilities in comparison to the community or the local 
government.  
 
Democratic Governance. One of the most cited benefits of democratic systems, is that 
they allow citizens to hold their leaders accountable. Democratic governments are accountable if 
citizens can discern whether politicians are acting on their best interests and sanction them 
appropriately, rewarding officials who perform well, usually through reelection, and replacing them 
if they fail to do so (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999). In addition to electoral accountability, citizens 
may also reward not only elected officials but also bureaucrats by supporting their initiatives and 
allowing them to manage more public funds and administrative responsibilities. Accordingly, if 
citizens perceive inefficient governance at one level, they may prefer that public funds and 
administrative responsibilities be managed at a different level.  
From this analysis, it could be expected that those individuals who are relatively more 
satisfied with the services provided by the local government show greater support for state 
decentralization. Conversely, those citizens who perceive that the national government is being 
more efficacious with respect to the management of public funds and administrative 
responsibilities should be more supportive of recentralization policies. Finally, as shown 
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somewhere else, political trust is another governance factor associated with the different levels of 
support for decentralization among individuals (see Montalvo 2008). Political trust is shaped by 
individuals’ perceptions of and experiences with governmental institutions responsible for 
ensuring the quality of democratic governance. Thus, as political trust in the municipality 
increases, citizen support for state decentralization should increase as well. On the other hand, 
citizens should exhibit greater support for recentralization if they have higher levels of political 
trust for the national level of government.  
 
Ethnic Divisions.  According to consociational theory, the adoption of decentralized forms 
of government facilitates social stability in multinational states (Lijphart 1969; Lijphart 1977; Norris 
2008). The mechanism behind this association shows that decentralized constitutions “which 
strengthen state’s rights and regional autonomy represent some of the most important strategies, 
as these safeguard some guaranteed areas of self-government for geographically concentrated 
minorities” (Norris 2008:157). Lijphart suggests that if political boundaries of sub-national 
governments reflect social or ethnic boundaries, then multicultural societies can become 
homogenous within their boundaries, promoting political stability and making it easier to 
aggregate diverse preferences to the larger state. 
If citizens of multinational countries are aware that decentralization can satisfy their 
demands for autonomy, they may be willing to show high levels of support for decentralization. In 
this context, it may be possible to find greater support for decentralization among indigenous and 
African Latin-American populations, in comparison to white, mestizo or other racial groups. An 
alternative hypothesis, however, may be that if the product of decentralization in multiethnic 
nations empowers an ethnic local group in detriment of other groups, then those groups that lose 
power relative to the beneficiaries of decentralization may be willing to show higher levels of 
support for state recentralization. In this view, for instance, indigenous or black populations in 
Latin America may prefer recentralization to decentralization, if white or mestizo groups are the 
dominant leaders at the municipal government and use their power to oppress other races.    
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In Search for Evidence of Citizen Support for Decentralization 
The five hypotheses advanced above constitute the research program for this chapter. 
These factors associated with citizen support for decentralization in Latin America and the 
Caribbean are not exhaustive; rather, they are intended to shed some light about plausible 
explanations for the willingness that people have to embrace the strategy. In order to test the 
hypothesis presented in this chapter, I query the AmericasBarometer 2008 data set to 
operationalize measures that I think best capture the Latin American public opinion on 
decentralization. This data set contains responses of 37,035 individuals in 22 countries in the 
region.1 In the next lines, I will describe the variables I use for each hypothesis and how these 
variables are operationalized.  
 
Dependent Variables. There are four dependent variables in this study to analyze the 
average citizen support for decentralization in Latin America and the Caribbean: (a) Citizen 
support for administrative decentralization; (b) Citizen support for fiscal decentralization; (c) a 
Composite index of citizen support for decentralization; and (d) a Trichotomous measure of 
citizen support for decentralization. The first two variables were obtained using the instrument in 
Appendix A1, while the third and fourth variables are a construct of the other two. The wording to 
obtain the variable Citizen Support for Administrative Decentralization is the following: “Taking 
into account the public services available in this country, who should assume more 
responsibilities?” The original 1 to 5 scale was recoded to a scale that ranges from 0 to 100, 
where 0 means “much more to the national government,” 25 means “something more to the 
national government,” 50 means “the same amount to the national government and the 
municipality,” 75 means “somewhat more to the municipality,” and 100 means “much more to the 
municipality.”  
                                                      
1 These countries are: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. For more information see Chapter I and www.lapopsurveys.org 
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Similarly, the wording to obtain the variable Citizen Support for Fiscal Decentralization is 
as follows: “And taking into account the existing economic resources in the country: Who should 
administer more money?” This variable, as well as the Composite Index, uses the same scale as 
the one used in Citizen Support for Administrative Decentralization. Finally, the Trichotomous 
Measure is coded as -100 for “support for recentralization,” 0 for “support for an even 
distribution,” and 100 for “support for decentralization.” This variable was created based on 
condensing the options “much more and something more to the national government” in one 
category, the “same amount to the national government and to the municipality” in a second 
category, and “much more and something more to the municipality” in a third category. 
Condensing these options will allow classifying individuals according to their preferences about 
decentralization, recentralization or even distribution. There are three features that are worth 
noting about these variables and scales. First, they only tap into the administrative and fiscal 
dimensions of decentralization, and leave aside the political dimension. With very few exceptions, 
mayors are nowadays being popularly elected across all Latin American countries, giving to 
political decentralization dimension the empirical characteristic of a constant instead of a variable. 
The administrative and fiscal dimensions of decentralization, on the other hand, are 
under permanent negotiation between the nation/state and municipal levels of government. 
Second, the wording used for the questions makes clear reference to the “existing or available 
services and resources.” With this wording, respondents should understand that no more taxes, 
bureaucracies or institutions are being created; rather, they have to choose from decentralization 
and recentralization in a zero-sum game. Of course tax-bases and institutional structures can be 
studied from a non-zero sum game perspective; however, in this chapter I am interested in citizen 
support for the occurrence of power transfers between the national and local levels of 
government instead of the willingness to create more taxes or institutions. Finally, since support 
for decentralization is studied from a zero-sum perspective, respondents have three fundamental 
options that compose the Trichotomous Measure: (a) support decentralization; (b) support an 
equal distribution of resources and responsibilities; and (c) support recentralization.   
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Independent Variables. In accord with the theory of this chapter, the explanatory 
variables will center around: (a) Human development; (b) Social capital; (c) Democratic 
governance; and (d) Ethnicity. In terms of Human Development this chapter uses both country-
level and individual-level measures. The country-level construct is a composite statistic crated by 
the United Nations Development Programme that classifies countries according to their level of 
life expectancy, education, and per-capita GDP as an indicator of standard of living.2 This index 
goes from 0 that means, “least developed” to 1 that means “most developed.” The individual-level 
human development variables are education that goes from 0 to 18 and quintiles of wealth that 
goes from 1 to 5.  While the former measures the number of years of completed education, the 
latter measures the quintal of wealth in which an individual is located.3 A control variable used in 
this section is Role of the State Index. This composite statistic measures the idea that citizens 
have about the role of the state in the economy and goes from 0, which means “Strongly 
disagrees” that the state (government) should have a role in the economy to 100, which means 
“Strongly agrees.”  
The variables to measure Social Capital are: Municipal Meetings Attendance that is 
coded as 0 if the respondent “Has not attended” and 1 if the respondent “Has attended;” 
Demand-Making on Municipal Government coded as 0 if respondent “Has not demanded” and 1 
if the respondent “Has demanded;” and Communitarian Participation that goes from 0 if the 
respondent “Never participated” to 100 if the respondent “Participates at least once a week.” It is 
worth noting that the first two social capital variables are dichotomous, while the third variable is 
continuous. As it can be observed, these variables measure participation not only in the 
municipality, but also in organizations of the civil society. Next, the variables that measure 
Democratic Governance are: Satisfaction with Local Democracy that goes from 0 if the 
respondent thinks, “the services provided by the municipality are very poor” to 100 if the 
respondent thinks, “the services provided by the municipality are very good;” Trust in the 
                                                      
2 For more information see: http://hdr.undp.org/en/  
3 For more information about how the quintals of wealth were created, see:  Abby Córdova, Nota metodológica: midiendo 
riqueza relativa utilizando indicadores sobre bienes del hogar (Nashville: El Barómetro de las Américas, 1 19, 2009).  
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Municipal Government that goes form 0 if the respondent  “Does not trust it at all” to 100 if the 
respondent “Trusts it a lot;” and Efficacy of the National Government which is an index that how 
efficacious is the government in the eyes of respondents, and goes from 0, representing the 
lowest level of efficacy to 100, representing the highest efficacy level. 
  
Table II-1: Descriptive Statistics from LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2008 and UNDP HDI 2007 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL 
  VARIABLE NAME CODE N MEAN SD MIN MAX 
Dependent Variables 
 Citizen Support for Administrative Decentralization LGL2AR 33682 49.05 33.45 0 100 
 Citizen Support for Fiscal Decentralization LGL2BR 33529 48.13 34.26 0 100 
 Composite Index of Citizen Support for Decentralization DECINDEX 34399 48.62 29.96 0 100 
 Trichotomous Measure of Citizen Support for Decentralization TRICH 34399 -2.10 84.86 -100 100 
Socioeconomics and Demographics 
 Education EDS 36694 8.92 4.47 0 18 
 Age Q2S 36939 38.91 15.8 16 101 
 Female MUJER 37035 0.51 0.5 0 1 
 Quintiles of Wealth QUINTALL 36817 2.93 1.41 1 5 
 Size of City/Town of Residence TAMANOR 37035 2.71 1.58 1 5 
Ethnicity 
 White WHITE 36018 0.25 0.43 0 1 
 Mestizo MESTIZO 36018 0.46 0.5 0 1 
 Indigenous INDIG 36018 0.07 0.26 0 1 
 Black  BLACK 36018 0.14 0.35 0 1 
 Other OTHER 36018 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Support for Democracy 
 Churchillian Democracy ING4R 34637 71.07 28.84 0 100 
 Preference for Authoritarian Leader AUT1R 34851 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Social Capital 
 Municipal Meetings Attendance NP1R 36597 0.11 0.31 0 1 
 Demand-Making on Municipal Government NP2R 36645 0.13 0.33 0 1 
 Communitarian Participation CP8R 36534 15.48 26.76 0 100 
Governance Indicators 
 Satisfaction with Local Services SGL1R 34620 49.85 23.49 0 100 
 Trust in the Municipal Government B32R 35746 49.98 30.29 0 100 
 Efficacy of National Government  EFICGOV 35886 43.68 26.81 0 100 
Role of the State in the Economy 
 Role of the State Index ROLST 35917 72.3 22.37 0 100 
        
COUNTRY-LEVEL 
  VARIABLE NAME CODE N MEAN SD MIN MAX 
 Human Development Index 2007 HDI07 22 0.78 0.08 0.53 0.88 
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Finally, the Ethnicity variables are dummies for Mestizo, Indigenous, Black and Other, 
using White as base category. According to the literature review and the hypothesis advanced in 
this chapter, four other variables need to be taken into consideration when exploring citizen 
support for state decentralization. The first two variables are associated with the socio-
demographic characteristics of the population: (a) Sex, (b) Size of the city/town of residence; 
while the other two are related to democratic values: (c) Support for democracy, and (d) 
Authoritarian preferences. Female is a dummy variable that taps into sex, and is coded as 1 if 
“Female” and 0 if “Male;” the Size of the City/ Town of Residence goes from 1 that means “Rural 
Area” to 5 that means “Metropolitan Area;” Support for Democracy taps into the “Churchillian” 
concept and goes from 0 that means that the respondent “Strongly disagrees” with the 
Churchillian concept of democracy, and 100 if the respondent “Strongly agrees;” and Preference 
for Authoritarian Leaders coded as 0 if the respondent thinks “We need a strong leader who does 
not have to be elected” or 1 if the respondent thinks “Electoral democracy is the best.” A 
summary of the descriptive statistics is depicted in Table II-1.  
 With these variables, this chapter fits several hierarchical linear models in order to test 
the associations among the dependent and explanatory variables described in the hypotheses of 
this study.4 The dependent variables “citizen support for administrative decentralization,” “citizen 
support for fiscal decentralization,” and the “composite index of support for decentralization” are 
modeled as continuous; while the trichotomous variable “support for decentralization” is modeled 
as multinomial, with decentralization as the base category. Hence, the intra-class correlation 
coefficients in this chapter are calculated by fitting three fully unconditional models, according to 
the specification of the dependent variables.5 After a series of analyses, and according to the 
theory of this chapter, the following models are selected: 
 
 
                                                      
4 All the statistical analyses in this chapter are carried out using STATA 10.1 and HLM 6.08. 
5 The intra-class correlation for the trichotomous support for decentralization is not meaningful because the level-1 
variance is heteroscedastic. 
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Equation II.1  
Dependent variable: Citizen Support for Administrative Decentralization 
Level-1 Model: 
Y = B0 + B1*(ING4R) + B2*(NP1R) + B3*(NP2R) + B4*(SGL1R) + B5*(B32R) + 
B6*(EFICGOV) + B7*(MUJER) + B8*(Q2S) + B9*(EDS) + B10*(CP8R) + 
B11*(ROLST) + B12*(TAMANOR) + B13*(QUINTALL) + B14*(MESTIZO) + 
B15*(INDIG) + B16*(BLACK) + B17*(OTHER) + B18*(AUT1R) + R 
 
Level-2 Model: 
B0 = G00 + G01*(HDI07) + U0 
Equation II.2  
Dependent variable: Citizen Support for Fiscal Decentralization 
Level-1 Model 
Y = B0 + B1*(ING4R) + B2*(NP1R) + B3*(NP2R) + B4*(SGL1R) + B5*(B32R) + 
B6*(EFICGOV) + B7*(MUJER) + B8*(Q2S) + B9*(EDS) + B10*(CP8R) + 
B11*(ROLST) + B12*(TAMANOR) + B13*(QUINTALL) + B14*(MESTIZO) + 
B15*(INDIG) + B16*(BLACK) + B17*(OTHER) + B18*(AUT1R) + R 
 
Level-2 Model 
B0 = G00 + G01*(HDI07) + U0 
Equation II.3  
Dependent variable: Composite Index of Citizen Support for Decentralization6 
Level-1 Model 
Y = B0 + B1*(ING4R) + B2*(NP1R) + B3*(NP2R) + B4*(SGL1R) + B5*(B32R) + 
B6*(EFICGOV) + B7*(MUJER) + B8*(Q2S) + B9*(EDS) + B10*(CP8R) + 
B11*(ROLST) + B12*(TAMANOR) + B13*(QUINTALL) + B14*(MESTIZO) + 
B15*(INDIG) + B16*(BLACK) + B17*(OTHER) + B18*(AUT1R) + R 
 
Level-2 Model 
B0 = G00 + G01*(HDI07) + U0 
Equation II.4  
Dependent variable: Trichotomous Measure (Base category: support for decentralization) 
Level-1 Model 
Prob[Y(-100) = 1|B] = P(-100) 
Prob[Y(0) = 1|B] = P(0) 
                                                      
6 The scale reliability coefficient for this construct is .7.  
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Prob[Y(100) = 1|B] = P(100) = 1 - P(-100) - P(0) 
 
log[P(-100)/P(100)] = B0(-100) + B1(-100)*(ING4R) + B2(-100)*(NP1R) + B3(-
100)*(NP2R) + B4(-100)*(SGL1R) + B5(-100)*(B32R) + B6(-100)*(EFICGOV) + 
B7(-100)*(MUJER) + B8(-100)*(Q2S) + B9(-100)*(EDS) + B10(-100)*(CP8R) + 
B11(-100)*(ROLST) + B12(-100)*(TAMANOR) + B13(-100)*(QUINTALL) + B14(-
100)*(MESTIZO) + B15(-100)*(INDIG) + B16(-100)*(BLACK) + B17(-
100)*(OTHER) + B18(-100)*(AUT1R)  
 
log[P(0)/P(100)] = B0(0) + B1(0)*(ING4R) + B2(0)*(NP1R) + B3(0)*(NP2R) + 
B4(0)*(SGL1R) + B5(0)*(B32R) + B6(0)*(EFICGOV) + B7(0)*(MUJER) + 
B8(0)*(Q2S) + B9(0)*(EDS) + B10(0)*(CP8R) + B11(0)*(ROLST) + 
B12(0)*(TAMANOR) + B13(0)*(QUINTALL) + B14(0)*(MESTIZO) + 
B15(0)*(INDIG) + B16(0)*(BLACK) + B17(0)*(OTHER) + B18(0)*(AUT1R)  
  
 
Level-2 Model 
B0(-100) = G00(-100) + G01(-100)*(HDI07) + U0(-100) 
B0(0) = G00(0) + G01(0)*(HDI07) + U0(0) 
 
Variable coding is depicted in Table II-1.  
 
Results  
This section analyzes the degree to which citizens in Latin American and Caribbean 
express support for decentralization, recentralization, or an equal distribution of administrative 
and fiscal responsibilities between the national and municipal governments. The regional mean 
values for the four measures show that public support is almost perfectly divided; however, the 
data show a slight preference for recentralization. While the regional mean of citizen support for 
administrative decentralization is 49.05 points in the 0 – 100 scale, the mean for citizen support 
for fiscal decentralization is 48.13 points (48.90 and 48.36 respectively, if design effects are taken 
into account). These results are depicted in Figure II-1. Although the mean differences between 
administrative and fiscal support for decentralization are not statistically significant, their 
confidence intervals do not cross the 50-point value, suggesting a slight inclination to favor 
recentralization over decentralization. 
 55 
 
Figure II-1: Citizen Support for Administrative and Fiscal Decentralization 
 
 
The mean value for the composite index of citizen support for decentralization is 48.62 
(48.47 if design effects are taken into account), corroborating the slight preference for 
recentralization. Finally, the trichotomous measure shows that 36.9 percent of citizens in Latin 
American and Caribbean prefer recentralization, 35 percent decentralization, and 28.1 percent an 
equal distribution of administrative and fiscal responsibilities between the national and the local 
levels of government. These results are depicted in Figure II-2. In spite of these findings, Figures 
II-1 and II-2 also show that there is variation across countries, not only in terms of their relative 
rankings, but also in their preferences for either decentralization or recentralization.7 For instance, 
while Bolivia, Costa Rica and Mexico are at the top of the scale of support for administrative 
decentralization with 61.0, 55.3 and 55.3 points respectively, Costa Rica, Paraguay and Bolivia 
                                                      
7 The intra-class correlation coefficient for the first three dependent variables is around four percent. 
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are at the top of the scale of support for fiscal decentralization, with 61.1, 57.4 and 56.2 
respectively. At the other end, countries like Panama, Haiti and Honduras show the lowest 
support for administrative decentralization with 39.8, 35.2 and 32.4 points respectively; and 
Ecuador, Haiti and Honduras show the lowest support for fiscal decentralization with 40.3, 37.4 
and 35.8 points respectively.  
 
 
Figure II-2: Composite Index and Trichotomous Measure of Citizen Support for Decentralization 
 
 
In the case of the composite index, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Mexico are at the top of the 
scale with 58.5, 58.1 and 55.1 points respectively, while the countries at the bottom of the scale 
are the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Honduras with 43.0, 36.3 and 34.1 points respectively. It is 
interesting to note that the wide variation of citizen support for decentralization appears to be 
independent from the degree of actual decentralization. The empirical evidence shows a federal 
country (Mexico), sharing the top of the scale of the composite index with a moderately 
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decentralized country (Bolivia) and a rather centralized country (Costa Rica). Also, the position of 
relatively high-decentralized countries in the middle of the scale (such as the Argentina and Brazil 
federations) suggests that support for decentralization may be determined by other contextual 
factors not related to the actual degree of decentralization.8 What are some of the possible 
factors related to citizen support for decentralization? The following lines show the results of the 
four hierarchical linear models specified in the previous section for this purpose.  
Table II-2 summarizes the results from the first three means-as-outcomes hierarchical 
linear models fitted to explore the correlations of citizen support for state decentralization. Results 
from the multinomial model are depicted in Table II-3. The three models with continuous 
dependent variables in Table II-2 are: (a) Support for administrative decentralization; (b) Support 
for fiscal decentralization; and (c) Composite index of support for decentralization. This table 
shows coefficients, significance levels and standard errors in parentheses. 
                                                      
8 Chapter III shows the degree of decentralization per country in the region.  
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 Table II-2: Results from the Means-As-Outcomes Models 
Model I Model II Model III 
  
Support for 
Administrative 
Decentralization 
Support for Fiscal 
Decentralization 
Support for 
Decentralization 
Index 
Intercept 48.649*** (1.217) 48.366***  (1.380) 48.574*** (1.228) 
Individual-Level       
Socioeconomics and Demographics       
     Education 0.292*** (0.068) 0.172*** (0.065) 0.24*** (0.062) 
     Age 0.034 (0.022) 0.008 (0.018) 0.022 (0.018) 
     Female -1.639***  (0.384) -1.100** (0.443) -1.310*** (0.342) 
     Quintiles of Wealth -0.174 (0.200) -0.437** (0.215) -0.321* (0.189) 
     Size of City/Town of Residence -0.21 (0.248) -0.831*** (0.308) -0.544** (0.254) 
Race (Base category: White)       
  Mestizo  -0.445 (0.835) -1.402* (0.780) -0.881 (0.786) 
  Indigenous -1.243 (0.934) -3.773** (1.455) -2.338** (0.997) 
  Black 0.502 (1.160) 0.09 (1.403) 0.204 (1.236) 
  Other 0.884 (0.862) 1.049 (0.767) 1.063 (0.728) 
Support for Democracy       
  Churchillian Democracy 0.011 (0.013) 0.01 (0.012) 0.011 (0.012) 
  Preference for Authoritarian Leader -2.49**     (1.173) -0.771 (1.321) -1.603 (1.207) 
Social Capital       
  Municipal Meetings Attendance 1.783**      (0.793) 1.314 (0.862) 1.547** (0.598) 
  Demand-making on Municipal       
Government 
2.067***     (0.559) 1.440** (0.736) 1.663*** (0.545) 
Communitarian Participation 0.021**       (0.010) 0.012 (0.008) 0.0166** (0.008) 
Governance Indicators       
     Satisfaction with Local Services -0.007 (0.016) 0.045*** (0.012) 0.02 (0.012) 
  Trust in the Municipal Government 0.056*** (0.011) 0.098*** (0.013) 0.076*** (0.011) 
     Efficacy of National Government -0.054**  (0.021) -0.151*** (0.032) -0.102*** (0.025) 
Role of the State in the Economy       
  Role of the State Index -0.029**   (0.014) -0.031* (0.019) -0.030** (0.014) 
Country-Level        
Human Development Index (2007) 42.505***  (1.173) 34.968**   (14.553) 38.706** (13.454) 
Variance Components   
     Random effect       
          Support for Decentralization, u0j 35.358***  44.826***  35.691*** 
          Reliability estimate 0.974  0.979  0.98   
Note: Individual and country-level variables grand-mean centered. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
* = p < .10; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01           Number of Countries = 22      Number of Cases = 37,035  
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP   
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 At the individual level, there are four socioeconomic and demographic variables 
statistically associated with citizen support for state decentralization. First, the number of years of 
completed education is positively associated with the three measures of citizen support for 
decentralization, suggesting that as individuals increase their levels of education, they tend to be 
more supportive of transfers from the national to the local government. Substantively, the greatest 
possible effect of this variable is on support for administrative decentralization. By moving from 
complete illiteracy to 18 years of completed education, there is a 5.26-point increase in support 
for administrative decentralization, all else equal, and a 3.06-point increase and support for fiscal 
decentralization. The greatest possible effects for all significant associations are summarized in 
Appendix A2.  
 Second, women, in comparison to men, tend to show higher support for recentralization. 
This result is consistent across the three continuous measures of citizen support for 
decentralization. However, the size of the effect is not very large: ceteris paribus being a woman 
decreases in -1.64 the level of support for administrative decentralization and in -1.1 the level of 
support for fiscal decentralization as opposed to being a man. Third, the level of wealth is only 
significantly associated with support for fiscal decentralization, and weakly associated (p<.10) to 
the composite index. Contrary to the expectations set forward in the theory of this chapter, as the 
level of individual wealth increases, support for both fiscal decentralization and the composite 
index decreases. The substantive effects are not very large, however. A from quintile one to 
quintile five is associated with a -1.75-point decrease in support for fiscal decentralization and a -
1.28-point decrease in the composite index of support for decentralization in the 0-100 scale. 
Finally, the size of the city of residence is also statistically relevant only for fiscal support and the 
composite index. As the size of the city of residence increases, support for decentralization 
decreases. Substantively, and individual who resides in the capital city shows 3.32 points lower 
support for fiscal decentralization in a 0-100 scale, than an individual who resides in a rural area, 
holding all other factors constant.  
 In terms of ethnic identification, those individuals who identify themselves as mestizos or 
indigenous, tend support greater fiscal recentralization than those who consider themselves as 
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white. The self-defined indigenous group shows the largest substantive effect, with a 3.77-point 
support for fiscal recentralization in comparison to white. In the case of the composite index, only 
the indigenous group shows a 2.34-point support for recentralization in comparison to whites. The 
other ethnic self-identification categories are not statistically significant at the .1 level. Another 
variable that is negatively correlated with support for decentralization is authoritarian preferences. 
Those who prefer an authoritarian leader show a 2.49-point support for recentralization in 
comparison with those who think that electoral democracy is always best.  
 All the social capital variables included in this chapter show a positive association with 
citizen support for administrative decentralization and the composite index; however, only 
demand-making on municipal governments has a statistical association with fiscal 
decentralization. The variables interpersonal trust and tolerance did not show a significant 
correlation with the decentralization measures.9 As a consequence, those individuals who have 
participated in municipal meetings or communitarian activities, and those who solicit the municipal 
government, tend to show greater support for administrative decentralization than those who do 
not participate. The size of the effects, however, is not very large: participating in municipal 
meetings, making solicitudes to the local government and participating in communitarian activities 
at least once a week increase support for administrative decentralization in 1.8, 2.1, and 2,1 
points respectively, in the 0-100 scale.  
 Where relatively larger effects are found, is in the association between the governance 
indicators and citizen support for decentralization/recentralization. As the perception that the 
current national government is fighting poverty, protecting democratic principles, fighting 
corruption, protecting human rights, improving security and fighting unemployment (efficacy of 
national government) increases, citizen support for administrative and fiscal recentralization 
increases as well. The largest possible effect is found in fiscal recentralization, with a 15.1-point 
increased support from those who think that the national government is not at all efficacious to 
those who think that it is very efficacious. In contrast, support for fiscal decentralization is 9.8 
points greater for those who trust municipal government a lot, in comparison to those who do not 
                                                      
9 These variables were excluded in order to obtain relatively more parsimonious models. 
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trust it at all. Statistically and substantive significance are also found, but in a lesser extent, in the 
relationship with efficacy of the national government and trust in the municipality. While in the 
former case the largest possible effect is 5.4 points in favor of administrative recentralization, the 
latter is 5.6 points in favor of decentralization. The role of the state is also negatively associated 
with all three dimensions of support for decentralization. As the belief that the government, 
instead of the private sector, should own the most important firms and factories and should be 
responsible for the provision of social welfare, job security and the reduction of income inequality 
(role of the states) increases, support for fiscal and administrative recentralization increase as 
well. The maximum substantive effect for this association, on average, is 3 points in the 0 - 100 
scale. Finally, satisfaction with local services is only statistically related to support for fiscal 
decentralization. Those who think that the services provided by the municipality are very good 
show a 4.5-point higher support for fiscal decentralization that those who thin that these services 
are very bad.   
 At the country level, the Human Development Index shows the largest effect on all three 
accounts of citizen support for state decentralization. The model explains that, on average, 
support for administrative, fiscal and the composite index of decentralization are 14.88, 12.24, 
and 13.55 points greater for citizens residing in Costa Rica or Chile in comparison with those 
living in Haiti. In other words, those individuals residing in countries with low levels of education, 
short life expectancies, and poor standards of living tend to show greater support for 
recentralization than decentralization. This finding corroborates the main argument of this 
chapter, which states that individuals residing in context of higher human development tend to 
feel better equipped to carry out the participation and oversight function that come along with 
decentralization programs. In contrast, those inhabitants of less developed countries prefer to 
leave civic engagement, participation and accountability activities to the “experts” at the national 
capital. 
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 Table II-3: Results from the Hierarchical Model for the Multinomial Support for Decentralization 
Category (-100) Category (0) 
 Base category: Support for Decentralization 
Support for 
Recentralization Equal Distribution 
Intercept 0.084 (0.105) -0.216*  (0.104) 
Individual-Level     
Socioeconomics and Demographics     
     Education -0.017*** (0.004) -0.007* (0.004) 
     Age -0.002 (0.001) -0.002** (0.001) 
     Female 0.115***  (0.029) 0.219*** (0.032) 
     Quintiles of Wealth 0.026** (0.011) 0.014 (0.012) 
     Size of City/Town of Residence 0.048*** (0.010) 0.039*** (0.011) 
Race (Base category: White)     
  Mestizo  0.045 (0.041) 0.018 (0.043) 
  Indigenous 0.137* (0.072) 0.035 (0.077) 
  Black -0.023 (0.071) 0.004 (0.076) 
  Other -0.075 (0.071) -0.034 (0.075) 
Support for Democracy     
  Churchillian Democracy -0.001 (0.001) -0.001** (0.001) 
  Preference for Authoritarian Leader 0.125***     (0.042) -0.061 (0.047) 
Social Capital     
  Municipal Meetings Attendance -0.113**      (0.049) -0.086 (0.053) 
  Demand-making on Municipal Government -0.001***     (0.044) -0.199*** (0.048) 
  Communitarian Participation -0.001**       (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
Governance Indicators     
     Satisfaction with Local Services -0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) 
  Trust in the Municipal Government -0.01*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.000) 
     Efficacy of National Government 0.01***  (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 
Role of the State in the Economy     
  Role of the State Index 0.002***   (0.000) -0.000 (0.001) 
Country-Level      
Human Development Index (2007) -2.81*  (1.383) -0.845   (1.377) 
Variance Components 
     Random effect         
          Support for Recentralization, u0j 0.238***  0.233***  
          Reliability estimate 0.979  0.975  
Note: Individual and country-level variables grand-mean centered. Standard errors in parenthesis.  
* = p < .10; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01           Number of Countries = 22      Number of Cases = 37,035 
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 
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Table II-3 makes a comparative assessment of the factors affecting the likelihood that an 
individual supports either decentralization or recentralization, or just prefers an equal distribution 
of fiscal and administrative responsibilities between the national and the local levels of 
government.  A hierarchical model for the multinomial (trichotomous) dependent variable is fitted 
for this purpose. In general terms, as an individual’s years of completed education increases, and 
as individuals grow older, the log odds of support for recentralization decreases relative to 
support for decentralization. Similarly, the log odds of support for an equal distribution relative to 
support for decentralization get smaller as the individual levels of education increase. The 
complete set of predicted probabilities for significant coefficients are depicted in Appendix A3.10 
Once again, this finding supports the hypothesis that better equipped individuals will more likely 
support decentralization as opposed to citizens who self-recognize their limitations, especially in 
terms of education. These and other findings will be interpreted further upon in the next section. 
On the other hand, socio-economic characteristics associated with heightened odds of 
preferring recentralization to decentralization include larger sizes of city/town of residence, 
wealthier individuals, being female as well as Indigenous ethnicity (relative to whites). Residing in 
larger cities/town and being female also increases the log odds of supporting an equal distribution 
of fiscal and administrative responsibilities relative to decentralization. As the belief that 
democracy is the best political system increases, the log odds of favoring and equal distribution 
between the national and local governments decreases relative to decentralization. Conversely, 
those who prefer authoritarian leaders instead of electoral democracy have higher log odds to 
prefer recentralization to decentralization. This finding suggest that support for authoritarianism is 
closely related to support for recentralization, since individuals may think that in order to remain 
strong, authoritarian leaders should not share their power with local governments. 
Social capital effects associated with lower odds of favoring recentralization relative to 
decentralization are participation in municipal meetings and communitarian activities, as well as 
making demands on the municipal government. Also, as demand-making on the local 
government increases, the log odds of supporting an equal distribution decrease relative to 
                                                      
10 The formula use to convert log odds to probability is: !ij= 1 / 1+ exp (- "ij). 
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decentralization. Consistent with what have been previously shown, greater perceptions of 
governmental efficaciousness and a heightened perception of the role of the sate in the economy 
increase the odds of favoring both recentralization and equal fiscal and administrative 
distributions relative to decentralization. In contrast, higher levels of trust in the municipal 
government decrease the odds of favoring recentralization and equal fiscal and administrative 
distribution. Finally, as the country levels of human development improve, the log odds of 
preferring recentralization relative to decentralization decrease.   
 
Citizen Support for Decentralization: Discussing the Results and Moving Forward 
This chapter has shown that in 2008, only 35 percent of the people living in the 22 Latin 
American and Caribbean countries selected for this study expressed direct support for state 
decentralization. The remaining 65 percent either favor recentralization or think that fiscal and 
administrative responsibilities should be equally distributed among the national and local levels of 
government. Thus, in this chapter I find support for the “light centralist preference” theory for Latin 
American and Caribbean countries put forward in the outset of the chapter. These findings 
uncover a silent challenge that policy-makers, international organizations, NGOs and the alleged 
beneficiaries themselves face if they are concerned about the political legitimacy of this state 
reform. Possibly, one of the main explanations for some of the unintended consequences of 
decentralization with regards to its objective of attaining participatory democracies lies behind this 
relatively moderate/low level of citizen support for decentralization. If one of the elements of a 
successful decentralization reform package is the role that citizens play in a particular sector 
(Hiskey 2010), then it may be natural to think that individuals’ attitudes and behaviors will depend 
on the their position about the reform in the first place. The following chapters will make a 
comparative assessment of how these citizen opinions affect their political participation, and their 
opinions seem to be a function of their relative abilities to perform their more demanding roles as 
principals as a result of state decentralization.  
Alternatively, citizens may be more inclined to approve decentralization after they see 
and experience its benefits first hand. From this reasoning, one could expect higher levels of 
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citizen support in more decentralized territories. However, the analyses carried out here did not 
yield any statistically significant evidence to support this claim.  Other contextual considerations, 
such as democracy levels, country area and population sizes and density were not statistically 
relevant either. An illuminating finding is, nonetheless, that country and individual levels of human 
development constitute a powerful and robust explanation for the different degrees of citizen 
support for decentralization.  
This finding, put in principal – agent terms, indicates that principals residing in countries 
with higher levels of health, wealth and education are better equipped to more closely monitor 
and shape the behavior of their agents. In other words, they are more willing to support 
decentralization reforms. In contrast, local principals living in relatively more underdeveloped 
territories appear to be comfortable letting the “experts” in the capital city take care of fiscal and 
administrative duties and responsibilities. This finding may be due to the fact that in less 
developed contexts, individual activities focus on the daily struggle to achieve the minimum levels 
of health, wealth and education necessary to meet some of the basic standards of living. Once 
citizens have satisfied these minimum standards, they can switch their attention to the 
satisfaction of the collective needs and demands, and for accomplishing this objective they could 
demand from central authorities more control and oversight over public resources. In short, the 
most important message of this discovery is that a key element behind citizen support for 
decentralization is the perceived abilities individuals have to fulfill the duties of decentralization. 
The empirical evidence shows that people living in Costa Rica or Chile express a degree of 
support for decentralization that is, on average, nearly 14 points higher than that reported by 
people living in Haiti, in a 0 to 100 scale. These findings are depicted in Figure II-3 and somehow 
corroborate what Lipset discovered some 30 years ago in 1981 in his seminal work Political Man. 
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Figure II-3: Composite Index and Trichotomous Measure of Citizen Support for Decentralization 
 
The claim that “low education, low participation in political or voluntary organizations of 
any type, little reading, isolated occupations, economic insecurity and authoritarian family 
patterns are some of the most important factors contributing to centralist, authoritarian 
governments” (Lipset 1981:476) finds support in this chapter in most of the elements, as 
mentioned before, but not all. Even though more educated individuals show higher support for 
decentralization, wealthier citizens show greater support for recentralization. The latter 
phenomenon could be due to the fact that individuals in higher quintiles of wealth may be able 
(and willing) to exert larger influence over national politics. Bankers, presidents and CEOs of 
large companies and corporations, and owners of the means of production in general may have a 
closer and direct relationship with congressmen and ministers at the national level and could 
even play a important role in decision-making over financial and monetary policies. On the other 
hand richer individuals may perceive decentralization as a tool to create more bureaucracy that 
can lead to an increase of taxes.  
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Other relevant variables associated with citizen support for decentralization and 
recentralization are ethnicity and gender. The results shown in the previous section indicate that 
indigenous populations tend to express higher support for recentralization relative to whites. 
Similarly, women are more willing to favor recentralization relative to men. These findings also 
support the theory put forward in this chapter, considering the stereotype that non-indigenous 
men are more likely to consider themselves capable to carrying out the duties and responsibilities 
that result from decentralization than indigenous groups and women. An alternative explanation 
for both findings may be related: in contexts where local governments in Latin America and the 
Caribbean are dominated by undemocratic white males, the decision-making process may 
exclude traditionally relegated groups, such as indigenous and women. These groups, as a 
result, should be against any administrative or fiscal transfer that can increase the relative power 
of dominant groups. Due to the scope of this study, however, I have not been able to make a 
characterization of the ethnicity and gender of local elites, hence, further research is needed in 
order to tests these presumptions.    
Civic engagement and participation also proved to be pertinent for explaining citizen 
support for state decentralization. Those who regularly attend municipal meetings, make petitions 
to the municipality, and participate in communitarian activities are more willing to favor both 
administrative and fiscal decentralization relative to those who do not participate. Though 
statistically relevant, these social capital factors only provide moderate substantive significance 
since they contribute a maximum of two points in favor of decentralization in the 0 - 100 scale. 
From a policy standpoint, however, it is important to pay a careful attention to social capital since 
local political elites may bring into play these dynamics in order to exert pressures to the national 
government for actual decentralization. A more detailed analysis in this regard will be carried out 
in Chapter V when I discuss local political elite behavior. 
Finally, the governance indicators studied in this chapter show the largest and most 
robust individual effects on support for decentralization. In particular, those who think that the 
current national government is fighting poverty, protecting democratic principles, fighting 
corruption, protecting human rights, improving security and fighting unemployment are much 
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more willing to favor recentralization than decentralization (15-point difference for fiscal and 6 
point-difference for administrative decentralization). This finding suggests that it may be easier to 
find citizen support for decentralization in contexts where people perceive that the national 
government is being ineffective. Likewise, if citizens trust their municipality, they will be willing to 
favor decentralization instead of recentralization (10-point difference for fiscal, and 7-point 
difference for administrative decentralization). These results suggest a strong accountability 
mechanism, where citizen only endorse those policies that come from what they perceive to be 
an efficacious and trustworthy government.   
This chapter has shown that even though there is a slight preference for recentralization 
in Latin America as a whole, there is wide variation in citizen support for decentralization both 
across and within countries. The main findings presented here indicate that principals favor 
decentralization in contexts of high levels of health, wealth and education. Also, the degree of 
citizen support for decentralization appears to be a reward or punishment based on perceptions 
of how well or bad national and municipal levels of government are carrying out politics. In 
contrast, a relatively lower self-evaluation of individual capabilities to respond to political, fiscal 
and administrative empowerments is associated with a higher probability of supporting 
recentralization. In contexts of lower education levels, citizens prefer to let the national 
government take care of public affairs. These findings suggest that similar decentralization 
policies can work differently according to the territorial contexts because principals’ willingness to 
back the strategy is contingent upon the distinct factors explored in these pages. However, this 
chapter has not shown the possible consequences of decentralization at different degrees of 
implementation. The following chapter will show the effects of decentralization on participatory 
democracy.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
III. EXPLORING THE LINK BETWEEN DECENTRALIZATION AND PARTICIPATORY 
DEMOCRACY: LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
 
Much of the discussion of decentralization reflects a curious combination of strong 
preconceived beliefs and limited empirical evidence. 
(Livtack et al. 1998:3) 
 
 
To those convinced that theory in this area implies almost no general effects, the weak, 
partial, and inconclusive flavor of the empirical literature is not puzzling at all. It is what one 
would expect.  
(Treisman 2007:269)  
 
 
 
Decentralization advocates persuasively argue that state decentralization stimulates 
popular participation in political, institutional and organizational spaces that are far more limited in 
centralized settings. The implementation of elections for local government officials, for instance, 
opens up new opportunities for individuals to become more involved with political parties and to 
directly compete and run for public office (O'Neill 2005). With more money and more power at 
their disposal, local officials establish participatory mechanisms to tap into the sentiments of 
voters, neighborhood organizations and citizen groups, as part of making plans and budget 
tradeoffs (Campbell 2003). From this perspective, decentralization should give citizens the 
opportunity to interact with the local government, and to deliberate and influence decision-making 
processes on the allocation of public resources. Important political spaces, such as the voting 
booth, institutions of political representation, participatory budgeting, open municipal meetings, 
and other forms of demand-making on local governments are deemed responsible for improving 
the prospects for democratic consolidation at the local level (Campbell 2003; Eaton 2004; 
Montero and Samuels 2004).  
But do these theories find support in the empirical evidence? Many researchers have 
attempted to identify some of these participatory outcomes that decentralization reforms seek to 
achieve, but to date, results remain somewhat inconclusive. Scholars such as Forewaker and 
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Landman (2002), for example, analyzed the quality of democracy in 40 nations over a 30-year 
period, using a variety of measures of accountability, representativeness, participation and other 
elements of democracy. They found that federal, and arguably more decentralized countries had 
slightly lower levels of participation relative to unitary states. Diskin, Diskin, and Hazan’s (2005) 
cross-national comparison of 62 countries found no statistical support for the association between 
federalism and the likelihood of democratic collapse. Litvack et al. (1998) concluded that from the 
abundance of research on these questions, the empirical support for the idea that 
decentralization contributes to higher levels of participation is weak at best. In a similar vein, 
Treisman (2007) found that the significant results of much of the research wash out when the 
models are more fully specified. In short, these scholars suggest that almost no generalizations 
that are robust in terms of the effects of decentralization on democracy have emerged.   
My findings do not agree with the prior work of weak, inconsistent results. Rather, I find 
robust, generalizable results in two important arenas: political parties and public protests. Resting 
upon a theory about the political survival of local elites, in this chapter I put into question the non-
findings advanced in the literature by arguing that the effects of decentralization with respect to 
participatory democracies should depend on the actions that local political leaders take in order to 
ensure their permanence in power. In this view, local governments use the tools that 
decentralization brings with it not only to exert greater control over local resources, but also to 
prevent the emergence of political competitors that can put their permanence in power at risk. 
Since the most significant threats for hanging on power come from either opposition political 
groups of even from within the incumbent’s political party, my hypothesis is that as a territory 
becomes more decentralized, local political elites will increase their efforts to prevent citizen 
participation in political parties. In other words, political, fiscal and administrative decentralization 
in Latin America empowers local officials, but at the same time decreases the citizen levels of 
agency with respect to elected municipal officers.  
This hypothesis challenges the common held notion that decentralization necessarily 
increases accountability for at least two reasons. First, political elites in decentralized settings 
have greater leverage over other actors to implement institutions that guarantee their political 
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survival. Second, decentralization transfers autonomy to settings that usually have less horizontal 
checks and balances than the national level, and therefore local power concentration deterrence 
heavily rests on vertical mechanisms only, such as sub-national elections. Thus concentration of 
power should be more difficult to control at the local than the national level. Citizen principals, as 
a result of this agency loss, may try to employ non-institutionalized mechanisms in order to 
influence the way in which newly empowered municipalities design and implement collective 
decision-making. These non-institutionalized forms of participation can be expressed as protests, 
street demonstrations and riots, among others.       
After querying the 2008 AmericasBarometer data set created by LAPOP, I find support 
for the theory that the implementation of decentralization reforms does not necessarily translate 
into higher and more democratic forms of citizen participation in politics. Rather, what I 
consistently find is that citizen participation in political parties and movements is lower in more 
decentralized territories but at the same time, citizen involvement in protests and more active 
forms of participation are significantly higher as decentralization increases. The picture this paints 
is one of decentralized reforms “lighting a fire” under citizens in a way that makes them more 
likely to look beyond simple acts of participation, such as voting or demand-making at municipal 
offices, toward more activist forms of participation.  
This chapter is divided in six sections. Section two takes a historical look of the 
milestones of decentralization since the last democratic transition and shows the state of the 
reform in Latin America and the Caribbean. This section allows understanding how 
decentralization reforms have been implemented in order to evolve from centralist, power-
concentrating systems to power-sharing societies that promote citizen participation. Section three 
presents a brief literature review that complements the purported connection between 
decentralization and participatory democracy discussed in the introductory chapter of this 
dissertation project. Section four develops a theory of the political survival of local elites, which 
elaborates on the relationships between citizen principals and local official agents at different 
degrees of state decentralization. This section also presents the data and methods employed to 
test this theory. Section five shows the results of hierarchical linear and non-linear models. 
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Section six discusses both findings and non-findings and concludes. These six sections constitute 
the research agenda of this chapter intended to contribute to the main goal of this dissertation, 
which tries to discover the most relevant effects of decentralization on Latin America’s 
participatory democracies.  
 
The Quest for Decentralization in Latin America and the Caribbean 
Historical compilations of decentralization reforms in Latin America and the Caribbean 
show the centralizing heritage received from the Spanish and Portuguese colonizers in the 
Americas as an efficient means for extracting resources. The seminal work of Claudio Véliz 
published in 1980 is arguably one of the most important contributions to the scholarly literature to 
understand the historical roots of this centralist heritage. Véliz suggests that the highly centralized 
political institutions established by the colonial masters with the purpose of extracting and 
sending resources to Europe generated a path-dependent political culture that affected 
subsequent political evolution. Consequently, the relationship between the state and society was 
shaped by a state-centered developmental model of economic growth, along with the emergence 
of corporatist institutions that characterized Latin America in most of the twentieth century 
(Montero and Samuels 2004).  
After almost a century of centrist planning, the developmental model reached a point 
where national level politics alone were unsustainable. The crisis of the centralist model was one 
of efficiency, where the increasing external indebtedness, the growing deficit of the public means 
of production and the monopoly of the state of external currency made the conduction of national 
politics and economics nonviable. Along with democratization, decentralization thus emerged not 
only as a condition to change the relationship between the state and society, but also to 
overcome the crisis of the developmental model. Decentralization was seen as a tool to achieve 
three major objectives: (a) Efficiency, by improving the allocation of public services according to 
sub-national preferences; (b) Growth and income redistribution, by reorganizing access to land 
and to other resources, and by consequence, decreasing poverty; and (c) Democratic 
governance, by increasing citizen participation and decreasing corruption (Finot 2001). 
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Seele (2004) makes an analysis of how decentralization began to alter the compensatory 
forces of economically and politically dominant regional elites, as well as citizen mobilizations 
demanding social inclusion in political decision-making in the late twentieth century. This 
alteration of the state-society relationship was in part responsible for the onset of a permanent 
bargain for the reallocation of political, fiscal and administrative transference of power that 
entered into effect in Latin American and the Caribbean at the end of the 1970s.1 Daughters and 
Harper (2007) argue that early state decentralization reforms took place in the political arena, 
specifically with the creation of local-level representative democracies. Mayoral elections began 
with high expectations, given the natural advantage the local and intermediate levels have over 
the national level to link the needs of the population with the goods and services offered by local 
governments.  
In the mid 1990s, one of the first conditions for political decentralization was widely 
accomplished among the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean—democratic mayoral 
elections were instituted in the entire region, except in Suriname.2 The first country to hold 
elections for local governments was Mexico in 1917. This coincided with the year of its post 
revolutionary regime transition. The last countries in the region to carry out local elections were 
Guyana and Panamá, both in 1995, and the years of their transition to democracy were 1966 and 
1989 respectively. Even though Uruguay held mayoral elections for the first time in 2010, 
elections of departmental officials representing sub-national governments started in 1984. Table 
III-1 shows the first years of mayor elections, along with the capacity of sub-national 
indebtedness. 
Table III-1 shows that most Latin American and Caribbean countries experienced 
profound political reforms during the 1970s and 1980s with respect not only to regime transitions 
at the national level but also at the municipal level. Even though countries in the region counted 
with sub-national authorities during the authoritarian period, higher levels of government usually 
appointed them. With the beginning of the regime transitions, however, elections replaced 
                                                      
1 See Robert Daughters and Leslie Harper (2007), Tulia Falleti (2005), Kathleen O’Neill (2005) Daniel Treisman (2002).  
2 Cuba is not taken into account in this analysis. 
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appointments in most Latin American sub-national governments; initiating in this way a deep 
transformation of how politics are carried out at the local level.  
 
Source: Inter American Development Bank (2004) Created by Robert Daughters and Leslie Harper (2007) 
and restructured by the author. aData not available bLocal government is non-existent 
 
 
 
Table III-1: First year municipal elections and sub-national indebtedness  
 
Country 
Municipal 
Mayor 
Elections 
Prohibition of 
Subnational 
Indebtedness 
Authorization from 
National 
Government for 
Indebtedness 
Restriction in 
the Use of 
Public Debt 
Funding 
Argentina 1983   •  •  
Belize 1981 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Bolivia 1985   •  •  
Brazil  n.a. a    •  •  
Chile 1992 •      
Colombia 1988   •  •  
Costa Rica 1949   •  •  
Dominican 
Republic 1966 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Ecuador 1983   •  •  
El Salvador 1985   •  •  
Guatemala 1985   •  •  
Guyana 1995   •  •  
Honduras 1982   •  •  
Jamaica 1962   •    
Mexico 1917   •  •  
Nicaragua 1992 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Panama 1995   •  •  
Paraguay 1991   •  •  
Peru 1980   •  •  
Surinam n.e.b •      
Trinidad y 
Tobago 1962   •  •  
Uruguay 1984 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Venezuela 1989 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
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Newly elected local officers soon discovered an urgent need for fiscal resources in order 
to fulfill the duties and responsibilities that political decentralization brought with it. As a result, 
sub-national governments started to push for the decentralization of economic resources and for 
autonomy of sub-national indebtedness, especially during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Thus, 
three common forms of local revenue were implemented: (1) excise taxes,3 (2) intergovernmental 
transfers,4 and (3) the generation of income by looking for external sources of funding (see Table 
III-1 for information about sub-national indebtedness).5 To show the evolution of fiscal 
decentralization around the world, Falleti (2005) states that in the 1980s, sub-national 
governments collected, on average, 15 percent of total income, and spent on average 20 percent 
of total expenditures. By the late 1990s, those figures had risen to 19 percent and 25 percent, 
respectively, and had even doubled in some regions. According to Daughters and Harper (2007) 
these data hide a significant difference among countries, particularly in terms of expenses and 
investment. In the period from 1996 to 2004, Inter-American Development Bank data reveal that, 
in descending order, three countries—Argentina, Brazil and Colombia—had high rates of fiscal 
decentralization, measured as the percentage of a country’s total expenditure spent by sub-
national governments, with percentages close to 50 percent. These figures place those countries 
among the group of the most decentralized countries in the world.6  
A second group of countries—Mexico Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador—present a 
moderate yet equally significant level of fiscal decentralization that ranged between 18 and 32 
percent in 2004. Of the eight countries in these two groups, four are federal systems of 
government.7 Additionally, Colombia deserves especial attention because this country has had a 
historically regionalist tradition that has allowed for higher levels of decentralization. A third group 
                                                      
3 The most common are taxes on property, vehicles, and industry and commerce. 
4 They can be made permanent and egalitarian through legislation or at the discretion of higher levels of government.  
5 This is in the case of municipal external indebtedness or through fees for the provision of water, electricity, etc. 
6 The list of these countries includes Canada, the United State, and North-European countries (Daughters y Harper, 
2007). 
7 Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela  (Central Intelligence Agency, 2007) 
 76 
of countries—Uruguay, Guyana, Chile, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Paraguay, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Jamaica and Haiti—are characterized by low 
levels of expenditure decentralization, from 14 percent in the case of Uruguay, to 1 percent in the 
cases of Panama Jamaica and Haiti. In the same vein, since the mid 1990s, a growing number of 
restrictions on sub-national indebtedness have been put in place across the region in order to 
avoid the problems of excessive debt that arose from the policies adopted by Brazil, Colombia, 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. A summary of the current characteristics of sub-national public 
indebtedness is presented in Table III-1. 
Not only have fiscal and political decentralization trends been evident in the region; 
today, local governments are increasingly responsible for the provision of public goods and 
services. In other words, municipalities are more responsible nowadays for planning and 
executing education, public health, urban highways, drinking water and sewerage, waste 
collection, electric power supply and other administrative duties and responsibilities than even 
before. As in the case of fiscal decentralization, there is important variation in the level of 
administrative decentralization across countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. According to 
qualitative World Bank data8 the three countries where such service provision responsibilities 
have expanded the most are Bolivia, Colombia and Chile. On the other hand, countries where 
these services are administered more often by the national government are Panama, the 
Dominican Republic and Jamaica. Fiscal and Administrative rankings are depicted in Figure III-1.9 
                                                      
8 For more information, see http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/qualitativeindicators.htm#a Accessed 
on October 4, 2010. 
9 Fiscal decentralization is measured as the percentage of sub-national over total government expenditure (2004). Data 
for this measure comes from the International Monetary Fund and the Inter-American Development Bank. This author 
computed the administrative decentralization measure from qualitative World Bank data. For more information about the 
administrative decentralization construct, see the Independent Variables section in this chapter.  
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Figure III-1: Fiscal and Administrative Decentralization Rankings in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
 Decentralization and the Promise of Participatory Democracy 
One of the characteristics of the centrist planning of the state described in the previous 
section was the mounting complexity of public administration. With the advent of the crisis of the 
developmental state, citizen participation became ever more difficult because the developmental 
model favored both clientelism and corruption, as small and hermetic groups made exclusionary 
decisions that helped only a few while placing the majority of the population in a disadvantaged 
position. In many countries, a large part of the external resources that came from international 
loans were inefficiently allocated due to increasingly high levels of corruption (Treisman 2000). 
Centralization reached the extreme in the early 1960s in a context of intensification of the Cold 
War, with the implementation of military dictatorships in many countries across the region (Finot 
2001). 
Along with the third democratic wave of the late 1970s and 1980s, however, policy-
makers and international organizations saw decentralization as a means of power-sharing, not 
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only across levels of government but also between the state and civil society. As a result of the 
new spaces created for sub-national elections, policy-makers and international organizations 
envisioned an opportunity for social organizations and traditionally discriminated minorities to 
voice their needs and complaints. From this point of view, decentralization was not only intended 
to increase the chances for popular participation, but it was also oriented to address inequalities 
under the “equal opportunity” principle (Finot 2001).   
In general terms, the concept of citizen participation has been linked to governmental 
decision-making. But if expanded to mean people’s involvement in the provision of cooperative 
solutions, the concept expands to refer to both direct participation in decision-making for the 
provision of social goods and services, and indirect participation through the election of 
representatives who make those decisions. In the same vein, citizen participation becomes an 
indispensable means to achieve efficiency and democratic governance, as well as an important 
political objective to ensure governability. As a consequence of decentralization, citizens also 
seek more active, visible ways of exerting oversight than mere voting or attending town hall 
meetings. In short, decentralization may be viewed as an increase in citizens agency.  
Based upon these theoretical benefits that decentralization is supposed to bring, several 
observers quickly linked various areas of citizen participation with this state reform policy. 
Arguably, one of the most important works in this domain is that of Campbell (2003), who 
observed the incidence of what he calls “the quiet revolution” on at least six areas of citizen 
participation in the local governments of various Latin American towns and cities. Campbell 
claims that “arranged in terms of complexity and formality, [these areas of participation] are 
tapping into grassroots opinion, mobilizing grassroots groups, beneficiary contributions, citizen-
initiated contact, the electoral and voting system and the legal and judicial system” (2003:81).  
Most of the forms of citizen participation mentioned by Campbell in his book are related 
to formal institutions and organizations of the local government. For instance, the author notes 
that the most common and easily arranged form of citizen participation is that of tapping into 
popular grassroots opinions, where local authorities simply visit local groups, invite them to the 
municipality, organize hearings or conduct opinion surveys to listen and interpret their demands. 
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Other forms of increased participation are the mobilization of citizens through local government 
material contributions to solve community problems, the creation of community centers through 
donations, citizen initiatives to create published ratings of local governments to increase 
accountability, the increased accessibility of the electoral systems and the legal recognition of 
local interest groups.   
More recently, scholars have incorporated consulting mechanisms into the equation of 
decentralization and citizen participation. The most recurrent of these mechanisms is, perhaps, 
the practice of participatory budgeting. Most of the decentralization literature documents Porto 
Alegre in Brazil as the pioneer in terms of institutionalizing citizen-group participation in the 
decision-making process of capital investment in their city (Campbell 2001; Eaton 2004; Finot 
2001; Fisman and Gatti 1999; Garcia-Guadilla and Perez 2002; Tulchin and Selee 2004).  Other 
countries, such as Bolivia, have formally signed into law the consultation of Municipal 
Development Plans with local territorial organizations in order to get access to intergovernmental 
transfers (Finot 2001). Finally, other consulting mechanisms frequently mentioned in the 
decentralization literature are referenda, recall of elected public officials, mandatory provision 
information sources, etc.  
The mechanisms analyzed above make particular emphasis on citizen participation in 
formal institutions of the local government. Other studies have focused, on the other hand, on 
people’s participation in institutions and organizations of the civil society. The seminal work of 
Robert Putnam (1993), for instance, suggests that social capital, and more specifically, citizen 
participation in organizations of the civil society is a product of a dense network of secondary 
associations tradition, rather than the implementation of decentralizing reforms that occurred in 
Italy in the 1970s. In particular, Putnam argues that in contrast to Northern Italy, the authoritarian 
ruling elites of the Southern region during much of the XIX Century destroyed the “horizontal ties 
of solidarity in order to maintain the primacy of vertical ties of dependence and exploitation” 
(1993:136). Thus for Putnam, as well as for other scholars such as Forewaker and Landman 
(2002); Diskin, Diskin, and Hazan (2005); 
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chapter, there is no relationship between state decentralization and citizen participation in 
organizations and institutions of the civil society. 
 
The Contradictory Effects of Decentralization: The Political Survival of Local Elites 
The literature reviewed in this chapter suggests that most of the scholarly work on the 
effects of state decentralization on citizen participation has focused on individual country studies 
or have scaled down the analysis to towns or cities. By using direct methods of observation, 
many scholars have reached the conclusion that state decentralization fosters citizen 
participation, especially in formal institutions of the local government. However, when scaled up 
to regional or global analyses, this linkage between decentralization and participation weakens 
considerably. Additionally, the research in this field distinguishes between the effects of 
decentralization on participation in formal institutions of the local government on the one hand, 
and in organizations of the civil society on the other. While national and sub-national case studies 
show a positive relationship between decentralization and citizen participation in local 
government institutions, the link between this state reform and participation in civil society 
organizations appears to be less clear. Based upon this literature, in this dissertation I claim that 
state decentralization has contradictory effects on citizen participation according to the type of 
institution or organization to be studied. The impact of decentralization on participatory 
democracy may in part be explained through the following hypothesis: 
 
The Political Survival of Local Elites and Institutionalized vs. Mobilized forms of Citizen 
Participation. This hypothesis is based on the premise that local political elites, or a coalition of 
elites, seek to hang on power as long as they can, in order enjoy the privileged positions that 
political, fiscal and administrative decentralization brings with it to the municipal arena. Thus, I 
expect that elites in relatively more decentralized contexts struggle more fiercely to remain in 
power the longest, because they have much more to lose if a politician outside the elite or the 
coalition of elites replaces their leader. There are at least two avenues that local elites can take in 
order to avoid replacement of their leader. First, they can use all the democratic tools they have 
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at their disposal in order please citizen principals. These are tools of good governance, such as 
administrative efficacy, governmental transparency, inclusionary politics, etc. By behaving in this 
way, local agents may increase the incumbent’s chances of reelection, or the election of one of 
the elite group members in case there is no reelection.  
Second, local elite principals could also use undemocratic tools to avoid replacement of 
their preferred leader. These tools are related to either corrupt practice, such as political 
clientelism (i.e. the exchange of goods for votes, bribes, and other private gains), nepotism and 
other forms of favoritism; or authoritarian practices, such as unfair elections, exclusionary politics, 
and restrictions on the media, among others. Of course, local political leaders can also choose to 
use a mixture of both alternatives to increase their chances of political survival. Drawing upon the 
conclusions reached by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) in their book The Logic of Political 
Survival, I hypothesize that empowered local officials will tend to resort to undemocratic practices 
in order to guarantee their permanence in power. These conclusions center on the fact that in 
many cases, good policies (i.e. democratic) are detrimental to political survival, whereas bad 
policies often enhance political survival.10  
There are at least two citizen principals’ responses to the combination of state 
decentralization and local political elites’ behaviors. First and foremost, citizens should try to find 
solutions to their collective problems more often in relatively more decentralized municipal 
governments in comparison to the frequency of municipal demand-making in more centralized 
countries. This hypothesis may be constrained, however, to the level of recognition and 
identification of the duties and responsibilities assigned to each governmental level. In other 
words, principals should carry out municipal dealings more often in relatively more decentralized 
countries, but this frequency is contingent upon the level of information at principals’ disposal. 
                                                      
10 The choices made by political elites will depend, of course, on the size of the winning collation and the behavior of the 
selectorate. However, for the purpose of this dissertation I base my analyses on the general empirical evidence shown by 
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) that autocratic leaders stay in office roughly twice as long as leaders in democratic 
nations. To my view, this evidence may also hold at the sub-national level. For more information see:  Bruce Bueno de 
Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge: The 
MIT Press, 2003). 
 82 
Second, if citizen principals perceive that different levels of government are not fulfilling their 
needs and demands, they could try to make their voices heard by engaging in either 
institutionalized or mobilized forms of participation (Seligson 1980). While the former comprises 
institutional forms of participation, such as political parties and movements, citizen initiatives and 
recalls, among others; the later is related to street protests, demonstrations, riots, etc.   
What would result from the daily interactions between principals and agents at different 
decentralization degrees in terms of participatory democracy? Since the transfer of political, fiscal 
and administrative powers from national and intermediate levels of government to municipal 
governments increase, in general terms, the ability and capacity of local government agents to 
exercise control and authority over citizen principals, I expect to find in more decentralized 
contexts local political elites that promote exclusionary behaviors in order to maintain and endure 
in their privileged positions. As a result, local agents in relatively more decentralized territories 
should dissuade or discourage citizen participation in institutions that may pose a threat large 
enough to challenge their continued control over resources and decision-making.  
Institutions of political representation, such as political parties and movements, are 
arguably the citizen organizations that pose the largest threats, since in a democracy, which is 
the case of most if not all the Latin American countries studied here, these institutions seek to 
influence government policies usually by nominating their own candidates with the purpose of 
seating them in political office. In contrast citizen principals that have lost agency due to 
decentralization should try to engage in mobilized forms of participation, since they are not able to 
find the appropriate spaces of political representation. Additionally, if citizens are able to 
recognize the new municipal duties and responsibilities that result from decentralization, they 
should carry out dealings more often at the local government and try to participate in municipal 
meetings. 
Other forms of participatory democracy, such as voter turnout, may show mixed results, 
due to the fact that local political elites could either discourage or encourage principals’ 
participation according to their anticipated calculus of the electoral outcomes. In other words, 
local agents may promote voter turnout in more decentralized setting if they think they could win 
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the following electoral period. At the same time, local political elites could place obstacles to 
voters if they fear potential undesired outcomes. Finally, other forms of civic engagement and 
participation in local organizations of the civil society are explored in this chapter at different 
decentralization degrees. Based on Putnam’s (1994) seminal contribution Making Democracy 
Work, I would expect that these social capital variables are independent from the levels of state 
decentralization. This expectation is based on Putnam’s finding that the quality of democracy was 
explained by the social engagement and participation preconditions of the North and South of 
Italy, and not on the deep institutional reforms carried out in that country.   
   
Alternative Explanations and Control Variables 
The section above has put forward a theory of political survival of local elites intended to 
discover the general effects of state decentralization on Latin America’s participatory 
democracies.  This section advances two rival hypotheses and a set of control variables that will 
be used in the empirical models to determine the factors that affect citizen participation. The rival 
hypotheses center around (1) Political trust and governance; and (2) Ethnic self-identification. 
The control variables focus on the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the 
population. 
 
Political Trust and Governance. The relationship between political trust and governance 
on the one hand, and the degree of citizen participation on the other, has been studied for quite 
some time and has been widely documented in the scholarly literature about civic engagement 
and participation. Arguably, some of the most notable contributions to this literature are the works 
of Almond and Verba in 1963 and Gamson in 1968. While Almond and Verba concluded that a 
sense of political efficacy and trust in political institutions are related with both party and 
organizational activism, Gamson manifested that a high sense of political efficacy in combination 
with low levels of political trust are important for citizen mobilization. Seligson (1980) noted that 
the now classical theories developed by Almond and Verba, on the one hand and Gamson on the 
other lacked “the unfortunate conceptual bifurcation of political participation into institutionalized 
 84 
and mobilized modes…” (75). Examples of institutionalized modes of participation are 
“campaigning and voting,” while examples of mobilized modes of participation are “riots and other 
forms of civil disorder” (75-76). As a result, Seligson finds in the same study that “…among Costa 
Rican peasants institutionalized participation is related to a sense of efficacy, whereas mobilized 
participation is related to low trust” (97). Based on these claims, I expect to find a positive 
relationship between a sense of political efficacy and good governance among the citizenry and 
higher levels of participation in institutionalized organizations. In particular, those who think that 
governmental performance is efficacious should participate more often in institutionalized 
organizations, such as elections and political parties.  
Conversely, I expect to find a negative relationship between trust in political institutions 
and mobilized participation. In other words, those individuals who manifest high levels of trust in 
formal political institutions should participate less often in public protests, riots and street 
demonstrations. The expectations above could be expanded in at least three ways. First, I 
evaluate not only the impact of efficacy perceptions, but also the effects of citizen experiences 
with institutional performance on political participation. In this sense, I expect to find greater 
citizen participation in contexts of low municipal corruption or crime victimization. Where crime 
and corruption rates are high, citizens may try to avoid any contact with institutionalized 
organizations in order to evade being victimized by these social ills. However, an alternative 
hypothesis may be formulated from the rationale that those who participate more often in 
institutionalized organization may precisely be the victims of crime and corruption in the first 
place. In other words, it may very well be possible to find an inverse relationship between 
corruption in particular and political efficacy in general, and citizen participation. This tautological 
reasoning suggests a high level of endogeneity between these variables; therefore their 
relationship will be analyzed with theoretical caution.  
Second, based on the social capital theory advanced by Putnam (1993) and others, I 
would expect a positive relationship between political trust and citizen participation in 
institutionalized organizations. More specifically, I expect to find greater institutionalized modes of 
citizen participation in contexts of high political trust in formal organizations of the democratic 
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regime. However, where political trust in these organizations is low I expect to find greater citizen 
engagement in mobilized modes of political participation, as mentioned before. Third, I also 
expect to find a positive association between preferences for direct democracy and both 
institutionalized and mobilized modes of citizen participation. In this view, those who think that the 
people should govern directly rather than through elected representatives should be relatively 
more engaged in all citizen participation modes.   
 
Ethnic Self-identification. Another way to explain variations across levels of citizen 
participation in formal governmental institutions and civil society organizations focuses on 
individual ethnic self-identification. In this view, ethnic groups’ perceptions of political 
representation should be directly related to the degree of citizen participation. In cases where 
ethnic groups are satisfied with the way they are represented by elected public officials, direct 
participation in public decision-making should be more sporadic. In contrast, ethnic groups who 
consider themselves as underrepresented minorities may perceive that elected representatives 
do not address their preferences properly, and therefore prefer to have greater stake in public 
decision-making in order to satisfy their specific demands.   
This hypothesis should be affected, of course, by the legislative context of each country. 
Nations with proportional representation formulas for seat assignments should be able to 
represent a larger portion of ethnic minorities than single district majority systems. Additionally, 
some countries in Latin America and the Caribbean apply different formulas for seat assignments 
in congress and in city councils. Nonetheless, I would expect that ethnic perceptions of their 
political representation affect more broadly their participatory behavior than the actual proportion 
of seats allocated in institutions of representation.  
 
Socioeconomic and Demographic Characteristics of the Population. A fourth possible 
way to explain variations in the degree of citizen participation is by analyzing education levels, 
age, sex, income and the city or town of residence of the citizenry. Drawing upon Lipset’s Political 
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Man (1981), once again,11 I would expect to find high education levels, economic prosperity, older 
individuals and men to be associated with higher levels of citizen participation in political or 
voluntary organizations of any type. In contrast, low education, economic insecurity, younger 
individuals and females should be associated with lower levels of citizen participation. In terms of 
the size of the city of residence, I expect to find greater citizen participation in smaller towns. The 
rationale behind this hypothesis is that in smaller municipalities, the implementation of goods and 
services, such as the construction of street or water pipelines, is usually carried out between 
municipal employees in concomitance with member of the benefited community. In larger cities, 
however, the implementation of these services is usually carried out on its entirety by the local 
government (see Montalvo 2010).     
 
Measuring the Impact of State Decentralization on Participatory Democracy in Latin 
America and the Caribbean 
In order to test the hypothesis of the political survival of local elites and to asses its rival 
hypotheses, I query the AmericasBarometer 2008 data set to operationalize measures that I think 
will be helpful in determining how citizen participation is shaped in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. This data set contains responses of 37,035 individuals in 22 countries in the region.12 
In the next pages, I will describe both the dependent and independent variables I use for each 
hypothesis, and will discuss how these variables are operationalized.  
 
Dependent Variables. In this chapter, I evaluate the effects of state decentralization on 
ten measures of participatory democracy. According to the theory advanced in the previous 
section, these measures of citizen participation are grouped into two the following: (a) Citizen 
participation in municipal meetings; (b) Citizen demand-making on municipal governments; (c) 
                                                      
11 For an expansion of Lipset’s theory, see Chapter II. 
12 These countries are: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. For more information see Chapter I and www.lapopsurveys.org 
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Citizen participation in meetings of religious organizations; (d) Citizen participation in meetings of 
parents associations; (e) Voter turnout; (f) Citizen participation in protests and demonstrations; (g) 
Citizen participation in political parties and movements; (h) Citizen participation in labor unions; (i) 
Citizen participation in professional associations; and (j) Citizen participation in communitarian 
activities.  
All dependent variables were obtained by LAPOP with the instrument attached in 
Appendix A1. Dependent variables (a) and (b) were obtained through the following questions: 
“Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 
months?” and “Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or 
councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months?” The original 1 and 2 dichotomous 
scale was recoded to a 0 and 1 dichotomy, where 0 means “No” and 1 means “Yes.” Dependent 
variables (c), (d), (g), (h), (i), and (j) were obtained through the following item: “I am going to read 
a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a 
week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never: Meetings of any religious 
organization?; Meetings of a parents’ association at school?; Meetings of a political party or 
political organization?; Meetings of a labor union?; Meetings of an association of professionals, 
merchants, manufacturers or farmers?; and Meetings of a community improvement committee or 
association?” The original 0 to 100 scale was recoded to a scale that ranges from 0 to 100, where 
0 means “Never,” 33 means “Once or twice a year, 67 means ”Once or twice a month,” and 100 
means “Once a week.” Dependent variable (e) was obtained through the following question: “Did 
you vote in the last presidential elections of (year of last presidential elections)?” The original 1 
and 2 dichotomous scale was recoded to a 0 and 1 dichotomy, where 0 means “Did not vote” and 
1 means “Voted.” Finally, dependent variable (f) was obtained through the following question: Do 
you participate in public demonstrations or protests? Do you do it sometimes, almost never or 
never? The original 1 to 3 scale is trichotomy, where 1 means “Sometimes,” 2 means “Almost 
Never,” and 3 means “Never.” A summary of the descriptive statistics for the ten dependent 
variables is depicted in Table III-2.  
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 Table III-2: Decentralization and Participatory Democracy: Dependent Variables 
  
VARIABLE NAME CODE N MEAN SD MIN MAX 
 Participation in Municipal Meetings NP1S 24,910 0.11 0.31 0 1 
 Demand-Making on Municipal Governments NP2S 24,910 0.14 0.34 0 1 
 Participation in Meetings of Religious Organizations CP6R 24,910 43.57 42.35 0 100 
 Meetings of Parents Associations CP7R 24,910 24.56 30.67 0 100 
 Voter Turnout VOTE 24,910 0.766 0.42 0 1 
 Participation in Protests and Demonstrations PROT2008 23,521 2.78 0.59 1 3 
 Participation in Labor Unions CP10R 24,910 4.21 15.45 0 100 
 Participation in Political Parties and Movements CP13R 24,910 7.6 20.20 0 100 
 Participation in Professional Associations CP9R 24,910 7.8 20.33 0 100 
 Participation in Communitarian Activities CP5R 24,910 19.07 28.57 0 100 
 
 
Independent Variables. Based on the theoretical section, the explanatory variables in this 
chapter center around: (a) State decentralization; (b) Political trust and democratic governance; 
(c) Ethnicity; and (d) Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the population. In terms 
of State Decentralization this chapter focuses on four measures to capture every dimension of the 
reform plus an index of the administrative and fiscal dimensions. First, the measure of fiscal 
decentralization is computed as the percentage of sub-national over total government 
expenditure from IMF and IADB data. Second, the measure of administrative decentralization is 
computed from qualitative World Bank data.13 These data show whether a service is executed by 
the central, the intermediate or the local government, or by a combination of the three, as 
explained below.  
When a service is totally executed by the local government, it receives 100 points. If a 
services is executed by either the intermediate or the central government, it receives 50 or 0 
points, respectively. If the service is provided by both the intermediate and local governments or 
by the central and local governments, or by all three, it receives 75 points. Finally, if the service is 
provided the central and the intermediate levels of government, it receives 25 points. 
Administrative decentralization is then the average of the scores received by each country in the 
provision of preschool, primary and secondary education, public health, urban highways, drinking 
                                                      
13 See section II of this chapter for more information about the data sources for state decentralization. 
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water and sewerage and waste collection. The selection of services and the scores given to each 
category are based on what I think are the most recurrent administrative duties decentralized 
according to the scholarly literature. 
With very few exceptions, mayors are nowadays popularly elected across all Latin 
American countries, giving to political decentralization dimension the empirical characteristic of a 
constant instead of a variable.14 This is why the third dimension of state decentralization is a 
dichotomous variable that takes on the value of 1 if the system is “Federal,” and 0 if the system is 
“Unitary,” instead of a more standard measure that would determine whether a mayor is elected 
or appointed. The fourth and final measure of decentralization is an index of the fiscal and 
administrative dimensions of state decentralization.15 This index is shown in Figure III-2.16 
A control, level II variable used in this section is the Human Development Index.17 This 
construct is a composite statistic crated by the United Nations Development Programme that 
classifies countries according to their level of life expectancy, education, and per-capita GDP as 
an indicator of standard of living.18 This index goes from 0 that means, “least developed” to 1 that 
means “most developed.”  
 
 
                                                      
14 See Table III-1 for more information. 
15 The scale reliability coefficient for this index is 0.77. 
16 In order to develop a more meaningful construct, the fiscal decentralization dimension was transformed into a ranking 
that goes from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the least fiscally decentralized and 100 the most fiscally decentralized 
countries in the region. The index depicted in Figure III-2 is, as a result, the average value of the fiscal and administrative 
dimensions.  
17 Since the number of level-II cases is low, I think this single variable may be useful as a proxy to control for some of the 
socioeconomic contexts of Latin American nations.   
18 For more information see: http://hdr.undp.org/en/  
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Figure III-2: Fiscal and Administrative Decentralization Index in 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
Next, the independent variables that measure Political Trust and Democratic Governance 
are divided into two groups. First, Trust in Political Parties, Trust in the Municipal Government, 
and Trust in Elections are measured with a scale that goes from 0 if the respondent  “Does not 
trust them at all” to 100 if the respondent “Trusts them a lot.” Second, crime and municipal 
corruption victimization take on the value of 0 if the respondent “Has not been victimized during 
the last year” and 100 if the respondent “Has been victimized during the last year.” Additionally, 
Satisfaction with Local Services is measured with a scale that goes from 0 if the respondent 
thinks, “the services provided by the municipality are very poor” to 100 if the respondent thinks, 
“the services provided by the municipality are very good;” and Efficacy of the National 
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Government is an index that goes from 0, representing the lowest level of efficacy in the eyes of 
the respondent to 100, representing the highest efficacy level.19  
 
Table III-3: Decentralization and Participatory Democracy: Independent Variables 
  VARIABLE NAME CODE N MEAN SD MIN MAX 
Socioeconomics and Demographics 
 Education EDS 24910 9.45 4.36 0 18 
 Age Q2S 24910 38.51 15.45 16 96 
 Female MUJER 24910 0.49 0.5 0 1 
 Quintiles of Wealth QUINTALL 24910 3.02 1.4 1 5 
 Size of City/Town of Residence TAMANOR 24910 2.81 1.57 1 5 
Ethnicity 
 White WHITE 24910 0.27 0.44 0 1 
 Mestizo MESTIZO 24910 0.48 0.5 0 1 
 Indigenous INDIG 24910 0.06 0.25 0 1 
 Black  BLACK 24910 0.12 0.32 0 1 
 Other OTHER 24910 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Governance Indicators 
 Crime Victimization VIC1R 24910 17.86 38.3 0 100 
 Satisfaction with Local Services SGL1R 24910 50.49 23.31 0 100 
 Municipal Bribe EXC11S 24910 3.19 17.57 0 100 
 Efficacy of National Government EFICGOV 24910 44.34 26.51 0 100 
Political Trust Indicators 
 Trust in Political Parties B21R 24910 34.36 28.66 0 100 
 Trust in the Municipal Government B32R 24910 50.56 29.66 0 100 
 Trust in Elections B47R 24910 51.06 30.9 0 100 
        
Support for Direct Democracy 
 Support for Direct Democracy POP107R 24910 40.72 33.21 0 100 
        
COUNTRY-LEVEL 
  VARIABLE NAME CODE N MEAN SD MIN MAX 
 Human Development Index 2007 HDI07 21 0.78 0.08 0.53 0.88 
 Federal Systems POL 21 19.05 40.24 0 100 
 Fiscal Decentralization FISC 21 16.52 15.54 1 49 
 Administrative Decentralization ADM_I 21 46.59 28.28 3.48 100 
  Index of Administrative and Fiscal Decentralization DINDEX 21 40.16 27.55 2.76 88.42 
 
                                                      
19 For more information, see:  Mitchell A. Seligson, Challenges to Democracy in Challenges to Democracy in Latin 
America and the Caribbean: Evidence from the AmericasBarometer 2006-07 (Nashville: Vanderbilt University, 2008). 
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The Ethnic Self-Identification variables are dummies for Mestizo, Indigenous, Black and 
Other, using White as base category. Finally, the Socioeconomic and Demographic 
Characteristics of the Population are: (a) Education, which goes from 0 to 18 years of completed 
education; (b) Quintiles of wealth, which goes from 1 to 5;20  (c) Sex, coded as 1 if “Female” and 0 
if “Male;” and (d) Size of the city/town of residence, coded from 1 that means “Rural Area” to 5 
that means “Metropolitan Area.” A summary of the independent variables descriptive statistics is 
depicted in Table III-3. 
As in Chapter II, in this chapter I fit several multi-level models in order to test the 
associations among the dependent and explanatory variables described in the hypotheses of this 
study.21 The model specification depends upon whether the dependent variable is continuous, 
dichotomous or categorical. The intra-class correlation coefficients are calculated by fitting fully 
unconditional models, according to the specification of the dependent variables.22 Drawing upon 
the theory of this chapter and according to the statistical significance of the relationship between 
state decentralization and some of the aspects of participatory democracy, the following models 
are fitted:23 
 
Equation III.1  
Dependent variable: Citizen Participation in Political Parties or Political Movements (continuous) 
Level-1 Model: 
Y = B0 + B1*(B21R) + B2*(VIC1R) + B3*(SGL1R) + B4*(B32R) + B5*(EFICGOV) 
+ B6*(MUJER) + B7*(Q2S) + B8*(EDS) + B9*(POP107R) + B10*(TAMANOR) + 
B11*(QUINTALL) + B12*(MESTIZO) + B13*(INDIG) + B14*(BLACK) + 
B15*(OTHER) + B16*(MCORR) + B17*(B47R) + R 
 
 
                                                      
20 For more information about how the quintals of wealth were created, see:  Abby Córdova, Nota metodológica: midiendo 
riqueza relativa utilizando indicadores sobre bienes del hogar (Nashville: El Barómetro de las Américas, 1 19, 2009).  
21 All the statistical analyses in this chapter are carried out in STATA 10.1 and HLM 6.08. 
22 The intra-class correlation for categorical dependent variables is not meaningful because the level-1 variance is 
heteroscedastic. 
23 A more complete explanation about these and other hierarchical models is developed in the introductory chapter of this 
dissertation.  
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Level-2 Model (no multi-level interaction): 
B0 = G00 + G01*(HDI07) + G02*(POL) + G03*(DINDEX) + U0 
 
Level-2 Model (multi-level interaction): 
B0 = G00 + G01*(HDI07) + G02*(POL) + G03*(DINDEX) + U0 
B1 = G10 + G11*(DINDEX) 
 
 
 
Equation III.2  
Dependent variable: Citizen Participation in Public Demonstrations or Protests (categorical) 
Level-1 Model 
Prob[Y(1) = 1|B] = P(1) 
Prob[Y(2) = 1|B] = P(2) 
Prob[Y(3) = 1|B] = P(3) = 1 - P(1) - P(2) 
 
 
 
log[P(1)/P(3)] = B0(1) + B1(1)*(B21R) + B2(1)*(VIC1R) + B3(1)*(SGL1R) + 
B4(1)*(B32R) + B5(1)*(EFICGOV) + B6(1)*(MUJER) + B7(1)*(Q2S) + 
B8(1)*(EDS) + B9(1)*(POP107R) + B10(1)*(TAMANOR) + B11(1)*(EXC11S) + 
B12(1)*(QUINTALL) + B13(1)*(MESTIZO) + B14(1)*(INDIG) + B15(1)*(BLACK) + 
B16(1)*(OTHER) + B17(1)*(B47R)  
 
log[P(2)/P(3)] = B0(2) + B1(2)*(B21R) + B2(2)*(VIC1R) + B3(2)*(SGL1R) + 
B4(2)*(B32R) + B5(2)*(EFICGOV) + B6(2)*(MUJER) + B7(2)*(Q2S) + 
B8(2)*(EDS) + B9(2)*(POP107R) + B10(2)*(TAMANOR) + B11(2)*(EXC11S) + 
B12(2)*(QUINTALL) + B13(2)*(MESTIZO) + B14(2)*(INDIG) + B15(2)*(BLACK) + 
B16(2)*(OTHER) + B17(2)*(B47R) 
 
 
Level-2 Model 
B0(1) = G00(1) + G01(1)*(HDI07) + G02(1)*(POL) + G03(1)*(DINDEX) + U0(1) 
B0(2) = G00(2) + G01(2)*(HDI07) + G02(2)*(POL) + G03(2)*(DINDEX) + U0(2) 
 
 
Variable coding is depicted in Table II-1.  
 
Results  
After carrying out several statistical analyses, this chapter finds no statistical relationship 
between state decentralization and most of the participatory democracy measures, except for: (a) 
Citizen participation in political parties or political movements; and (b) Citizen participation in 
public demonstrations or protests. In the following pages, I will report the degree of citizen 
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participation in each of these two organizations and institutions affected by decentralization. 
Additionally, I will present the results of the hierarchical models fitted to determine statistical 
significant correlations. Finally, I will show a multi-level interaction that puts in context some of the 
most statistically powerful associations between explanatory and dependent variables.       
Citizen Participation in Political Parties and Movements 
 
 
Figure III-3: Citizen Participation in Political Parties or Movements, 2008 
  
The first statistically significant result found in this chapter is the association between 
state decentralization and citizen participation in political parties and movements. Figure III-3 
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shows the frequency of citizen participation in meetings of these organizations of political 
representation in the region. At least three aspects of the comparative frequency of participation 
can be highlighted. First, citizen participation in political parties or movements in Latin America 
and the Caribbean appears to be rather low, as the regional average is only 7.6 points in a 0 to 
100 scale. However, people’s participation in this type of organizations of political representation 
is also low in relatively more advanced democracies. A separate analysis of LAPOP data (not 
depicted in the figure above) shows that the frequency of citizen participation in political parties or 
movements in Canada and the US is only 7.6 and 9.4 points in the same scale that goes from 0 
to 100, respectively, positioning these countries close to the regional average. 
Second, Figure III-2 shows that there is significant variation among rates of participation 
in political parties and movements across nations. At one extreme, countries like the Dominican 
Republic, Paraguay and Nicaragua show the highest rates of citizen participation, even above the 
advanced industrial democracies of Canada and the US. It is particularly important to note that 
the participation rate for citizens of the Dominican Republic is 24 points; that is, three times more 
participation than the average Latin American and Caribbean country. The other two countries 
with relatively high levels of participation, Paraguay and Nicaragua, show rates of 11.1 and 10.8, 
respectively.  
At the other extreme, countries like Bolivia, Ecuador and Chile show the lowest rates of 
participation in political parties and movements in the region. The inhabitants of a relatively stable 
democracy, such as Chile, show a participation rate as low as 1.6 points, placing this country next 
to Ecuador and Bolivia, two “partly free” regimes according to Freedom House, with participation 
rates of 3.7 and 3.4 respectively.24  Third, the computation of intra-class correlation coefficient for 
this variable shows that almost 5 percent of the variance can be explained across countries, 
suggesting that citizen participation in political parties and movements may vary according to the 
country’s degree of state decentralization. 
 
 
                                                      
24 For more information see: www.freedomhouse.org  
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 Table III-4: Results from the Means-As-Outcomes and Slopes-As-Outcomes Models 
Participation in Political Parties and Movements 
Model I Model II 
 Means as Outcomes 
Means and Slopes as 
Outcomes 
Intercept 7.72*** (1.344) 7.741*** (1.344) 
Individual-Level     
Socioeconomics and Demographics     
     Education 0.336*** (0.035) 0.333*** (0.035) 
     Age 0.034*** (0.008) 0.033*** (0.001) 
     Female -2.057***  (0.246) -2.434***  (0.246) 
     Quintiles of Wealth -0.345*** (0.097) -0.344*** (0.097) 
     Size of City/Town of Residence -0.856*** (0.088) -0.867*** (0.087) 
Ethnicity (Base category: White)     
Mestizo  0.185 (0.338) 0.175 (0.338) 
Indigenous 1.086* (0.598) 1.040* (0.597) 
Black 1.683*** (0.624) 1.760*** (0.624) 
Other -0.047 (0.599) -0.043 (0.598) 
Governance Indicators     
     Crime Victimization 0.023*** (0.003) 0.022*** (0.003) 
     Satisfaction with Municipal Services 0.007 (0.006) 0.007 (0.006) 
     Municipal Bribe 0.045*** (0.007) 0.044*** (0.007) 
     Efficacy of National Government 0.011* (0.06) 0.010* (0.06) 
Political Trust Indicators     
Trust in Political Parties 0.082*** (0.005) 0.083*** (0.005) 
Trust in the Municipal Government -0.002 (0.005) -0.002 (0.005) 
Trust in Elections 0.019*** (0.005) 0.019*** (0.005) 
Support for Direct Democracy     
     Support for Direct Democracy 0.013*** (0.005) 0.013*** (0.004) 
Country-Level      
Means as Outcomes     
     Human Development Index (2007) -9.358  (16.037) -3.807  (16.041) 
     Federal System 0.028 (0.037) 0.029 (0.037) 
     Index of Fiscal and Administrative    
Decentralization -0.100* (0.052) -0.099* (0.052) 
Slopes as Outcomes     
    Trust in Political Parties x Index of     Fiscal and 
Administrative Decentralization -- -- -0.001*** (0.000) 
Variance Components 
     Random effect         
          Participation in Political Parties, u0j 27.338***  27.338***  
          Reliability estimate 0.988   0.988   
Note: Individual and country-level variables grand-mean centered, except for group-mean centered 
internaction variables  
* = p < .10; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01 Number of Countries = 22      Number of Cases = 37,035 
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP     
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What are some of the factors that help to explain variations in the degree of citizen 
participation in political parties and movements both within and across countries? Table III-4 
summarizes the results obtained through hierarchical linear modeling. There are four aspects of 
the results that are worth noting according to the theory advanced in this chapter. First, Model I 
shows that after controlling for levels of human development and system type (i.e. federal vs. 
unitary), the degree of fiscal and administrative decentralization is negatively correlated to citizen 
participation in political parties and movements. In other words, as countries become more 
decentralized in fiscal and administrative terms, citizen participation in these institutions of 
political representation decreases. Substantively, the largest possible effect of decentralization on 
citizen participation in political parties or movements is depicted in Appendix A4. This result 
shows that moving from Jamaica to Colombia decreases, on average, citizen participation in 
these institutions and organizations of political representation by -8.56 points in a 0 to 100 scale. 
Second, some of the political trust and governance indicators that are significantly 
associated with citizen participation in meetings of political parties and movements show a 
positive contribution. As trust in elections and trust in political parties increase, citizen 
participation in these institutions of political representation increases as well. Similarly, those who 
perceive that the national government is efficacious participate more often in political parties and 
movements. Thus, political parties are seen as vehicles for national political representation, so in 
more decentralized countries citizens have less need for political parties, as they are not as 
relevant for local level politics. However, social ills such as crime and corruption victimization are 
also positively associated with participation in the institutions and organizations of political 
representation studied in this section. In other words, as crime and corruption victimization 
increase, political party engagement increases too. This may represent for citizens system failure 
at the local level, so citizens turn to parties and away from municipal governments. Finally, those 
individuals who think that citizens should govern directly and not through elected representatives 
show higher rates of participation in political parties and movements. This result suggests that 
those individuals who participate more often in political institutions in general may do so because 
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they perceive they should take a more direct involvement in governmental activities in the first 
place. However, further evidence is needed to support this claim. Sub-national coefficients, like 
trust in the municipal government or satisfaction with the services provided by the local 
government are not statistically significant. 
Substantively, the largest effect on citizen participation is the one exerted by the degree 
of trust in political parties, with a total effect of 8.2 points in the scale that goes from 0 to 100. Not 
surprisingly, this is the largest effect not only across all political trust and governance indicators, 
but also among all level-I variables. For this reason, it is imperative to know if state 
decentralization affects the strong existing association between trust in political parties and 
participation in these institutions. Model II in Table III-4 shows the results of the multi-level 
interaction.25 The negative coefficient indicates that the positive effect of trust in political parties 
on citizen participation in meetings of political parties and movements decreases as the degree of 
fiscal and administrative decentralization increases. Results depicted in Figure III-4 show that the 
slope of trust in political parties is a flatter in relatively more decentralized contexts (red line).26 
 
 
Figure III-4: Multilevel Interaction between Decentralization Degree and Trust in Political 
Parties on Citizen Participation in Political Parties and Movements 
                                                      
25 It is worth noting that substantive and statistical significance in both Models I and II are remarkably similar, thus no 
individual interpretation of each model will be made in order to save space.  
26 Negative values in the X-axis and the decentralization index are due to centering. See Chapter I for more information. 
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 Third, the indigenous and black categories in the ethnic self-identification variables are 
positively related to citizen engagement in political parties and movements. Statistically, both 
blacks and indigenous populations participate more often in these institutions and organizations 
of political representation in comparison to whites. Substantively, the participatory frequency for 
blacks is 1.68 points greater than whites, while the participatory frequency for indigenous it is 1.1 
points greater than whites. Finally, while education and age are positive contributors; female, 
quintiles of wealth, and size of the city or town of residence are negative contributors. In other 
words, as individuals get more years of completed education and grow older, their level of 
participation in political parties and movements increases. On the contrary, women, richer 
individuals and those residing in larger cities tend to participate less often in these institutions of 
political representation.   
 
Citizen Participation in Public Protests and Demonstrations  
 
 
Figure III-5: Citizen participation in Protests and Manifestations, 2008 
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 The second dependent variable that shows a statistically significant association with state 
decentralization is the percentage of people who participate in protests and manifestations. 
Controlling for the effects of the complex design, as all the statistical analyses in this dissertation 
are, the regional mean of citizen participation in this mobilized mode is 12.62 percent. Results 
depicted in Figure III-5 show that there is significant variation in the percentage of participation 
across countries. Countries with the highest rate of participation in protests and manifestations 
are Bolivia, Argentina and Peru, with 29.3, 27.3 and 17.4 percent, respectively. On the other 
hand, countries with the lowest rates of participation are the Dominican Republic, Brazil and El 
Salvador, with 7.0, 5.8 and 4.7 percent, respectively.  
When citizen participation in protests and demonstrations is analyzed as a trichotomous 
variable, it can be seen that 86.6 percent of the inhabitants of Latin America and the Caribbean 
do not participate in this mobilized mode. The remaining 12.4 percent participate either 
sometimes (7.2 percent) or almost never (5.2 percent). It is interesting to note, nonetheless, that 
18.2 percent of U.S. citizens reported having participated in public protests or demonstrations.27 
This is almost six percentage points above the regional mean of participation. Additionally, if we 
compare participation frequencies, it is striking to see that the percentage of people who 
participate in political parties and movements is only two points greater than the percentage of 
people who participate in public protests or demonstrations.    
                                                      
27 This question was not asked in Canada.  
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 Table III-5: Results from the Hierarchical Model for the Multinomial Citizen Participation in Protests 
Participation in Protests and Demonstrations (Model III) 
Category (1) Category (2) 
 Base category: Never Participate 
Sometimes 
Participate 
Almost Never 
Participate 
Intercept -2.550*** (0.134) -3.013*** (0.196) 
Individual-Level     
Socioeconomics and Demographics     
     Education 0.093*** (0.007) 0.053*** (0.008) 
     Age 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 
     Female -0.244***  (0.050) -0.243***  (0.059) 
     Quintiles of Wealth -0.009 (0.019) 0.021 (0.023) 
     Size of City/Town of Residence 0.000 (0.018) -0.054** (0.021) 
Ethnicity (Base category: White)     
Mestizo  0.154** (0.070) 0.010 (0.085) 
Indigenous 0.573*** (0.109) 0.020 (0.150) 
Black 0.274** (0.130) 0.025 (0.157) 
Other -0.045 (0.125) 0.137 (0.146) 
Governance Indicators     
     Crime Victimization 0.006*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 
     Satisfaction with Municipal Services -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
     Municipal Bribe 0.006*** (0.001) 0.003** (0.001) 
     Efficacy of National Government -0.004*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Political Trust Indicators     
Trust in Political Parties 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 
Trust in the Municipal Government 0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) 
Trust in Elections 0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) 
Support for Direct Democracy     
     Support for Direct Democracy 0.003*** (0.001) 0.016* (0.001) 
Country-Level      
Means as Outcomes     
     Human Development Index (2007) 1.839  (1.694) -3.21 (2.145) 
     Federal System  -0.003 (0.003) 0.001 (0.005) 
     Index of Fiscal and Administrative    
Decentralization 0.009* (0.005) 0.005 (0.007) 
     
Reliability Estimate 
          Reliability estimate 0.939   0.952   
Note: Individual and country-level variables grand-mean centered, excpet for Federal System 
* = p < .10; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01 Number of Countries = 20      Number of Cases = 27,977 
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP     
 
 
 102 
What are the characteristics of the individuals who sometimes or almost never 
participate, in comparison with those who never participate in public protests or demonstrations?  
Is there any effect of the degree of state decentralization on the odds of citizen participation? The 
answers to these questions are depicted in Table III-5.  Results from the hierarchical model for 
the multinomial dependent variable of citizen participation in protests and demonstrations show at 
least four theoretically relevant findings. First, as the degree of fiscal and administrative 
decentralization increases, the log odds of participating sometimes increases relative to those 
who never participate. However, there is no statistically significant association between state 
decentralization and the log odds of participating almost never, relative those who never 
participate in public protests and demonstrations.  A complete set of participation probabilities is 
depicted in Appendix A5.28 
Second, among the political trust indicators, only trust in political parties and support for 
direct democracy show significant associations with citizen participation in protests and 
manifestations. As trust in political parties increases, the log odds of being in the sometimes 
participate and almost never participate categories also increase, relative to being in the never 
participate category. Similarly, those who think that people should govern directly and not through 
elected representatives have higher log odds of belonging to the sometimes participate or the 
almost never participate categories, relative to belonging to the never participate category. With 
regards to the governance indicators analyzed in this study, as crime and corruption victimization 
increase, the log odds of both almost never participating and sometimes participating increase, 
relative to never participating in protests and manifestations. Finally, as the perception of national 
governmental efficacy increases, the log odds of sometimes participating decreases, relative to 
never participating.  The difference between the almost never participate category and the never 
participate category, however is no statistical significant effect, with respect to perceptions of 
national government efficacy. 
Third, most of the coefficients for the association between the ethnic self-identification 
indicators and the sometimes participate category are positive and statistically significant. 
                                                      
28 The formula use to convert log odds to probability is: !ij= 1 / 1+ exp (- "ij). 
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However, all of the coefficients for the association between the ethnicity variables and the almost 
never participate category are not significant. Specifically, being in the mestizo, indigenous or 
black category, as opposed to being in the white category, increases the log odds of participating 
sometimes in protests and manifestations relative to never participating. Fourth, two of the 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics also show significant contributions. Belonging to 
the female category, as opposed to the male category, decreases the log odds of sometimes 
participating or almost never participating relative to never participating in protests and 
demonstrations.  Conversely, as education increases, the log odds of sometimes participating in 
protests and manifestation increases relative to never participating. Finally, the difference 
between the categories almost never participate and never participate is not statistically 
significant with respect to an individual’s years of completed education.  
 
Lessons from State Decentralization and Participatory Democracy in Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
Four important lessons are drawn from the results presented above. First, in this chapter 
I have found two opposing, yet significant correlations between state decentralization and 
participatory democracy. According to the empirical analyses in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
high levels of fiscal and administrative decentralization are associated with both low levels of 
participation in political parties and high odds of participation in public protests. These results 
offer confirmatory evidence for the theory of political survival of local elites developed in the 
outset of the chapter. In general terms, these results suggest that in order to prevent replacement 
of their preferred political authorities, local political elites or coalitions of elites use the tools that 
result from decentralization with the purpose of preventing the emergence of local political 
competitors, making no distinction with regards to the political party ideology or affiliation. In other 
words, as decentralization increases, local political elites will discourage more fiercely citizen 
participation even in their preferred political parties in order to avoid potential competition. As a 
result of this behavior, those citizens that find it difficult to participate in political parties and 
perceive that local governments are not fulfilling their expectations are more likely to switch their 
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involvement in institutionalized to mobilized modes of participation (i.e. protests, demonstrations 
and riots), just as Seligson pointed out nearly 30 years ago in the 1980.  
Differently put, these findings suggest that there are some internal mechanisms in state 
decentralization that make political parties seem less effective to citizens as institutions of political 
representation. As a result, individuals may face incentives to turn to mobilized modes of 
participation in order to voice their demands. In short, state decentralization may be producing an 
unintended deinstitutionalization of citizen participation in organizations of political representation 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, and fomenting at the same time public demonstrations, 
protests and riots. What are the internal mechanisms of decentralization that make individuals 
less prone to participate in formal institutions of political representation? The answer to this 
question revolves around political survival of local elites, and will be fully developed in Chapter V. 
A cautionary note must be introduced to the analysis above, because the inverse 
direction of causality may be possible. In this view, countries where institutionalized modes of 
participation are low and the likelihood of mobilized modes is high may dwell citizens who have 
crafted the relatively high levels of fiscal and administrative decentralization. A partial solution to 
this potential caveat would be to carry out a comparative historical analysis in order to determine 
if most of the pressure to decentralize comes from above or below.  Chapter V, as a result, will 
develop a critical juncture analysis in order to at least partially tap into this endogeneity problem.      
Second, in this chapter I found no statistical evidence for the association between state 
decentralization and participation in consensus institutions. In other words, the theory implying 
that state decentralization increases citizen participation in city council meetings or fosters 
demand-making on municipal governments does not pass the empirical test here. Even though 
this part of the results is consistent with Putnam’s (1994) claims and with the cites put forward in 
the epigraph of this chapter, it is important to note that the low number of level-II cases may also 
be responsible for these non-findings. To try to solve this problem, I will carry out a similar 
analysis in Chapter IV with 46 level-II cases in order to increase the statistical power necessary to 
more appropriately verify the theory of the effects of state decentralization on participation in local 
institutions of the civil society.    
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Third, the results presented here show that there is a positive association between crime 
and corruption vicitimization on the one and, and citizen participation in political parties and public 
protests on the other. These findings may be explained in two ways. First, individuals who 
experience these social ills may be more inclined to participate in political parties or public 
protests in order to change the course of social interactions. Second, those who participate more 
often may also be more likely to be exposed to higher levels of crime and corruption. Additionally, 
higher levels of trust in political parties and a preference for direct democracy are also positively 
correlated with participation in political parties and public protests. No statistically significant 
relationship was found, however, between low levels of trust in other institutions and mobilized 
modes of participation.  
Finally, some of the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the population as 
well as the ethnic self-identification variables also show consistent association patterns with 
participation in political parties and public protests. The results presented here show that more 
educated individuals and men are usually more prone to participate in political parties and 
engage in public protests or demonstrations. Additionally, mestizos and indigenous populations 
are more likely to participate in political parties and public demonstrations, relative to whites. In 
the next chapter, I will explore whether or not the findings presented here survive the level of 
analysis test in 46 Argentinean municipalities.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
IV. EXPLORING THE LINK BETWEEN DECENTRALIZATION AND PARTICIPATORY 
DEMOCRACY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 46 ARGENTINEAN MUNICIPALITIES  
 
 In the prior chapter, this dissertation found that state decentralization is negatively 
associated with citizen participation in political parties and movements on the one hand, and 
positively associated with citizen participation in public protests and manifestations on the other. 
These results suggest that decentralization reforms activate certain internal social mechanisms 
that foster changes from institutional modes to mobilized modes of citizen participation. These 
changes, in my opinion, arise as a result of choices made by local political elites and the 
responses of citizen principals to local agents behaviors. In general terms, political elites seek to 
guarantee their survival by placing obstacles to citizen participation in institutions that may place 
their permanence in power at risk. The most important institution in this regard is political parties, 
and the efforts of local elites to prevent citizen participation in these organizations of political 
representation should be higher as decentralization increases. Citizens, as a result, try to voice 
their complaints and demands about the government in mobilized forms of participation, such as 
public demonstrations and riots, because they perceive they are not able to meet their demands 
through institutionalized forms, especially in relatively more decentralized contexts.  
Chapter III, however, was not able to establish a clear connection between 
decentralization and citizen participation in either municipal institutions or other organizations of 
civil society. One of the main reasons behind this inability to find empirical correlations may be 
methodological rather than theoretical. Since the number of level-II cases available was limited to 
22 countries, the large confidence intervals in the associations between individual-level and 
country-level variables may falsely lead to believe that there is no theoretical connection between 
decentralization and citizen participation in local organizations of the civil society. In effect, we 
 107 
have a strong risk of “type II errors.”1 In order to avoid these potential errors, this chapter 
introduces a new data set that will allow carrying out a sub-national comparative analysis of 
survey data representative at 46 municipalities in Argentina. The characteristics of this data set 
will not only help to increase the statistical power of hierarchical models, but will also allow to 
assess the particular effect that every decentralization dimension has on participatory democracy. 
Data for this analysis come from “Programa de Auditoria Ciudadana (PAC),” collected through 
survey research by the Argentinean Government in three waves between 2003 and 2008. Data 
were gathered through 18,583 face-to-face public opinion interviews and respondents were 
selected in a stratified and clustered sample design.  
In general terms, this chapter finds, once again but with increased statistical robustness, 
that state decentralization is negatively associated with citizen participation in political parties. In 
particular, those Argentinean territories with relatively higher levels of administrative 
decentralization, measured as municipal per capita expenditures relative to total provincial per 
capita expenditures, are ones in which citizens are less likely to participate in political parties than 
those with lower per capita expenditures. This result is consistent with what was found in Chapter 
IV and with what will be reported on Chapter V.  
Another hypothesis that finds empirical support in this chapter is that state 
decentralization increases citizen demand-making on municipal governments. As a result of 
bringing the government closer to the people, citizens should be able to carry out dealings at 
governmental offices more easily because they do not have to travel long distances, especially if 
they live far away from the national capital, in order to voice their needs and demands. Moreover, 
empowered individuals should be able to direct their demands to municipal offices, especially in 
territories that have the ability to tax their residents. By recognizing which governmental level is in 
                                                      
1 Type II errors occur when we fail to reject the null hypothesis when it is, in fact, false. An example of this type of error 
may occur if we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient that results from the association between state 
decentralization and demand-making on municipal governments is not significantly different from zero; or in other words, 
we wrongly conclude that there is no statistical association between decentralization and demand-making on municipal 
governments. For more information see Appendix A in Damodar Guajarati, Basic Econometrics, Fourth Edition (West 
Point: Mc GrawHill, 2003). 
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charge of collecting and spending taxes, citizen principals could increase their oversight over 
public expenditures, especially if they reside closer to governmental offices. Consistent with this 
theory, results from the hierarchical models show that fiscal decentralization fosters citizen 
participation in Argentinean municipal governments. Those municipalities that have the ability to 
tax their residents experience more demand-making relative to those municipalities where tax 
impositions are forbidden by law.  
Finally, the hypothesis developed in Chapter III that claims that voter turnout may show 
mixed results, due to the fact that local political elites could either discourage or encourage 
principals’ participation according to their anticipated calculus of the electoral outcomes, is also 
tested in this chapter. In other words, this hypothesis states that local agents may promote voter 
turnout in more decentralized setting if they think they could win the following electoral period. At 
the same time, local political elites could place obstacles to voters if they fear potential undesired 
outcomes. Results from the hierarchical models indicate that in the 46 Argentinean municipalities 
subject to this study, political decentralization is negatively associated to voter turnout. In 
municipalities regulated by organic charters, voter turnout is lower than in municipalities that do 
not possess this constitutional document. A potential explanation for this finding is that municipal 
charters are designed by local elites and other actors in such a way as to make it difficult for 
citizens to participate as voters in electoral processes. An alternative explanation may be that 
citizen principals are relatively more disenchanted with the way electoral systems work in 
municipalities that possess organic charters, and hence prefer to refrain from voting. Not matter 
which explanation, or a combination of the two, is the most appropriate for this finding; it seems 
clear that municipal organic charters in Argentina are associated with a greater electoral apathy 
among the citizenry. 
Just as in Chapter III, in this chapter I was not able to find a clear statistical relationship 
between state decentralization and citizen participation in local organizations of the civil society, 
such as meetings of neighborhood associations, labor unions, meetings of parents associations 
and meetings of professional associations. These non-findings corroborate Putnam’s (1994) 
theory that suggests that civic engagement and participation in civil organizations is rather a 
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societal precondition rather than a product of decentralization. It is also important to note, 
however, that the study of mobilized modes of citizen participation, such as public protests, 
demonstrations and riots, was not included in the PAC questionnaires. Therefore, the positive 
statistical association between decentralization and mobilized modes of participation found in 
Chapter III cannot be corroborated through PAC data.  
In sum, I was able to find statistically significant associations between state 
decentralization and participatory democracy in three out of seven institutions and organizations. 
While citizen participation in political parties is less frequent in relatively more decentralized 
Argentinean municipalities, the effect of municipal decentralization on citizen participation in other 
institutions is rather mixed. On the one hand, fiscal decentralization shows a positive association 
with the frequency with which citizens carry out dealings at the municipality; on the other, political 
decentralization in Argentinean municipalities is related to lower levels of voter turnout, at least in 
the 46 cities and towns selected for this study. 
In the following section I will carry out an analysis of the evolution of Argentinean 
municipalities, making a particular emphasis on the transformation from “cabildos” (Spanish city 
councils) to modern municipal governments, the assignment of municipal competences, and the 
state of decentralization in the 46 municipalities. I will then summarize the theoretical framework 
that has been discussed throughout this dissertation to analyze the effects of decentralization on 
participatory democracy. Next, I will briefly describe the data and variables that will be used in my 
analysis, followed by a specification of the hierarchical models that will allow me to verify the 
theoretical association between decentralization and citizen engagement in institutionalized vs. 
mobilized modes of participation in Argentina. Subsequently, I will present the results obtained by 
fitting three multi-level models to test the theory summarized in this chapter and fully developed in 
the introductory chapter of this dissertation. Lastly, I will discuss the results and conclude.      
 
A Look into the Evolution of Argentina’s Municipal Governments          
The first forms of municipal governments in Argentina were contemporaneous to the 
Spanish conquest (Iturburu 2001). When founding a new city, Spanish colonizers used to 
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jurisdictionally delimit a territorial circumscription, usually composed of both rural and urban 
areas, and then established a “cabildo.” The functioning of this very first form of city council (the 
cabildo) was based upon customary laws and municipal ordinances instead of a normative of 
general scope (Iturburu 2001). Initially, these forms of local governments were very aristocratic 
since only conquistadores and their descendents were allowed to represent them. However, the 
composition of city councils gradually changed until the XVII century, when groups of neighbors 
were allowed to buy municipal positions in city council auctions.2 This new governing class 
quickly offered less resistance to the Spanish Crown, giving away the original autonomy with 
which Argentinean cabildos were initially constituted  (Tau Anzoátegui and Martiré 1981). 
In general terms, the duties and responsibilities of these early Argentinean city councils 
were the registration of professional titles, land distribution, maintenance of the city’s health and 
infrastructure, conservation and inspection of city jails and hospitals, control of farmer’s markets, 
price regulations, fixing salaries, costs and prices, primary schooling, political advisory, and 
justice administration. In some occasions, city council officers invited neighbors, clergymen and 
military officers to open city council meetings to discuss issues that needed public opinion 
support. Final decision-making remained, however, on the hands of municipal officers. Public 
funding to accomplish the above duties and responsibilities was obtained usually through taxes, 
especially to agriculture and stockbreeding, transit in bridges, public auctions, and public spaces; 
and through the leasing of public houses and communal lands (Iturburu 2001). 
In 1776, the Spanish Crown created the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata that led to a 
territorial restructuration. As a result of this reform, the newly created “intendencias” were in 
charge of improving tax collection, promoting economic development, and strengthening the 
political centralization of the Spaniard Empire. The quartermaster (intendente) was directly 
appointed by the King and was responsible for the administration of justice, fiscal revenues, and 
                                                      
2 According to Tau Anzoátegui and Martiré (1981) and Iturburu (2001), King Philip II of Spain introduced a system where 
some municipal positions were auctioned, except for mayors’ offices, in order to obtain fiscal resources. This system 
allowed buyers, under certain conditions, to re-sell, donate or transfer their perpetual positions in municipal offices.   
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homeland security  (Tau Anzoátegui and Martiré 1981). A little after the “May Revolution,”3 during 
1813 and 1814 the new Provinces were created based upon the former “intendencias,” and were 
administered by governors appointed by the central government. However, the 1820 outset of the 
central government facilitated the creation of an autonomous Provincial system that abolished the 
cabildos, which duties and responsibilities were carried out by the newly created executive, 
legislative and judicial powers of the Argentinean Provinces  (Tau Anzoátegui and Martiré 1981; 
Iturburu 2001). 
After an anarchic period, the 1853 National Constitution established that: 
 
Each Province shall write a Constitution for itself that ensures the administration of justice, 
its municipal regime and its primary education. Under these conditions, the federal 
Government shall guarantee each province the use and exercise of its institutions 
(Constitutional Provision cited by Iturburu 2001:24).4  
 
 
However, the “municipal regime” expression was ambiguous enough to create a century-
long controversy, where a group interpreted this Constitutional Provision as an autarkic form of 
government in opposition to a second group that interpreted it as an autonomous level of 
government (Ternavasio 1990; Passalacqua 1992; Rosatti 1994). In this context, Provincial 
Constitutions were in charge of defining the competences and resources of the municipal 
jurisdiction, giving it in most cases only administrative responsibilities and limiting the political 
dimension to the provincial and national levels of government (Tau Anzoátegui and Martiré 1981; 
Iturburu 2001).  
This deinstitutionalization of the “cabildos” deepened in the 1930s when the national 
government decided to transfer the provision of public goods and services that once belonged to 
the municipality to the private sector and to the provincial and national levels of government 
(Dromi 1983).  In the same decade, developed countries began to adopt the Keynesian economic 
model, and Argentina, along with other countries in the region, started to implement the import 
                                                      
3 Argentina’s May Revolution (May 18 to May 25, 1810) is considered the starting point for the Argentine War of 
Independence. For more information see:  H. Tau Anzoátegui and E. Martiré, Manual de Historia de las Instituciones 
Argentinas (Buenos Aires: Macchi, 1981). 
4 Translated from Spanish to English by this author.  
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substitution and industrialization (ISI) model that drastically changed the role of the state in the 
economy. The ISI model intensified after 1945, and political, administrative and fiscal powers 
were highly concentrated in the central offices of authoritarian regimes until 1973. Starting in this 
year and until the mid-1980s, the centrist state was not only hyper-dimensioned, but also had 
concentrated a considerable external debt, an increasing fiscal deficit and hyperinflation. The 
popular demands, along with the economic debacle exerted significant pressures in 1983 to bring 
about democracy. This democratization process favored decentralization as an initiative intended 
to strengthen the local levels of government.     
Municipal decentralization initiatives included in the 1994 constitutional reform formally 
granted institutional autonomy to Argentinean municipalities. These initiatives included, but were 
not limited, to the transfer of functions and competences that once were responsibility of the 
national and provincial levels of government (Arroyo 1997). Thus, the current duties and 
responsibilities of modern Argentinean municipalities can be summarized in two groups. First, the 
“traditional competences” that includes: (a) Administrative organization of the local government to 
plan the future, organize the system, manage personnel, governing activities and controlling 
results; (b) Urban development, including urban planning, public works (construction of gas 
pipelines, water and sewerage infrastructure, urban hygiene, waste collection, urban illumination, 
etc.); (c) The provision of some public services (potable water and sewerage, garbage collection, 
street maintenance); and (d) The regulation of communitarian life, such as local security, 
commercial and industrial security and safety, urban transit, etc.  (Tau Anzoátegui and Martiré 
1981; Iturburu 2001).  
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Source: INDEC, 2001 and Ministerio del Interior de la República Argentina, 2008.  
    
Table IV-1: Population, Organic Charter and Taxation in 46 Argentinean Municipalities 
Province Municipality Municipal Population  Organic charter Municipal Tax 
Pergamino 99,193 No No 
Olavarria 103,961 No No 
Junin 88,664 No No 
Morón 309,380 No No 
Bragado 40,259 No No 
Villa Gesell 24,282 No No 
Balcarce 42,039 No No 
General Belgrano 15,381 No No 
General Pueyrredón 564,056 No No 
Bahía Blanca 284,776 No No 
Buenos Aires 
San Fernando 151,131 No No 
Catamarca San F. del Valle de Catamarca 141,260 Yes No 
Monte Caseros 24,671 Yes Yes Corrientes 
Curuzú Cuatiá 36,390 Yes Yes 
Chaco Roque Saenz Peña 88,164 No Yes 
Chubut Comodoro Rivadavia 137,061 Yes Yes 
Gualeguaychú 76,220 No No 
Crespo 18,296 No No 
Concepción del Uruguay 67,474 No No 
Diamante 19,545 No No 
Villaguay 32,027 No No 
Cerrito 4,653 No No 
Concordia 141,971 No No 
Entre Ríos 
Libertador San Martín 5,273 No No 
Formosa Pirané 19,124 No Yes 
Jujuy Palpala 48,199 Yes Yes 
La Pampa General Pico 53,352 No No 
Lujan de Cuyo 104,470 No No 
Lavalle 32,129 No No 
Godoy Cruz 182,977 No No 
Las Heras 182,962 No No 
Malargüe 23,020 No No 
Mendoza 
Guaymallén 251,339 No No 
San Martín de los Andes 23,519 Yes Yes 
Villa La Angostura 7,526 No Yes Neuquén 
Neuquén 203,190 Yes Yes 
Rawson 107,740 Yes No San Luis 
Rivadavia 76,150 No No 
Rafaela 83,563 No No 
Rosario 909,397 No No 
Firmat 18,294 Yes No 
Las Rosas 12,793 No No 
Santa Fe 
El Trebol 10,506 No No 
Tucumán Yerba Buena 50,783 No No 
Salta Coronel Moldes 4,194 No Yes 
Córdoba Villa Gral Belgrano 5,888 No Yes 
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Second, the “new competences” envision the Argentinean municipality as a promotion 
agent. This consists of, on the one hand, (a) The architectural policies of local development, the 
design and implementation of strategies, territorial and societal revalorization; and (b) The 
management of territorial image in order to generate innovative surroundings capable of 
attracting, retaining and fomenting investments and employment. On the other hand, the new 
municipality is in charge of connecting both the educational and productive systems, in order to 
avoid brain drain, reinforce human capital and strengthen local firms. Other new municipal duties 
and responsibilities include the procurement of social welfare by detecting specific local 
necessities and registering them in the political agenda, coordinating technical studies and public 
deliberation, intervening in executive decision-making, executing projects, evaluating results and 
communicating social dynamics of the city hall (Tau Anzoátegui and Martiré 1981;  Finot 2001; 
Iturburu 2001). 
In spite of the general duties and responsibilities mentioned above, not all municipal 
governments share the same degree of fiscal, administrative and political decentralization. For 
instance, there are some municipalities that have the right to develop a local constitution known 
as “organic charter.” This type of municipal constitution is intended to regulate the local 
government’s functioning and giving it higher levels of political autonomy. There are at least three 
prerequisites that municipalities need to fulfill before being able to write an organic charter. First, 
the municipality’s Provincial Constitution should allow the establishment of an organic charter. 
Second, there should be a minimum of inhabitants in the municipality interested in drafting an 
organic charter. Finally, there should be enough political will to use this municipal right.5 Table IV-
1 summarizes population sizes and municipal possession of organic charters in 46 Argentinean 
local governments selected for this dissertation.  
Table IV-1 also depicts those municipalities that exercise their right to collect tax income. 
It is important to note, however, that not all municipalities are allowed to tax their residents. 
                                                      
5 For more information about the requirements to draft an Organic charter, see Mónica Iturburu, Municipios Argentinos, 
Segunda Edición (Buenos Aires: Dirección Nacional de Estudios y Documentación del Instituto Nacional de la 
Administración Pública, 2001). 
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Municipal taxation ability depends on whether or not the Province to which the local government 
belongs has formally decentralized this fiscal competence. Other sources of municipal income in 
Argentina are: (a) services fees; (b) economic activities or concessions; (c) fines received from 
contraventions; (d) loans; (e) donations and subsidies; and (f) fiscal transfers from other levels of 
government (know in Argentina as co-participation).6 National legislation, Provincial Constitutions 
and organic charters (where applicable) regulate not only municipal income but also local 
governments’ expenditures. An important sum of the annual municipal budget is spent in both the 
traditional and new municipal competences described earlier in this section. Figure IV-1 shows a 
comparative analysis of the levels of administrative decentralization in the 46 municipalities 
selected for this study in municipal per capita expenditure units. 
The bar chart on the right of Figure IV-1 (1b) shows the per capita municipal expenditure 
as a proportion of the total per capita expenditure of the province. This ratio allows comparing 
municipal per capita spending controlling for average provincial expenditures.7 The bar chart 
shows that municipalities like Rawson, Rivadavia and Curuzú Cuatiá have the lowest levels of per 
capita expenditure relative to the total average spent in their provinces. On the other hand, per 
capita expenditures in municipalities like Coronel Moldes and Malargüe even surpass the 
average per capita provincial expenditures.8 Additionally, the bar chart on the left of Figure IV-1 
shows a proxy for municipal human development, based on Census data of socioeconomic 
indicators such as health, education and quality of housing materials.9 At one extreme, 
municipalities such as Libertador San Martín, Morón and Bahía Blanca, show the highest levels 
of human development. At the other extreme, municipalities like Pirané, Coronel Moldes and 
Lavalle show the lowest levels of human development. The possession or lack of an organic 
charter, the capacity to tax municipal inhabitants and the municipal per capita expenditure ratio 
                                                      
6 For more information about municipal sources of income in Argentina, see Javier Curcio, Financiamiento municipal y 
reducción de la pobreza en Argentina, Medio ambiente y desarrollo (Santiago de Chile: CEPAL, 2005), 71. 
7 The computation of this ratio is further explained in the variable description section. 
8 This is why their values are above 1.  
9 The computation of the human development proxy is further explained in the variable description section.  
 116 
will serve as measures of political, fiscal and administrative decentralization respectively; and 
both the municipal population and human development levels will serve as control variables. 
  
 
Figure IV-1: Human Development and Municipal Expenditure Ratio in 
46 Argentinean Municipalities 
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State Decentralization and Participatory Democracy in 46 Argentinean Municipalities   
How do these features of Argentinean municipalities shape the degree of citizen 
participation in consensus and dissension institutions? This dissertation found in Chapter III that 
state decentralization is associated with lower levels of citizen participation in political parties on 
the one hand, and with higher log odds of participation in public protest on the other. In this 
chapter I will verify if some of these results hold when using sub-national level data. This 
empirical verification is based upon the theory of state decentralization and participatory 
democracy advanced throughout this dissertation. In general terms, I claim that state 
decentralization has contrasting effects on citizen participation according to the type of institution 
or organization to be studied. This theory may be summarized in the following hypothesis 
(political survival of local elites) that will be tested in this chapter, along with a rival explanation 
(democratic governance) and a set of control variables (socioeconomic characteristics of the 
population): 
 
Political Survival of Local Elites. The study of the impact of state decentralization on 
citizen participation in governmental institutions and organizations of the civil society is at the 
heart of this dissertation. Consistent with the theory developed in both the introductory chapter 
and Chapter III, the general expectation is that local political elites will either encourage or 
discourage citizen participation depending upon their expected utility. In this view, 
decentralization increases citizen participation in institutions and organizations that foster the 
likelihood of political survival of local elites, or that do not pose a risk large enough to negatively 
modify the status quo. In contrast, state decentralization decreases citizen participation in 
organizations and institutions that may challenge the political stability of local elites. As a result, I 
expect to find once again a negative relationship between decentralization and citizen 
participation in political parties. Conversely, there should be higher levels of demand-making on 
municipal governments in more decentralized settings. Finally, it Putnam (1994) is right, I expect 
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to find statistical independence between decentralization and participation in local organizations 
of the civil society.10  
 
Democratic Governance. The degree of democratic governance is another way to explain 
different levels of citizen participation. In this view, a sense of institutional efficacy should be 
associated with greater citizen participation in institutional modes. In other words, those 
individuals who positively rate the work of municipal employees, those who assess the 
performance of municipal institutions as adequate, and those who are satisfied with the way 
democracy works at the municipal level should participate more often in municipal meetings or 
carry out more dealings at the local government. Conversely, those who regard the local or 
national governments as inefficacious or have been victimized by municipal corruption should 
participate more often in mobilized modes such as protests, manifestations and riots. Finally, 
consistent with the findings of previous chapters and the theory advanced by Putnam (1993) and 
others, I expect to find little or no effect of state decentralization on citizen participation in 
organizations of the civil society.  
 
Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Population. A third way to explain variations in the 
degree of citizen participation is through the socioeconomic characteristics of the population. 
Based on Lipset’s findings (1981), I expect to encounter a positive association between high 
education levels, economic prosperity, aging individuals and men, and citizen participation in 
political or voluntary organizations of any type. In contrast, low education, economic insecurity, 
younger individuals and females should be negatively associated with citizen participation. 
Finally, in terms of population size, I expect to find greater citizen participation in smaller towns. 
The rationale behind this hypothesis is consistent with what was found in Chapter III: The 
collaboration between larger shares of the population and municipal officers is logistically easier 
in smaller than in larger municipalities (see also Montalvo 2010).     
 
                                                      
10 See Chapters I and III for fully developed hypotheses. 
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Political Survival of Argentinean Local Elites: The Linkage Between Theory and 
Observation 
The three hypothesis described above summarize the factors that I believe are affecting 
the depth of participatory democracy in the 46 Argentinean municipalities selected for this study. 
In order to test these hypotheses, I query the PAC’s public opinion survey data gathered between 
2003 and 2008. These data were obtained through face-to-face public opinion interviews of 
18,583 non-institutionalized individuals, with a sample design that allows reaching conclusions at 
the municipal level. Respondents were selected probabilistically and the sample design included 
area stratification and clustering at the neighborhood level. At the household level, individuals 
were selected using sex and age quotas, taking into consideration only respondents of at least 18 
years of age. The error margins oscillate between +/- 2.9 and +/- 4.8 depending upon the 
dispersion of the variable, with a confidence interval of 95 percent. 
 
Dependent Variables. In this chapter, I evaluate the effects of state decentralization on 
seven measures of participatory democracy in Argentina. According to the theory advanced 
throughout this dissertation, these measures of citizen participation are: (a) Citizen dealings at the 
municipal government; (b) Voter turnout; (c) Citizen participation in parents-teachers 
associations; (d) Citizen participation in political parties; (e) Citizen participation in labor unions; 
(f) Citizen participation in cooperatives; (g) Citizen participation in neighborhood meetings.  
PAC obtained all variables included in this chapter with the instrument that is included in 
Appendix A6 of this dissertation.11 Dependent variable (a) was obtained through the following 
question: “In the past 12 months, have you turned to any municipal office to carry out a 
transaction?”12 The original 1 and 2 dichotomous scale was recoded to dummy variable, where 0 
means “No” and 1 means “Yes.” Dependent variable (b) was obtained through the following 
question: “Taking your age into account and the elections you could have participated in, would 
you say that you have…” The original 1 to 8 scale was recoded to a 0 to 100 scale, where 0 
                                                      
11 Questionnaire in Spanish.  
12 All questions shown here were translated by this author.  
 120 
means “Not voted in any election” and 100 means “Voted in all elections.” Variables (c); (e); (f); 
and (g) were obtained through the following battery of questions: “Do you currently participate in 
an organization of any type, for example: parent-teacher associations, religious or ecology group, 
neighborhood club, political parties, labor unions, etc.? Only if respondent does participate in an 
organization: In which of the following organization do you participate? Option 01: Labor union? 
Option 03: Neighborhood meetings? Option 04: Parent-teacher association? and Option 07: 
Cooperatives? The original filter and the 1 to 2 scale were recoded to a dummy variable were 0 
means “Does not participate” and 1 means “Does Participate.” Finally, dependent variable (d) is a 
combination of the following questions: “Do you currently participate in an organization of any 
type, for example: school cooperator, religious or ecologist group, neighborhood club, political 
parties, labor unions, etc.? Only if respondent does participate in an organization: In which of the 
following organization do you participate? Option 02: Political party?” and “To all except those 
who currently participate in political parties (Option 02): Have you ever participated in a political 
party?” The original 1 to 2 scales were recoded to a dummy variable where 0 means, “Does not 
and have not participated” and 1 means “Participates or have participated.” 
 
Independent Variables. Drawing upon the theoretical section, the explanatory variables in 
this chapter center around: (a) Municipal decentralization; (b) Democratic governance; and (d) 
Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the population. In terms of Municipal 
Decentralization this chapter focuses on three measures to capture every dimension of the 
reform. First, a measure of political decentralization indicates whether or not a particular 
municipality possesses an organic charter. With this measure I intend to capture the degree of 
municipal political autonomy (from higher levels of government) that all 46 popularly elected 
mayors have in their jurisdictions. As a result, the political decentralization dimension in this study 
takes on the value of 1 if an organic charter regulates the municipality, and 0 otherwise.13 
Second, a measure of fiscal decentralization differentiates local governments that generate their 
own revenues through income tax from those that only depend on tax transfers from other levels 
                                                      
13 Source: Argentine Ministry of Interior’s Webpage: http://www.mininterior.gov.ar/. Last accessed: November 2009.  
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of government. In this case, this fiscal decentralization measure takes on the value of 1 if the 
local government taxes its residents, and 0 otherwise.14  
Finally, the administrative decentralization measure for this chapter is a ratio of municipal 
per capital expenditure to total provincial per capita expenditures. For example, the 2007 
municipal budget in Gualeguaychú was 54,644,632.00 pesos for a 2001 population of 76,220. In 
the same year, the total provincial expenditure in Entre Rios (i.e. the sum of national, provincial 
and municipal expenditures) was 4,332,451,227.04 pesos for a 2001 population of 1,158,147. 
Thus the measure of administrative decentralization (MER) is computed as follows:  
Equation IV.1 
! 
MER =
m _budget
m _ population
tp_expenditure
p_ population
=
54,644,632
76,220
4,332,451,227.04
1,158,147
= 0.192. 
Where:   
m_budget is the executed municipal budget for 2007;15 
m_population is the 2001 municipal population;16 
tp_expenditure is the 2007 total provincial expenditure (i.e. the sum of national, 
provincial and municipal expenditures in a particular province);17 and   
p_population is the 2001 provincial population.18  
 
Additionally, two level-II indicators are used as control variables: size of the municipal 
population and a proxy of municipal human development. While the former is measured through 
the 2001 municipal population in thousands of inhabitants, the latter is an index of three census’ 
                                                      
14 Source:  Javier Curcio, Financiamiento municipal y reducción de la pobreza en Argentina, Medio ambiente y desarrollo 
(Santiago de Chile: CEPAL, 2005), 71. 
15 Source: municipal and provincial WebPages, and local newspapers.  
16 Source: 2001 National Census (www.indec.gov.ar).  
17 Source: Dirección de Análisis de Gasto Público y Programas Sociales – Secretary of Economic Policy of the Ministry of 
Economics and Public Finances (http://www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/default.htm)   
18 Source: 2001 National Census (www.indec.gov.ar). 
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constructs: (a) Quality of housing materials in the municipality, measured through a scale that 
goes from 0 “worst quality” to 1 “best quality;” (b) Educational level in the municipality, measured 
through a scale that goes from 0 “least educated” to 1 “most educated;” and (c) Health level in the 
municipality, measured as the percentage of individuals in the municipality with access to health 
care.19   
Next, six independent variables are operationalized to measure the concept of 
Democratic Governance. First, support for political parties is measured with a dummy variable 
that takes on the value of 0 if respondent thinks that “Democracy can function without political 
parties” and 1 if respondent thinks that “There cannot be democracy without political parties.” 
Second, need for improvement of quality of national politics and institutions is measured through 
a scale that goes form 0 that means “Nothing needs to be improved” to 100 that means “A lot 
needs to be improved.” Third, satisfaction with the way democracy works at the municipality is 
measured through a scale that goes form 0 “Not satisfied at all” to 100 “Very satisfied.” Fourth, 
municipal bribe is measured as 0 if the respondent “has not been victimized” and 1 if the 
respondent “has been victimized.” Fifth, performance of municipal institutions perception is 
measured with a scale that goes from 0 if the respondent thinks it is “Very bad” to 100 if the 
respondent thinks it is “Very good.”  Sixth, evaluation of municipal employees is measured from 0 
if respondent thinks they perform “Very badly” to 100 if respondent thinks they perform “Very 
good.” Finally, the Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Population are: (a) Education, which is a 
scale that goes from 1 “Incomplete primary school” to 9 “Graduate school” of either the 
respondent or the head of the household; (b) Socioeconomic status, which goes from 1 
“Marginal” to 7 “High 1;”20  (c) Sex, coded as 1 if “Female” and 0 if “Male;” and (d) Age Cohort, 
coded from 1 “18 and younger” to 7 66 and older.” A summary of the independent variables 
descriptive statistics is depicted in Table IV-2. 
                                                      
19 The data source for this index is the 2001 National Census and its scale reliability coefficient is 0.827.  
20 For more information about how to compute this index, see www.indec.gov.ar.   
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Figure IV-2: Descriptive Statistics from PAC 2003- 2008, INDEC 2001, and Municipal WebPages 
 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL 
  VARIABLE NAME CODE N MEAN SD MIN. MAX. 
Dependent Variables 
 Participation in Political Parties POLPAR 17,909 0.18 0.39 0 1 
 Participation in Labor Unions LABU 17,425 0.01 0.12 0 1 
 Participation in Cooperatives COOP 17,425 0.01 0.11 0 1 
 Dealings at Municipal Government MUNIDEAL 18,583 0.35 0.48 0 1 
 Voter Turnout PARP86 18,388 83.96 28.89 0 100 
 Participation in School Cooperators SCHOOL 17,424 0.04 0.21 0 1 
 Participation in Neighborhood Meetings NEIGHBOR 17,432 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Socioeconomic Variables 
 Education EDU_IMP 18,581 3.65 2.01 1 9 
 Age Cohort AGER 18,581 4.09 1.66 2 7 
 Female SEX 18,583 0.52 0.5 0 1 
 Socioeconomic Level NESR 18,558 3.4 1.78 1 7 
Democratic Governance Indicators 
 Need for Improvement of Quality of National Politics and Institutions DEMP11 17,980 84.46 22.06 0 100 
 Satisfaction with Democracy at Municipality DEMP16 17,982 47.42 26.89 0 100 
 Performance of Municipal Institutions EVAP34 18,103 60.04 20.8 0 100 
 Evaluation of Municipal Employees EVAP43 17,563 61.53 21.1 0 100 
 Municipal Bribe CLIEP69 17,630 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Support for Political Parties 
 Support for Political Parties DEMP10 17,518 0.7 0.46 0 1 
        
MUNICIPAL-LEVEL 
  VARIABLE NAME CODE N MEAN SD MIN. MAX. 
 Organic Charter CHART 46 0.2 0.4 0 1 
 Municipal Expenditure Ratio SUBEX 46 0.35 0.28 0.09 1.43 
 Municipal Population (Thousands) M_POP01K 46 107.11 159.73 4.19 909.4 
 Municipal Tax MTAXR 46 0.24 0.43 0 1 
  Human Development Proxy HDP01 46 64.33 6.85 46.09 78.37 
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As in previous chapters, this chapter fits several multi-level models in order to test the 
associations among the dependent and explanatory variables described in the hypotheses of this 
study.21 The model specification depends upon whether the dependent variable is continuous or 
dichotomous. The intra-class correlation coefficients are calculated by fitting fully unconditional 
models, according to the specification of the dependent variables.22 Drawing upon the theory of 
this chapter and according to the statistical significance of the relationship between state 
decentralization and some of the aspects of participatory democracy in 46 Argentinean 
municipalities, the following models are fitted:23 
 
Equation IV.2  
Dependent variable: Citizen Participation in Political Parties (dichotomous) 
Level-1 Model: 
Prob(Y=1|B) = P 
 
log[P/(1-P)] = B0 + B1*(SEX) + B2*(AGER) + B3*(DEMP10) + B4*(DEMP11) + 
B5*(DEMP16) + B6*(EVAP34) + B7*(EVAP43) + B8*(CLIEP69) + B9*(EDU_IMP) 
+ B10*(NESR)  
 
Level-2 Model: 
B0 = G00 + G01*(CHART) + G02*(SUBEX) + G03*(M_POP01K) + 
G04*(MTAXR) + G05*(HDP01) + U0 
 
 
 
Equation IV.3  
Dependent variable: Voter Turnout (continuous) 
Level-1 Model 
Y = B0 + B1*(SEX) + B2*(AGER) + B3*(DEMP10) + B4*(DEMP11) + 
B5*(DEMP16) + B6*(EVAP34) + B7*(EVAP43) + B8*(CLIEP69) + B9*(EDU_IMP) 
+ B10*(NESR) + R 
 
                                                      
21 All the statistical analyses in this chapter are carried out in STATA 10.1 and HLM 6.08. 
22 The intra-class correlation for dichotomous dependent variables is not meaningful because the level-1 variance is 
heteroscedastic. 
23 For more information about these models, see the note on hierarchical linear modeling in the introductory chapter of this 
dissertation.  
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Level-2 Model 
 
B0 = G00 + G01*(CHART) + G02*(SUBEX) + G03*(M_POP01K) + 
G04*(MTAXR) + G05*(HDP01) + U0 
 
 
Equation IV.4  
Dependent variable: Dealings at Municipal Government (dichotomous) 
Level-1 Model 
Prob(Y=1|B) = P 
 
log[P/(1-P)] = B0 + B1*(SEX) + B2*(AGER) + B3*(DEMP10) + B4*(DEMP11) + 
B5*(DEMP16) + B6*(EVAP34) + B7*(EVAP43) + B8*(CLIEP69) + B9*(EDU_IMP) 
+ B10*(NESR)  
 
Level-2 Model 
B0 = G00 + G01*(CHART) + G02*(SUBEX) + G03*(M_POP01K) + 
G04*(MTAXR) + G05*(HDP01) + U0 
 
 
Results  
After carrying out several statistical analyses, this chapter finds evidence for the 
statistical association between municipal decentralization and: (a) Citizen participation in political 
parties; (b) Voter turnout; and (c) Dealings at the municipal government. In the following pages, I 
will report the degree of citizen participation in each of these institutions and its association with 
the level of municipal decentralization in the 46 Argentinean municipalities selected for this study.  
Also, I will describe the effects of the democratic governance indicators and the socioeconomic 
variables on the degree of citizen participation in the domains described above.  
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Citizen Participation in Political Parties  
 
 
Figure IV-3: Citizen Participation in 46 Argentinean Municipalities 
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Figure IV-3 shows the percentage of individuals who currently participate or have 
participated in the past in political parties, in the 46 municipalities subject to this study. On 
average, 18.2 percent of Argentinean residents of these municipalities currently participate or 
have participated in political parties. Municipalities with the highest participatory rates are Pirane, 
Rivadavia and Neuquen, with 41.3, 32.1 and 30.9 percent respectively. On the other hand, 
municipalities with the lowest participatory rates are Comodoro Rivadavia, Balcarce and Bahia 
Blanca, with 10.6, 10.0 and 8.8 percent respectively. The 32.5 participation range that exists 
between the municipality with the highest participation level (Pirané) and the municipality with the 
lowest participation level (Bahia Blanca), suggests that there is a wide variation of participation 
rates in the 46 municipalities selected for this dissertation. What are the municipal-level and 
individual-level factors that may help to explain the different degrees of citizen participation in 
Argentinean political parties?   
Table IV-2 shows results from the hierarchical model. There are at least three aspects of 
these results that are worth noting. First, the measure of administrative decentralization used in 
this chapter (municipal expenditure ratio), is negatively associated with the degree of citizen 
participation in political parties. The statistical meaning of this finding is that a 1-unit increase in 
the level of municipal per capita expenditures, relative to total provincial per capita expenditures, 
is associated with a -0.3 decrease in the log odds of citizen participation in political parties in the 
46 municipalities depicted in Figure IV-3.  Substantively, the probability of citizen participation in 
political parties associated with a 1-unit increase in the administrative decentralization measure is 
0.42.24 Other municipal-level factors negatively associated with citizen participation in political 
parties are municipal population and human development. In other words, a 1-unit increase in 
municipal population and human development is associated with a -0.001 and -0.032 decrease in 
the log odds of citizen participation in political parties, respectively. In substantive terms, 
however, these effects are not as large as the effect of administrative decentralization (0.50 and 
0.49 respectively).  
                                                      
24 A complete set of probabilities is depicted in Appendix A7.  
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 Table IV-2: Results from the Hierarchical Model for Dichotomous Participation in Political Parties 
Participation in Political Parties 
 
Means as Outcomes 
Intercept -1.550*** (0.056) 
Individual-Level   
Socioeconomics and Demographics   
     Education 0.136*** (0.016) 
     Age Cohort 0.189*** (0.016) 
     Female -0.350***  (0.046) 
     Socioeconomic Level -0.040* (0.022) 
Governance Indicators   
     Evaluation of Municipal Employees 0.004*** (0.001) 
     Performance of Municipal Institutions -0.005*** (0.001) 
     Municipal Bribe 0.821*** (0.079) 
     Satisfaction with Democracy at Municipality -0.001 (0.001) 
     Need for Improvement of Quality of National Politics and Institutions 0.003** (0.002) 
Support for Political Parties   
     Support for Political Parties 0.227*** (0.053) 
Country-Level    
Means as Outcomes   
     Human Development Proxy (2001) -0.032***  (0.007) 
     Municipal Population (Thousands) -0.001** (0.000) 
     Organic charter 0.103 (0.133) 
     Municipal Tax 0.058 (0.131) 
     Municipal Expenditure Ratio -0.305** (0.139) 
Variance Components 
     Random effect     
          Participation in Political Parties, u0 0.082***  
          Reliability estimate 0.786   
Note: Independent variables grand-mean centered, except for uncentered centered dichotomous 
municipal-level variables. Robust standard errors.  
* = p < .10; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01 Number of Municipalities = 46      Number of Cases = 18,583 
Source: Programa Auditoria Ciudadana 
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Second, support for political parties; need for improvement of quality of national politics 
and institutions; municipal corruption victimization; and evaluation of municipal employees are 
positively associated with citizen participation in political parties. While the largest effect in this set 
of variables is that of municipal corruption victimization, the smallest is that of the need for 
improvement of quality of national politics and institutions. In other words, a 1-unit increase in 
municipal corruption victimization is associated with a 0.821 increase in the log odds of 
participation in political parties. In contrast, a 1-unit increase in the perception that national 
politics and institutions need to be improved is associated with a 0.003 increase in the log odds of 
participation in political parties. On the other hand, performance of municipal institutions 
perception is negatively associated with citizen participation in political parties. A 1-unit increase 
in the perception that municipal institutions are performing well is associated with a -0.005 
decrease in the log odds of participation in these institutions of political representation. This 
effect, however, is not substantively large in comparison to other effects, since the probability of a 
unit increase in the performance of municipal institutions perception is only 0.499.    
Finally, the variables education and age cohort are positively associated with citizen 
participation in political parties. Statistically, a 1-unit increase in education and in the age cohort 
variable increases in 0.136 and 0.189 the log odds of citizen participation in political parties, 
respectively. Substantively, a 1-unit increase in education and in the age cohort variable is 
associated with a probability of 0.534 and 0.547 of participation in political parties, respectively. In 
contrast, the variables female and socioeconomic level are negatively associated with citizen 
participation in political parties. Statistically, being in the female category and a 1-unit increase in 
socioeconomic level decrease in 0.350 and 0.040 the log odds of citizen participation in political 
parties, respectively. Substantively, being in the female category and a 1-unit increase in 
socioeconomic level are associated with a probability of 0.413 and 0.490 of participation in 
political parties, respectively. Along with the measure of administrative decentralization, being in 
the female category exert the largest negative effects on citizen participation in these institutions 
of political representation.  
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Voter Turnout  
 
 
 
Figure IV-4: Voter Turnout in 46 Argentinean Municipalities 
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 Even though voting in elections is compulsory in Argentina, there is wide variation in 
voter turnout levels, not only across Argentinean citizens as individuals, but also across 
municipalities. Figure IV-4 shows the results of the frequency of citizen participation in 
Argentinean elections. In a scale that goes from 0 that means “Not voted in any election” to 100 
that means “Voted in all elections” the average citizen participation in elections for the 46 
municipalities selected in this study is 83.96, suggesting a rather high rate of voter turnout.25  The 
three municipalities with the highest voter turnout levels are Crespo, El Trebol and Villaguay with 
92.1, 90.2, and 90.1 points, respectively. At the other extreme, Comodoro Rivadavia, Libertador 
San Martin, and San Fernando del Valle de Catamarca show the lowest levels of voter turnout, 
with 77.0, 75.4 and 72.9 points respectively. In the following lines I will report some of the factors 
associated with this different degrees of citizen participation in Argentina’s elections. 
 Results depicted in Table IV-3 show a negative association between organic charter and 
voter turnout. In other words, being regulated by an organic charter decreases voter turnout by -
4.357 points in the 0 to 100 scale.26 In terms of democratic governance, support for political 
parties, need for improvement of quality of national politics and institutions and performance of 
municipal institutions perception are positively associated with voter turnout. From these 
variables, citizen perception that the quality of national politics and institutions need improvement 
shows the largest possible effect (3.8 in the o to 100 scale) and performance of municipal 
institutions perceptions the lowest (2.3). Finally, education level, age cohort, female, and 
socioeconomic level are positively related to voter turnout. Substantively, the largest possible 
effect on voter turnout is that of the age cohort. Those individuals who are 66 and older have an 
electoral participation frequency of 19.31-points greater than those between 18 and 25 years of 
age. In contrast, the smallest effect on voter turnout is shown by female, who participate 1.72-
points more often than men.    
                                                      
25 According to the AmericasBarometer 2008 data set, the percentage of Argentineans who voted in the last election is 
78.5 percent.  
26 The larges possible effects of independent variables are depicted in Appendix A8.  
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 Table IV-3: Results from the Hierarchical Linear Model for Continuous Voter Turnout 
Voter Turnout 
 
Means as Outcomes 
Intercept 85.352*** (0.607) 
Individual-Level   
Socioeconomics and Demographics   
     Education 1.102*** (0.195) 
     Age Cohort 3.862*** (0.277) 
     Female 1.722***  (0.585) 
     Socioeconomic Level 0.664*** (0.216) 
Governance Indicators   
     Evaluation of Municipal Employees 0.001 (0.014) 
     Performance of Municipal Institutions 0.023* (0.014) 
     Municipal Bribe 0.292 (1.022) 
     Satisfaction with Democracy at Municipality 0.014 (0.010) 
     Need for Improvement of Quality of National Politics and Institutions 0.038** (0.013) 
Support for Political Parties   
     Support for Political Parties 2.521*** (0.500) 
Country-Level    
Means as Outcomes   
     Human Development Proxy (2001) -0.0680  (0.115) 
     Municipal Population (Thousands) -0.004 (0.004) 
     Organic charter -4.357** (2.121) 
     Municipal Tax 0.753 (1.585) 
     Municipal Expenditure Ratio -1.549 (1.508) 
Variance Components 
     Random effect     
          Voter Turnout, u0 13.508***  
          Reliability estimate 0.851   
Note: Independent variables grand-mean centered, except for uncentered centered dichotomous 
municipal-level variables. Robust standard errors.  
* = p < .10; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01 Number of Municipalities = 46      Number of Cases = 18,583 
Source: Programa Auditoria Ciudadana 
 
 133 
Dealings at Municipal Governments  
 
 
Figure IV-5: Dealings at Local Government in 46 Argentinean Municipalities 
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The final dependent variable statistically associated with one of the measurements of 
municipal decentralization is the extent to which citizens carry out dealings at any of the 46 
municipalities in this study. Figure IV-5 shows that in comparative terms, Cerrito, Rosario and Las 
Rosas are the municipalities with greater citizen demands, with 53.5, 52.5, and 50.8 percent, 
respectively. At the other extreme, Gualeguaychú, San Fernando and Godoy Cruz dwell citizens 
that show the lowest participation rates with 23.0, 16.8 and 13.8 percent, respectively. The 
average rate of demand-making on the 46 municipal governments subject to this study is 34.7 
percent, and the participation range is 40 percent. This large range and the frequency distribution 
of citizen dealings at the local government suggest that there is a wide variation of participation 
across municipalities. What factors could explain the frequency of citizen demand-making in 
some Argentinean municipalities? 
Table IV-4 shows that residing in municipalities that excise taxes from their population 
increases the log odds of demand-making at the local government. The probability of carrying out 
dealings at municipalities that tax their citizens is 0.58.27 Additionally, those individuals who think 
that the quality of national politics and institutions need to be improved, those who have been 
victimized by corruption at the municipal government and those who positively evaluate municipal 
employees show higher log odds of demand-making at the municipal government. Substantively, 
the effects of a 1-unit increase in municipal employee evaluations and in the quality of national 
politics and institutions perceptions on the frequency of citizen dealings at the municipality are not 
very large (probabilities of 0.501 and 0.502, respectively). However, there is a 0.6 probability that 
those who have been victimized by corruption at the municipal government have also presented 
solicitudes in municipal offices. Finally, the individual’s socioeconomic level, age and education 
are positively associated with the log odds of carrying out dealings at the municipal government. 
The demand-making probabilities associated with a unit increase in the socioeconomic level, age 
and education, however, are not very large (0.519, 0.515 and 0.531, respectively). 
                                                      
27 The complete set of probabilities is depicted in Appendix A9.  
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  Table IV-4: Results from the Hierarchical Model for Dichotomous Dealings at Municipal Governments 
Dealings at Municipal Government  
 
Means as Outcomes 
Intercept -0.654*** (0.074) 
Individual-Level   
Socioeconomics and Demographics   
     Education 0.125*** (0.017) 
     Age Cohort 0.060*** (0.015) 
     Female -0.0144 (0.038) 
     Socioeconomic Level 0.078*** (0.026) 
Governance Indicators   
     Evaluation of Municipal Employees 0.007*** (0.001) 
     Performance of Municipal Institutions -0.001 (0.001) 
     Municipal Bribe 0.427*** (0.069) 
     Satisfaction with Democracy at Municipality 0.001 (0.001) 
     Need for Improvement of Quality of National Politics and Institutions 0.006** (0.001) 
Support for Political Parties   
     Support for Political Parties 0.014 (0.040) 
Country-Level    
Means as Outcomes   
     Human Development Proxy (2001) 0.010  (0.009) 
     Municipal Population (Thousands) 0.000 (0.000) 
     Organic charter 0.102 (0.168) 
     Municipal Tax 0.313** (0.149) 
     Municipal Expenditure Ratio 0.384 (0.277) 
Variance Components 
     Random effect     
          Dealings at Municipal Government, u0 0.188***  
          Reliability estimate 0.929   
Note: Independent variables grand-mean centered, except for uncentered centered dichotomous 
municipal-level variables. Robust standard errors.  
* = p < .10; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01 Number of Municipalities = 46      Number of Cases = 18,583 
Source: Programa Auditoria Ciudadana 
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Discussing Results and Moving Forward  
This chapter has shown, once again, that at least one decentralization dimension is 
negatively associated with citizen participation in political parties. In particular, high levels of 
municipal per capita expenditures relative to total provincial per capita expenditures are 
associated with lower probabilities of citizen participation in these institutions of political 
representation. Consistent with what has been said in previous chapters, there seems to be some 
internal mechanisms behind decentralization that contribute to a deinstitutionalization of citizen 
participation in political parties. In the next chapter, I will qualitatively analyze the hypothesis that 
empowered local political elites have greater incentives and tools to discourage citizen 
participation in institutions of political representation. These incentives and tools that may result 
from decentralization are at the disposal of strong local elites in order to prevent the emergence 
of political competitors who can put them at risk of removal from office in the following electoral 
period.28 The qualitative analysis in the next chapter may also prove useful for dealing with a 
potentially endogenous relationship between decentralization and participatory democracy.  
Not only administrative decentralization is negatively associated with citizen participation 
in political parties: As municipal size of the population and municipal human development 
increase, the likelihood of participating in these institutions of political representation decreases. It 
is important to note, however, that the effect sizes are relatively smaller in comparison to the 
administrative decentralization measure. Notwithstanding, these relationships suggest that 
wealthier, healthier and more educated populations on the one hand, and municipalities with 
larger numbers of inhabitants on the other participate less often in political parties. As a reminder, 
PAC questionnaires did not include any item to measure citizen engagement in mobilized modes 
of participation. Hence, it is impossible to determine whether or not the very same variables that 
negatively affect citizen participation in political parties increase public engagement in protests, 
manifestations and riots, as they did when we studied the Latin American and Caribbean region.    
                                                      
28 This hypothesis is only valid, of course, in municipalities considered as full electoral democracies.  
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In this chapter, decentralization is also theoretically and empirically found to be 
associated with participatory democracy in at least two other ways. First, the political 
decentralization measure employed here is negatively related to voter turnout. Specifically, in 
those municipalities were an organic charter binds citizens and politicians, the likelihood of voter 
turnout is smaller than in municipalities without Organic charters. A possible explanation for this 
phenomenon is that these charters leave so little room for political maneuver to elected public 
officials, that citizens regard voting as meaningless. Another potential explanation is that organic 
charters condition the electoral structure in such a way as to make it difficult for individuals to 
vote. All in all, this is an association that requires further research in order to best comprehend 
the negative effect of written sub-national constitutions on voter turnout.  
Second, the fiscal decentralization measure employed in this chapter is positively 
associated with the frequency that citizens carry out dealings at the municipal government. In 
other words, the likelihood of demand-making at the local government is higher in municipalities 
that tax their citizens in comparison to those municipalities that do not posses a taxation 
structure. A plausible explanation may be that once individuals contribute directly to the fiscal 
income of local governments, citizens appear to become more interested in either controlling or 
extracting back resources from municipal offices. Hence, municipal taxation may be used as a 
tool to increase local officials’ accountability, and at the same time recognize with more efficacy 
territorially specific citizen needs and demands.  In the next chapter, I will scale down the analysis 
of decentralization to two neighboring but dramatically different towns in terms civic virtue in 
Argentina: Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
V. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF MUNICIPAL PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY: 
GUALEGUAYCHÚ AND CONCEPCIÓN DEL URUGUAY 
 
 
Give a Man a Fish, Feed Him For a Day. Teach a Man to Fish, Feed Him For a Lifetime. 
(Chinese Proverb) 
 
 
Why can two nearly identically decentralized towns have dramatically different outcomes 
with respect to participatory democracy? The puzzle behind this question can be best explained 
by carrying out a comparative study of Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay in Argentina.  
These two neighboring towns share not only remarkably similar foundation histories, geographic 
characteristics and socioeconomic levels, but they are also regulated under the same provincial 
constitution that dictates the levels of institutional decentralization in both territories. However, 
one town transited to a relatively consolidated democracy, characterized by a regular alternation 
in power of local authorities, a strong social capital and important levels of citizen satisfaction with 
the way democracy functions at the local level. The other remains today a single-family politically 
dominated town, with relatively lower levels of citizen participation and a generalized 
disenchantment with local political affairs.   
Table V-1 shows the historical and socioeconomic similarities and the political differences 
of these twin towns. Don Tomás de Rocamora, a Nicaraguan politician and soldier, founded 
several villages in the Province of Entre Ríos, Argentina. Among these villages, he founded both 
Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay in 1783. Both towns currently have nearly the same 
number of inhabitants, and both municipalities invested almost 700 pesos per person in 2008. 
The Partido Justicialista has traditionally governed both towns since the return to democracy in 
Argentina in 1983. However, public opinion data collected by the Programa de Auditoría 
Ciudadana (PAC) reveal dramatically different citizen evaluations of and attitudes towards the 
way democracy functions at the local level. At the one extreme, Gualeguaychuenses constantly 
place their municipality in the top-ten ranking of best performance in terms of respect for citizen 
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rights, efficacy and transparency. At the other extreme, Uruguayenses rate their municipal 
government among the 10 worst local governments, in an evaluation of 46 Argentinean 
municipalities. 
 
Table V-1: Twin Cities with Opposed Political Outcomes 
    
Gualeguaychú Concepción del Uruguay 
Contextual Factors 
Year Founded  1783 1783 
Founder  Tomás de Rocamora Tomás de Rocamora 
Population  76220 (2001) 67474 (2001) 
Province  Entre Ríos Entre Ríos 
Municipal Budget per capita 
(2008)  716.93 673.59 
Number of Municipal Councilors  12 12 
Mayor's Political Party  Partido Justicialista Partido Justicialista 
Incumbent was Reelected?  No Yes 
Existence of Representatives of 
the Traditional Opposition Party 
(Unión Cívica Radical) in the City 
Council 
 Yes No 
 
Public Opinion and Behavior  (Rankings: 1st=Highest 46th=Lowest) 
Belief that Citizen Rights are 
Respected at the Municipality  
3rd 38th 
Evaluation of Municipal Efficacy 
 
4th 45th 
Citizen Participation in Political 
Parties  
10th  43rd 
Belief that Municipality is Free 
from Corruption   
7th 28th 
Sources: Municipal WebPages and Programa de Auditoria Ciudadana (PAC) 
  
What factors could explain this contrast? How does the same set of decentralization 
reforms produce such different outcomes? Previous chapters have been useful in uncovering 
connections between decentralization and participatory democracy. However, they have proven 
less useful in determining when decentralization contributes to the consolidation of democracy, 
when it does not, and why. In this chapter, I hold decentralization and other municipal level 
factors constant and compare two cases with opposing decentralization outcomes in order to 
identify the most important explanations that make decentralization a successful policy or a failure 
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with respect to enhancing the quality of local participatory democracy. Thus, the goal of this 
chapter is three-fold. First, resting upon Collier and Collier’ Shaping the Political Arena (2002), I 
examine what these scholars refer to as a critical juncture, a point in history that established 
certain paths of development for these two towns that opened up certain possibilities and 
foreclosed others in a way that shaped Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay’s 
participatory democracies for years to come.  Second, based on the work of Bueno de Mesquita, 
et al. (2003) I examine the size of local political coalitions and their behaviors with respect to the 
goal of political survival and the size of local elites’ coalitions, and how these behaviors have 
modified the levels of local democracy in both towns. Finally, I intend to assess how citizens in 
Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay carry out the tasks of decentralization as a response 
to local elites’ behavior, using Hiskey’s principal-agent work (2010) as analytical framework.  
In order to accomplish the goals put forward in this chapter, I first conduct a comparative 
historical analysis of Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay. The aim of it is to find a critical 
juncture that can best explain the different paths taken by these two neighboring towns in the 
development of their local political systems amidst a context of decentralization reforms. Second, 
I carry out 24 semi-structured interviews with local elites. These interviews are intended to 
gathered information that can explain democratic or undemocratic actions taken by local political 
elites with the purpose of surviving in office. Finally, I assess focus groups responses in 
Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay with the goal of understanding citizens’ behaviors 
and opinions that result from local political elites actions or inactions.    
Results from the comparative historical analysis, local elite interviews and focus groups 
unveil an intriguing factor: Decentralization policies seem to have worked better in territories 
where citizens, instead of local authorities, have exerted greater pressures for the implementation 
and functioning of local institutions; that is, places where citizens have pressured in a greater 
extent for political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization in comparison to other social actors. 
To explain this finding further, decentralization successes should be more common in settings 
where citizens are the key actors of their own development, as opposed to towns where caudillos 
have been responsible for most of their progress. As the epigraph of this chapter suggests, 
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decentralization policies fail in places where citizens are either unwilling or unable to provide 
support for democratic development. In the particular case of the two Argentinean towns studied 
in this chapter, part of the answer can be found in the popular dictums of each society: While 
Concepción del Uruguay “developed under the heat of her caudillos,” Gualeguaychú is the 
mother of her own developments” (these quotes are popular sayings in both towns). As a result of 
this diverting social construction, the former continues to be a family-led illiberal democracy, while 
the latter has transited to a relatively consolidated participatory democracy.  
This chapter consists of five sections. Section two develops the theory and hypotheses of 
this chapter that derive from the literature on critical junctures, political survival and agency 
theory. Section three explains the qualitative research methods and how the data were acquired. 
Section four describes and discusses empirical results. Finally, section five concludes. 
 
Explaining the Social Construction of Participatory Democracy Through Critical 
Junctures, Political Survival and Agency Theory 
Relying on three aspects of the social construction of participatory democracy can help to 
explain different outcomes of similar decentralization policies. The first aspect proposed in this 
chapter is historical. This aspect is based on the discovery of a critical juncture, or as Collier and 
Collier put it “a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different 
units of analysis and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies” (2002:29). Thus, the 
general idea behind the quest for a critical juncture in Gualeguaychú and Concepción del 
Uruguay is the finding of crucial choices made during a transition that established a path 
dependent direction. With the purpose of establishing a critical juncture, three elements must be 
considered: (a) A significant change that must have occurred wit    hin each case; (b) This change 
must have taken place in different ways in each case; and (c) This change must have produced 
different outcomes (Collier and Collier 2002). 
In the case of Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay, the period of basic change 
corresponds to the foundation of both towns. The contrasts involve the varied roles of the 
founding fathers in determining which city shall be selected as the provincial capital. Finally, the 
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legacy consists of different routes to the consolidation of participatory democracies: 
Decentralization and development carried out mainly by local political elites, and decentralization 
and development carried out by citizen groups along with the municipal government. Other 
elements of this critical juncture are mechanisms of production of the legacy, its perpetuation 
through ongoing institutional and political processes and the consolidation of the way participatory 
democracies function in each town (Collier and Collier 2002). 
The second aspect proposed in this chapter to explain the social construction of 
participatory democracy is the study of the political survival of local elites. This aspect is based on 
an adaptation to the local level of the selectorate theory put forward by Bueno de Mezquita and 
others in 2003. Leaders, all of whom face emerging challengers who wish to remove them from 
office, maintain their coalition of supporters by providing them a mixture of public and private 
goods and services. When leaders depend on a “small” group or elite coalition to survive in office, 
they engender loyalty by providing them with access to ample personal, private goods and 
services they would not otherwise receive if they were not in the elite. Family-ruled towns are a 
good example of small elite coalitions. In this context, alternation in power is less frequent and 
citizen participation is highly discouraged.  
In contrast, contexts where many supporters demand for rewards, the costs of private 
benefits required to keep their loyalty is just too high. Instead, those leaders who rely on a “large” 
local elite coalition to remain in office emphasize the provision of goods and services that benefit 
everyone in the society. In this framework, democratic alternation of power is more frequent 
because coalition members can defect to a rival since they do not enjoy private benefits. As a 
result, in large coalition contexts citizen face less restrictions to participate in oversight and 
decision-making. Thus, the consolidation of municipal participatory democracies in both 
Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay depends in important ways on the size of the local 
elite coalition. That is, as the size of the coalition grows larger, the town’s decision-making and 
oversight becomes more participatory and democratic. 
 The third and final aspect proposed in this chapter revolves around the citizen principal-
local government agent dynamics proposed by Hiskey in 2010. In his work The Promise of 
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Decentralized Democratic Governance, Hiskey states that as a result of decentralization, “there is 
a change in the responsibilities that both [principals and agents] have in carrying out the duties 
such reforms assign to them” (2010:30). Thus, the understanding of these new interactions 
between principal and agents and the willingness and capacity of citizens and local political 
officers to carry out their responsibilities may serve to identify reasons behind the different 
degrees of participatory democracy that result from similar decentralization policies. 
Viewing Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay through the lens of agency theory, 
the principal-agent dynamic analyzed above suggests that decentralization policies may not work 
as expected in contexts where citizens are unwilling or unable to take an active role as principals 
in both decision-making and accountability processes, as a result of entrenched and powerful 
local agents (Hiskey 2010). Taking into account this reasoning, it may also be important to 
distinguish between the different sources of decentralizing pressures. The literature in this regard 
distinguishes between “local-up” dynamics, in which decentralization is forced on national 
decision-makers from pressures exerted by sub-national officials, and “national-down” patterns, in 
which national actors, operating in an strategic mode, decide to decentralize (Eaton 2004; Falleti 
2010; Grindle 2007; O'Neill 2005; Tulchin and Selee 2004).  
This chapter introduces a third element to explain different degrees of citizen participation 
in equally decentralized territories: the “citizen-up” dynamic. This dynamic suggests that in some 
towns, principals instead of local agents exert the most significant pressures for the transfers of 
power to their territories. In contrast, towns where “local-up” processes were led by a local 
caudillo (or family of caudillos), institutions are designed in such a way as to favor power 
concentration among agents that in the end will restrict principals’ participation in decision-making 
and oversight activities. The “national-down” dynamic, as a result, may only reinforce the pre-
existing dynamics between local agents and citizen principals.  
These three aspects, intended to explain the social construction of participatory 
democracy, are interrelated with one another. They will help to analyze the association between 
decentralization and participatory democracy from a historical perspective, and its effects on the 
relationship between local political elites and citizens in Gualeguaychú and Concepción del 
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Uruguay. The following section presents the research design and qualitative methods employed 
in this study to gather the empirical evidence necessary to test the hypotheses advanced in this 
chapter.  
 
 
In Search of Qualitative Evidence 
Case Selection 
In order to discover why similar decentralization policies can produce dramatically 
different outcomes with respect to participatory democracy, two Argentinean towns were carefully 
selected for comparison. These two towns are Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay, and 
were chosen using the Mill’s Method of Difference. This method involved selecting municipalities 
that are similar in ways that are treated as parameters but dissimilar with regards to the 
dependent variable (Mill 1970). In terms of parameters, Concepción del Uruguay and 
Gualeguaychú are two middle size towns located in the Province of Entre Rios. Both towns 
inherited the legacy of Spanish colonial rule. Both share common borders. Both are located on 
the shores of the Uruguay River. Both have remarkably similar income levels, populations and 
area sizes. Both towns exist under the Constitution of the Province of Entre Rios. Both have 
experienced significant decentralization reforms, following Argentina’s transition to democracy in 
1983. 
In terms of participatory democracy, however, these two towns are almost exact 
opposites. PAC data shows that while Gualeguaychú enjoys high levels of citizen support for 
democracy, political participation, tolerance and interpersonal trust, Concepción del Uruguay is 
characterized for a tradition of public apathy, little institutional and interpersonal trust and high 
levels of dissatisfaction with the way democracy works at the municipal level. In short, the former 
town transited to a relatively consolidated democracy, while the latter remains today a single-
family politically dominated town. What makes these twin towns so different with respect to their 
degree of democratic consolidation? To answer this question, I combine three qualitative 
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methods that I think best capture the essence of the sociopolitical disparities between the two 
towns: (a) Historical Comparative Analysis; (b) Semi-structured Elite Interviews; and (c) Focus 
Groups. 
 
Research Methods 
 While the public opinion databases employed in previous chapters provided powerful 
resources to find some of the correlates between decentralization and participatory democracy, 
the use of quantitative methods is less powerful for discovering the mechanisms behind these 
correlations. Holding the degree of decentralization constant, in this chapter I use three qualitative 
methods intended to uncover some of the causal differences behind Gualeguaychú and 
Concepción del Uruguay’s democracies. First, I carry out comparative historical research based 
on historical literature and specialized interviews with historians. With this type of research I 
intend to unveil antecedent conditions, cleavages, and legacies that will help me to identify the 
most telling critical juncture that made these towns to take so different paths. The antecedent 
condition, as Collier and Collier put it, “represents [the] base line against which the critical 
juncture and the legacy are assessed” (2002:30). Thus, the antecedent condition in the historical 
comparative component of this study is the period right before the foundation of both towns. The 
cleavage, as a result, corresponds to the period between the foundation of Gualeguaychú and 
Concepción del Uruguay, and the establishment of the provincial capital by the founding fathers. 
Finally, the legacy is the asymmetry between both towns’ levels of participatory democracy.  
The second qualitative method of this chapter is the application of 24 semi-structured 
interviews to local elites and experts in the area of local democracy. These semi-structured 
interviews were carried out during April 2010, with the purpose of identifying both historical 
reasons and elite behaviors that shaped the different paths that Gualeguaychú and Concepción 
del Uruguay have taken on their way to democratic consolidation. For this purpose, these 
interviews included councilors, historians, jurists and journalists that were crucial in the efforts of 
understanding some of the mechanisms that connect political elite behavior and local 
participatory democracy. They also allowed collecting information about how decision-making is 
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carried out and implemented, what are the deadlocks in the process, and what is the generalized 
perception of local political elites about opposition groups and emerging political competitors. The 
master questionnaire used for these semi-structured interviews can be found in Appendix A10. 
The third and final qualitative method is the implementation of four focus groups per 
town. The four focus groups in Gualeguaychú were carried out on October 28 and 29, 2004, 
taking into consideration two variables of basic segmentation: age and socioeconomic level. Two 
groups of young adults between 18 and 35 years of age were formed; one representing middle 
and middle-high social classes, and the other representing middle-low and low social classes. 
The other two groups include older adults 36 years old and older, also segmented in two 
categories: one representing middle and middle-high social classes, and the other representing 
middle-low and low social classes. The four focus groups in Concepción del Uruguay were 
carried out on November 10 and 11, 2005, taking into consideration the same two variables of 
basic segmentation applied in Gualeguaychú. Pseudo-probability sampling was implemented as 
the scheme of participant selection in both towns. Finally, the purpose of these eight focus groups 
is to determine the differences between agent-principal relations and their impact on participatory 
democracy. 
 
Twin Towns, Mismatched Democracies? 
 
A Glance at Entre Rios History: Antecedent Conditions  
Before the arrival of the first Spaniard conquerors, the current territory of the Entre Rios 
province (where Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay are located) was occupied by 
different nomad ethnicities, such as the chanas-timbues, the charruas and the guaranies  
(Taborda 1963). However, these indigenous groups were defeated and reduced by Governor 
Hernandarias as Entre Rios entered to form part of the Viceroyalty of Peru under the Jurisdiction 
of Buenos Aires and Santa Fe. Spanish colonizers continued their expedition against the 
charruas situated in the Oriental Band, and started to found the first villas of the province. In 
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1783, a short period after the Viceroyalty of La Plata was created, Viceroy Juan Jose de Vertiz y 
Salcedo ordered Tomás de Rocamora the Organization of the Entrerrian territory, and proceeded 
to found the villages of Gualeguay, Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay (Taborda 1963).  
In 1810, the Entrerrian villages adhered to the May Revolution that constituted the first 
effort to gain independence, collaborating logistically and militarily with Manuel Belgrano during 
the Libertarian Expedition to Paraguay. The relationship with Buenos Aires deteriorated one year 
later due to an agreement signed in Montevideo with the Viceroy with the purpose of reoccupying 
Guleguay, Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay and the entire Oriental Band in exchange 
of the unblock of the harbor. The Entrerrian villages, under the command of local caudillos, 
managed to defeat the realists that occupied their territories, and since then Entre Rios adopted a 
strong federalist position (Taborda 1963). For this reason, Entre Rios did not accept the Unitarian 
constitution of 1826 promoted by Buenos Aires.  
The French blockage between 1838 and 1840, and the Anglo-French blockage between 
1845 and 1950 allowed merchant vessels to freely navigate both the Parana and Uruguay rivers, 
directly favoring Entre Rios’ commerce that was previously monopolized by the Port of Buenos 
Aires. When these blockages were withdrawn, along with the traditional insistence of Entre Rios 
for a true federalism, resentment ignited between Entre Rios Governor Justo Jose de Urquiza 
and Buenos Aires Governor Juan Manuel de Rosas. In 1852 in the Battle of Caseros, Urquiza 
defeated Rosas and in 1860 dictated the new Constitution of Entre Rios (Taborda 1963).  
During the great European immigration between 1853 and 1930, Entre Rios was one of 
the provinces that received the largest number of immigrants who in turn formed a large number 
of agricultural colonies. The 1929 world’s economic crisis, known as The Great Depression, hurt 
the agricultural international sector, which accelerated the province’s urbanization process. The 
industrialization process initiated during the 1930s caused a provincial exodus because the 
provincial urban centers could not assimilate all the population that arrived from the countryside. 
These facts influenced in the provincial constitutional reform of 1933 (Taborda 1963). Other 
important constitutional reforms were carried out between 1946 and 1955; however, provincial 
authorities reestablished in 1955 the constitutional chart of 1933.  
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Several coups that occurred between 1930 and 1983 eliminated provincial autonomies 
Military governments, directly appointed by the dictator in charge, assumed the position of 
“provincial governors.” The most important events during this period were the construction of the 
Sub-pluvial Tunnel Raul Uranga – Carlos Sylvestre Begnis that connected the cities of Parana 
and Santa Fe, ending with the land isolation of the Mesopotamia; and the construction in 1975 of 
the Zarate – Brazo Largo Rail Complex that unites Gualguaychu with Buenos Aires. In 1983, after 
democracy was reestablished, six governors have been democratically elected; one has been 
elected three times (Jorge Busti, Justicialista Party), another was elected twice (Sergio Alberto 
Montiel, Union Civica Radical), and two have been elected only once (Mario Armando Moine and 
Sergio Urribarri, both from the Justicialista Party). The historical origins of both Gualeguachú and 
Concepción del Uruguay discussed in this section are important to understand in which point of 
history both cities took different paths on their way to democratic consolidation. Before moving to 
the quest for critical junctures, the next section will analyze the current system of municipal 
decentralization in the province of Entre Ríos.   
 
Analysis of the Current System of Municipal Decentralization in Entre Rios 
Currently, there are three jurisdictional levels that articulate modern Argentina’s 
federalism: National, provincial and municipal. Due to its federal character the National 
Constitution of Argentina does not define a municipal regime of government. Rather, provincial 
constitutions delegate powers and functions to municipal governments, each with different 
modalities (Curcio 2005). In the case of Entre Rios, there are at least three salient constitutional 
dimensions that define the level of municipal decentralization. The first dimension is political 
decentralization. Two organs compose local governments: one executive and the other one 
deliberative (legislative). A mayor and a vice-mayor compose the executive power and 12 
councilors compose the deliberative power. Both the executive and deliberative organs are 
popularly elected for four years terms (Constitution of Entre Rios, 1933).  
The method of seats assignment in the Deliberant Council is a mixture of majoritarian 
and proportional systems. Specifically, the political party that wins the election for mayor gets 
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seven out of 12 seats in the Deliberant Council. The five seats remaining are allocated by the 
d’Hont method of proportional representation.29 This combination of methods, of course, could 
guarantee a majoritarian local democracy that favors first-past-the-post politics. However, it also 
segments minorities who need to reach a consensus in order to carry out a more effective 
opposition. Some experts manifest at least three concerns about the fairness of this system. The 
first concern is that:   
 
The electoral laws that regulate elections for local governments in the Province of Entre Rios are 
unfair.  Let me explain to you why. In the current electoral system, political parties that obtain the 
majority of votes, even if it does not reach 50 percent, gets 50 percent plus one of the available 
legislative seats. The remaining seats are assigned by proportional representation and this formula, 
of course, favors mayors and atomizes minorities. Thus, a minority may have, for four years, the 
domain of the legislative power. As a result, the legislatures or deliberant councils will always 
belong to the dominant party. In other words, the Deliberant Council will always back mayors, 
which is unfair because there is no possibility for opposition. This phenomenon decreases 
minorities’ political power (Public Prosecutor, University Professor, Concepción del Uruguay).      
    
  
Even though this concern about the electoral system in the province of Entre Rios may 
be legitimate, it is also important to note that belonging to the same political party does not 
automatically guarantee the same political ideology between its members. Entre Rios’ recent 
history shows a rather constant division or fragmentation of ideologies within dominant political 
parties (Justicialista or Peronista Party and Union Civica Radical). Some of these internal 
divisions could even mean open political opposition not only between members of the same 
political party at the local level, but also across jurisdictions; that is municipal, provincial and 
national levels. As one expert noted: 
 
The political party Union Civica Radical governed this municipality during the first democratic 
period, from 1983 to 1987. After that, the Justicialista Party has governed until today. However, 
there have been three political lines inside the Justicialista Party that governed Gualeguaychú. The 
first line was an internal political group referenced by Dr. Hector Maya. This political group is called 
“Frejuli.” This group governed from 1987 to 1991. From 1991 to 2007 governed a political group 
called “Militancia Peronista – Nuevo Espacio.” Finally, from 2007 until today, there is another 
political group inside the Justicialista Party. Sometimes these political groups have followed the 
general line of the Justicialista Party, but some other times they have acted as opposition groups 
within the very same political party (Councilor, Schoolteacher, University Professor, Justicialista 
Party, Gualeguaychú).  
 
                                                      
29 For more information about this method, please see 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/generalconference/pisa/papers/PP996.pdf (last visited, January 30, 2011). 
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 A second concern about the fairness of the electoral system corresponds to the laws that 
rule political parties. Not only the hybrid majoritarian/consensus system seems to favor large 
parties; national parties are also entitled by law to receive public monies that small local parties 
are not entitled to. Most of the local elites interviewed in this study agreed that after the 
democratic transition of 1983 there is no normative restriction for citizens to gather in political 
organizations. However, a legal monetary reimbursement that applies only to national parties put 
small and local political parties and movements in disadvantage. As a local jurist noted:  
 
Here, for example, based on the National Law of Political Parties, national parties get a 
reimbursement for every vote obtained right after an election. This is not a large amount, but when 
the party gets a lot of votes it represents, for example, one peso per vote or something like that. 
However, neighborhood unions and municipal parties are excluded from this benefit, because they 
are not formally considered as political parties, thus municipal political parties have almost no 
financial support, and on top of that, they have to pay the printing costs of the ballot and all other 
costs that could be otherwise avoided (Jurist, Lawyer and Journalist, Gualeguaychú). 
 
 
This funding restriction may have at least three repercussions for citizens and political 
parties. First, national political parties have greater chances of political survival than local parties, 
since the former are entitled by law to receive monetary reimbursements after elections, as 
opposed to the latter, that depend mostly on the availability of private funds. This phenomenon 
may be contributing to the explanation of the bi-partisan system of political representation in 
Argentina, where the Justicialista Party and the Union Civica Radical permanently compete in 
elections, while local political parties get created and disappear frequently before and after a 
particular electoral period. Second, since local political parties heavily depend on private 
monetary contributions to survive, they may be more prone to respond to corporatist interests 
than national political parties that receive public funds.  
However, decision-making within large national political parties should be more contested 
due to the generally lager number of affiliates relative to local political parties. Moreover, conflicts 
may arise more often in political parties of national scope among leaders who represent local vs. 
provincial or federal interests, while leaders of local parties may only represent municipal 
interests. Third, ordinary citizens may have greater influence over partisan decision-making in 
local parties, where most decisions are generally made at the local level, as opposed to national 
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political parties where decision-making may be greatly influenced by political leaders at both the 
provincial and national levels. As one expert noted, larger political parties pose relatively bigger 
challenges for new members:  
 
Citizen participation in political parties varies because in some parties doors are open; for example 
it occurs to me that the Socialist Party is making a good job lately here in Gualeguaychú in terms of 
receiving inquiries, and it is agglutinating lots of people; however, in larger political parties it is more 
difficult because young individuals who want to become a member of the party may find in advance 
too many occupied spots. Though difficult, it is not impossible for young individuals to participate, 
but participatory mechanisms in large political parties are usually very closed for those who want to 
participate and obtain a membership (Jurist, Lawyer and Journalist, Gualeguaychú).  
 
 
Finally, the third concern about Argentina’s electoral system is a mechanism that protects 
the survival of traditional political parties of national scope from emerging political competitors. 
This mechanism is the structure of the ballot. In Argentina, the ballot paper is designed in such a 
way as to favor a straight-party vote to choose all candidates from dominant parties with one 
selection, as opposed to individual candidates from weaker parties. A valid vote is casted by 
selecting an entire or partial list, and placing this list into an envelope that is immediately 
deposited into a ballot box. All candidates from a single party usually compose one list. The ballot 
can be cut and candidates from other lists can be selected, but if more than one candidate is 
chosen, the vote is spoiled. Figure V-I shows an example of a ballot in Argentinean elections: 
 
 
Figure V-1: Argentine’s Ballot for 1987 General Elections, Alianza Popular de Centro 
 
About this ballot, one ex-political candidate interviewed explains that: 
 
This ballot belongs to a single party. This is when I run for governor. It starts with national 
congressmen, governor, provincial senator, mayor and councilmen; but it could have been longer 
because it could have included national senators and the nation’s president. This is why I call it 
“sausage ballot.” One day on TV I pulled out a long sausage and asked the audience if they 
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thought they were able to swallow the entire thing without slicing it into pieces. Then I proceeded to 
explain that they face the same challenge with the ballots because in every list only a printed line 
without being die-cut divides the available candidates. In this context, a person who wants to select 
a governor from this list but a mayor from a different list has to cut the ballot and be sure not to 
superpose two ballots from the same political party. Additionally, the dark room to cast the ballot 
and the nervousness to do so quickly, especially if there are large queues, increases the chances 
of spoiling the vote. For this reason, lots of people just pick an entire list and cast the ballot 
producing, as a result, the dragging of large political parties  (Jurist, Lawyer and Journalist, 
Gualeguaychú).  
 
 
The second Constitutional dimension that defines decentralization in the province of 
Entre Rios is fiscal decentralization. The federal system in Argentina implies fiscal relationships 
across different levels of governments that result in complex mechanisms of intergovernmental 
transfers (Curcio 2005). Moreover, the concurrence of fiscal powers among the national 
government, provinces and municipalities require of co-participation mechanisms to assign fiscal 
resources across jurisdictions. In the particular case of Entre Rios, 41.8 percent of the total 
municipal income comes from fiscal transfers collected through taxes by the national and the 
provincial levels of government; 50.4 percent comes from non-tax fees and contributions; 6.7 
percent from other current income and 1.2 percent from capital income. Municipal governments in 
Entre Rios are not allowed to collect taxes (Curcio 2005).30 
The third and final Constitutional dimension that defines Entre Rios’ municipal 
governments is administrative decentralization. This dimension is basically defined by the 
traditional provision of local goods and services, such as garbage collection, potable water and 
public electricity, maintenance of local streets and avenues, sewerage, and the conservation of 
public parks. In the particular case of Entre Rios, 57,2 percent of the total income is allocated in 
public salaries; 22,7 percent is invested in goods and services; 13,7 percent is invested in capital 
goods; 4,0 percent is transferred to other institutions; and 2,6 percent goes to other current 
expenditures (Curcio 2005).  
                                                      
30 Other provinces, such as Chaco or Chubut, allow their municipalities to collect taxes on urban and rural housing, and 
vehicles, among others. 
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The Political Survival of Local Elites in Concepción del Uruguay and Gualeguaychú 
 
To my understanding, Concepción del Uruguay has been politically constructed by familial clans. 
Two families, one Peronist [Justicialista Party] and the other one Radical [Union Civica Radical] 
have been marking the political rhythm of the city generation after generation. In Gualeguaychú, in 
contrast, that political construction has been more disperse. There is no single family that can 
arrogate those rights for themselves. Thus, in Gualeguaychú there is a relatively greater degree of 
political alternation. Those who participate in Gualeguaychú know in advance that they could 
sooner or later occupy a position of collective responsibility. And this, to my judgment, is the single, 
most important achievement that differentiates Gualeguaychú from Concepción del Uruguay, 
where citizens are more apathetic with respect to participation to the point that most Uruguayenses 
think that if they are friends with the politician, they will get their problems solved. This, as a result, 
translates into a scorn of their self-participation (Journalist, Gualeguaychú and Concepción del 
Uruguay). 
 
As mentioned in the outset of this chapter, one of the most important differences between 
Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay is their levels of participatory democracy. PAC data 
and elite responses to semi-structured interviews suggest that in Gualeguaychú, for instance, 
individuals appear to have relatively higher control over the determination and development of 
democracy as a whole. The distinction between citizenry and political class is minimal, and 
today’s neighbor could be tomorrow’s mayor or councilor. Similarly, after a politician’s term in 
office is due, he or she can easily reintegrate to civil society. Perhaps one of the most salient 
features of Gualeguaychú’s society is the characteristic of being the promoter of its own 
development. Specifically, ordinary citizens have developed a great deal of the most important 
public edifications and enterprises for the city. Two quotes from local specialist briefly exemplify 
participatory democracy in Gualeguaychú:  
 
In general terms, the citizen of Gualeguaychú has a very social lifestyle. A common citizen 
participates in a sports club, participates in an association that helps the hospital, participates in a 
political party; is very active. Not only minds about his own life, but he also carries out social tasks 
all the time in different areas. The Gualeguaychuense mobilizes… And most importantly, people 
from the political sector are that very same citizen. There is no distinction between a political class 
on the one hand, and the citizenry on the other. These political actors are the same people that 
form this mobilized society. For example, a former mayor belongs to the Environmental Assembly.  
Two or three councilors are schoolteachers and recently mobilized on the streets protesting about 
their salaries; thus we are the same actors. Hence, there is a very direct relationship between the 
political sector and ordinary citizens, and this is what differences Gualeguaychú from other cities 
(Councilor, Schoolteacher, University Professor, Justicialista Party, Gualeguaychú).  
 
Gualeguaychú is proudly called the “mother of her own developments.” If you analyze here in 
Gualeguaychú, most of the largest developments were carried out by groups of ordinary citizens. 
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The slaughterhouse, for example, was one of the largest export plants in the country for over half a 
century, and was created by Gualeguaychú’s cattle breeders who were not satisfied with the prices 
received from foreign slaughterhouses. Instead of blocking roads as they do today, 
Gualeguaychú’s cattle breeders resolved to develop their own slaughterhouse. Another example is 
the Gualeguaychú Theatre that was developed with funds collected by several families who 
decided to build that colossus that is now one of the best scenarios in the country. At the same time 
the Theatre was being built, the current Centenario Hospital was born as a private 
entrepreneurship made possible by the beneficence society. I could go on and on with examples 
like these: the Firefighters, for instance, was entirely implemented by private initiative; the industrial 
park of Gualeguaychú was an initiative of retailers with support from the municipality; and finally, 
the Carnival of Gualeguaychú was an entrepreneurship of the local clubs. So this city has 
traditionally had a characteristic of independence and above all, mobilized things with the engine of 
her inhabitants without relying on the official heat to get things done (Jurist, Lawyer and Journalist, 
Gualeguaychú). 
 
 
In contrast, citizens of Concepción del Uruguay appear to have little or no control over 
the determination of the way democracy functions at the local level. A single family has 
traditionally ruled the city, thus power alternation has been rather scant. Since this family has 
been in power for many years, they have formed an impressive clientelistic network that poses an 
insurmountable challenge for politicians who want to compete in local elections. In this context, 
the incumbent and his family always win elections (which appear to be not free or fair) by a wide 
margin and political parties are meaningless. The city is also characterized by low levels of social 
capital, where citizens simplify their civic engagement and participation to elections, and manifest 
a generalized apathy and discontent with the way democracy works at their municipality. Again, 
two quotes from different local experts are worth noting in order to best understand Concepción 
del Uruguay’s level of participatory democracy: 
 
 
In this town, there are political groups formed by caudillos instead of political parties. The last 
caudillo in this town was elected mayor three or four times, and is the uncle of the current mayor 
and grandfather of current president of the Deliberant Council. This caudillo, which was a good 
person, spent his life creating a power pole through the Peronism [Justicialista Party]. His son was 
also national and provincial congressman. In terms of the Radicalism, they also had caudillos, but 
they disappeared. They do not exist anymore… Since the return to democracy in 1983, with the 
exception of the period between 1983 and 1987, the Peronism has always governed the city under 
the command of the Peronist caudillo and his family (Jurist, Concepción del Uruguay) 
 
In this town, one family has been governing the city for more than 50 years and the next mayor will 
be the one that is now president of the Deliberant Council; that is, the one you just interviewed. 
Since this family has had the power for so long, they have an extraordinary clientelistic network. 
Thus it is very difficult to win elections against the incumbent that every week gives the citizen a 
bag of food, subsidies, jobs, etc. This should not happen in Gualeguaychú. But in Concepción del 
Uruguay and Concordia, the incumbents or candidates related in one way or another with the 
incumbent win elections with a wide margin. Take into account that in Entre Rios the winner party 
generally prevails with a small percentage of the votes. This difference almost never surpasses 
three-percent of the total valid votes; that is, if the Peronism wins, it only has a three percent 
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advantage over the Radicals, and vice versa. However, in Concepción del Uruguay and Concordia, 
winners get a seven to ten-percent advantage over losers (Historian, ex-congressman, Concepción 
del Uruguay).     
 
 
These differences may be directly affecting citizen evaluations of local democratic 
governance. Public opinion data obtained through the Programa de Auditoria Ciudadana (PAC) 
show the dramatic differences between evaluations of Gualeguaychú and Concepción del 
Uruguay’s municipal performances. There are at least three groups of variables that are worth 
comparing in this chapter. First, an Index of Perceptions of Municipal Performance that includes 
questions related to the evaluation of the political situation of the municipality, satisfaction with 
performance of local democracy, evaluations of authorities’ respect for citizen rights, evaluations 
of performance of municipal institutions and a general evaluation of municipal employees shows 
that in a comparative analysis of 47 Argentinean municipal governments, Gualeguaychú is 
located in the top five best perceptions of Municipal Performance while Concepción del Uruguay 
appears in the 41st position.  
Second, an Index of Perceptions of Administrative Efficacy that includes questions 
associated with municipal employees’ responses to citizen demand-making, such as long queues 
at the municipal government, unnecessary dealings, costly or denied information, disrespectful 
and impolite employees, discriminative and humiliating public officers, ranks Gualeguaychú in the 
top four municipal governments with best administrative efficacy, while placing Concepción del 
Uruguay in the next-to-last position in the same group of 47 Argentinean municipalities. Third, in 
an Index of Perceptions about Freedom from Corruption at the Municipal Government that 
includes assessments of how often citizens have to pay bribes to get things done, frequency of 
bribe solicitation by municipal employees and general evaluations of municipal corruptions shows 
that Gualeguaychú, once again is the seventh most transparent municipality, while Concepción 
del Uruguay is number 29.   
The differences in the characteristics of local democracy (power-sharing and alternation 
of local elites in Guelguaychu vs. single family power concentration in Concepción del Uruguay), 
along with citizen evaluations of local democratic governance (high evaluations in Gualeguaychú 
vs. poor evaluations in Concepción del Uruguay) are closely associated with the way citizens 
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view and behave about local politics. In terms of behavior, there is clear difference between 
citizen participation in political parties. According to PAC data, while Gualeguaychú is the 10th city 
among 47 municipalities with the highest frequency of citizen participation in political parties, 
Concepción del Uruguay is the 44th. A local expert explains one of the potential reasons behind 
these low levels of citizen participation in political parties in Concepción del Uruguay:  
 
Political rights are increasingly circumscribed to elections… Incumbent governments always have 
the possibility to make participation in political parties unattractive to ordinary citizens. Even though 
there is liberty to constitute new political parties under certain national and provincial electoral laws, 
the reality is that political parties do not reflect the ideologies. It is also true that students have been 
obliged to participate in political campaigns in order to keep their fellowships in this university 
(Lawyer, University Professor, Concepción del Uruguay). 
 
This behavior matches very well with citizen views about the solutions to collective 
problems. In Concepción del Uruguay for instance, citizens expect the government to take the 
initiative in problem solving, in spite of its relatively lower degree of democratic governance. In 
other words, Uruguayenses favor the “I elected you, now is your problem” mentality. Conversely, 
Gualeguaychu’s citizens identify their collective problems, get organized, and directly take the 
initiative to overcome their difficulties. In this scenario, the municipal government supports 
citizens’ initiatives but it is not considered the only actor responsible for problem solving. As one 
observer puts it:  
 
I think that the political differences between Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay are based 
not only on partisan politics, but also on the way collective leaderships have been assumed on 
each community. Politicians do not come from another planet; rather, they come from the same 
community ordinary citizens do. But Gualeguaychú’s most important achievement, in my view, is 
that citizens do not rest upon their leaders. Instead, Gualeguaychúenses mobilize the most with 
their leaders. Uruguayenses, in contrast, tend to select their leaders and leave them with the whole 
responsibility. I selected you, and now it’s your problem… (Journalist, Gualeguaychú and 
Concepción del Uruguay).  
 
 
In Search for Critical Junctures in Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay 
Until now, this chapter has shown that even though Gualeguaychú and Concepción del 
Uruguay have very similar origins, they took remarkably different paths with respect to 
democracy. What could have caused this bifurcation in the political processes of these twin 
towns? To answer this question, it is necessary to go back in time and try to find the critical (or 
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group of critical) juncture(s) that mot likely constituted the starting point for the differences 
mentioned in the previous section. Patterns in responses to semi-structured interviews with local 
experts and the historical literature suggest a very interesting juncture: When Don Tomas de 
Rocamora, the founding father of Gualeguay, Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay, 
decided to establish three cabildos with the purpose of facilitating their political and fiscal 
administration by delegates of the Spanish Crown, he decided that Concepción del Uruguay was 
the most appropriate village of the three to establish the command of the Entre Rios’ parties. In 
other words, Rocamora determined that Concepción del Uruguay had to be the provincial capital. 
As a Concepción del Uruguay’s Historian recognizes:  
 
 
Don Tomas de Rocamora founded Concepción del Uruguay first, and then Gualeguaychú with a 
similar diagram of the territory: The church is located in the same place in both towns; both central 
parks have the same façade; the building of the first cabildo was constructed next to the park, etc. 
These two towns, along with Gualeguay, share very similar characteristics in terms of 
infrastructure. Soon after the foundations, Concepción del Uruguay became, according to Don 
Tomas de Rocamora, the best village of the three. Thus he relocated the command of the Entre 
Rios’ parties, a sort of provincial government, to Concepción del Uruguay. This town became since 
then the provincial capital. Then the greatest Entrerrian caudillos were: Ramirez, also from 
Concepción del Uruguay, who governed the province from Concepción del Uruguay; Urquiza, who 
not only governed the province, but also was responsible for organizing the provincial capital until 
1883, when it was relocated to Parana. Thus, Concepción del Uruguay lived under the official heat. 
This town was home of the executive, legislative and judicial powers, and the military. (Historian, 
ex-congressman, Concepción del Uruguay).   
 
 
Rocamora, Ramirez and Urquiza were the three most important characters in the origins 
of both Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay. In the latter, however, they established their 
home and governmental headquarters. For this reason, these political leaders brought to the 
village of Concepción del Uruguay most of the first and crucial political and economical 
developments. Overall, their governments were paternalist in the sense that they ruled without 
consulting the town, but benefiting the citizenry (Bosch 1991). They protected local livestock, 
favored the installation of beef salting businesses, made obligatory the inscription of peasants, 
improved roads and ports, installed watermills, and supported the establishment of small 
industries (Bosch 1991). They established a very efficacious police, but were very cruel since 
minor crimes were punished with the death penalty.  
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These founding fathers were also characterized for carrying out the town and province’s 
accountancy in an extremely precise manner. They applied a strict control over public funds, 
reduced public investments, and ordered to publish monthly statements of provincial incomes and 
expenditures in sub-national newspapers, located in Concepción del Uruguay (Taborda 1963). 
Urquiza was particularly interested in education. He extended primary schools and founded new 
secondary schools. In Concepción del Uruguay, he founded one of the nation’s most important 
secondary schools: the Colegio Nacional de Concepción del Uruguay. This school boomed 
during the time that Buenos Aires separated from the Confederation, and under the direction of 
Alberto Larroque, the Colegio Nacional became for many years the most prestigious school in the 
country (Taborda 1963). The Colegio Nacional de Concepción del Uruguay was the alma mater 
of very important political figures of Argentina’s history. As an expert notes:     
 
 
The Colegio Nacional is a notable historical institution that educated three former Presidents of the 
Republic, two Vice-presidents, 23 Province Governors, three Presidents of the Supreme Court of 
Justice, and several mayors (Historian, ex-congressman, Concepción del Uruguay).  
 
 
 
The monumental developments that Rocamora, Ramirez and Urquiza brought to 
Concepción del Uruguay were later complimented by the notable politicians mentioned in the 
paragraph above. Colegio Nacional de Concepción del Uruguay graduates funded several 
theatres, women’s secondary schools, public libraries, factories, businesses and industries. They 
attracted the attention of illustrious immigrants such as Pedro Ferre, Manuel Leiva and Nicasio 
Oroño who were crucial characters in Argentina’s development (Bosch 1991). This characteristic 
of a small group of citizens in charge of the city’s development instead of a large portion of the 
population has remained until modern times, and arguably constitutes the most important factor 
that explains why Concepción del Uruguay has developed “under the heat of its caudillos.” A local 
expert explains how this paternalist tradition endures until today by showing the special attention 
provincial authorities pay to Concepción del Uruguay relative to other cities: 
        
In this city, the Provincial Government in general and the vice-governor specifically are very 
prominent in this town’s decision-making. Vice-governor Laurito has been mayor for many years; 
he is one of the most notable Peronist caudillos of the zone, even though he is philosophically a 
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conservative. He exerts influence in this town in particular, because this is his town. The areas he 
influences the most are public works, services, etc. And if he would like to opt for another position 
after his term is due, he would run once again for city mayor (Public Prosecutor, University 
Professor, Concepción del Uruguay).   
 
This mayor walks hand-in-hand with the provincial governor. We know that the governorship is a 
terrible mafia; thus this influences our governor and mayor’s decisions a lot. This is why we have in 
this city a heavy weight in terms of decision-making (Young adult, high SES, Concepción del 
Uruguay). 
 
 
 
The founding fathers and provincial authorities, on the contrary, have traditionally 
neglected the city of Gualeguaychú. Citizens have had to exert significant pressures over 
authorities in order to obtain public goods and services, while witnessing at the same time how 
other neighboring towns have graciously received large quantities of aid and development. The 
main explanation of this inequity is that provincial authorities tend to favor the cities and towns 
where they come from. In this context, Gualeguaychú is not characterized for being a source of 
important caudillos and paternalist figures at the provincial or national levels of government.  
Rather, its citizenry has been permanently concerned about local politics, and most importantly, 
private developments. As a Historian notes: 
 
 
In think that Gualeguaychú was always one of the least benefited towns by provincial incumbent 
governments. Historically, Gualeguaychú was always relatively more relegated. Thus, the city felt 
the necessity of getting stronger to knock doors in order to achieve their developments. This 
materialized the idea that “Gualeguaychú is the mother of her own developments.” Gualeguaychú 
always needed to beg authorities, while witnessing, at the same time, how they graciously 
conceded in greater quantity goods and services to neighboring towns. Why? I think it is because 
we had certain governors that belonged, for example, to the city of La Concordia. Thus La 
Concordia grew up to become the Province’s second city, with an economic power based on 
agriculture. It is also important to note that three times Concordian’s mayor was also three times 
Governor of the Province of Entre Rios, so he gave to Concordia certain privileges that 
Gualeguaychú could not access (Historian, Gualeguaychú). 
 
As suggested before, this abandonment of Gualeguaychú by governmental authorities is 
not new. It could be traced back to the city origins. Right before its foundation, Gualeguaychú was 
roughly composed by a dozen family settlers of European descent. These families did not have a 
common authority; rather, they were horizontally organized especially to protect the villages from 
foreign invaders and robbers. Thus, when Don Tomas de Rocamora founded the village of 
Gualeguaychú, he decided not to impose an external authority. Instead, he relocated these 
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families to a central place, distributed land and property rights, and gave them the administrative 
authority of the village. This self-government characteristic prevented the influence of paternalist 
caudillos that made the most significant contributions to the development of other villages, such 
as Concepción del Uruguay. In Gualeguaychú, citizens had to organize and collect private funds 
to carry out public developments; a characteristic that has endured until modern times. Two 
specialists explained in greater detail these historical facts:  
 
 
Almost all cities in Entre Rios have the same characteristics: all of them were geographically 
isolated; all of them have, more or less, the same origins, and were founded around the same time 
during the Spanish Colony. So what could have made the difference?  My explanation to this 
question revolves around the groups of immigrants that colonized the city during the mid-XIX 
century. It is worth noting that Gualeguaychú never received the massive immigration that occurred 
in other cities. Rather, a dozen French families, a dozen Scottish and English families, a dozen 
Basque families and a few Northern Italians notably changed Gualeguaychú (Councilor, 
Schoolteacher, University Professor, Justicialista Party, Gualeguaychú). 
 
In the case of Gualeguaychú, I would say that the characteristic of a vibrant society could be traced 
back as far as the origins of the town. During the Viceroyalty of La Plata, there was a policy 
implemented by the Bourbons under the monarchy of Carlos III that consisted in the foundation of 
towns in the south of Entre Rios. As part of this initiative, the first Bishop of the Rio de la Plata 
started to adequate some abandoned chapels and casually found that some of the towns in the 
south of Entre Rios existed by themselves without any external authority. One of them was 
Gualeguaychú. That is to say that, when Tomas de Rocamora, the founder of Gualeguaychú, came 
to the town, he did not bring a group of inhabitants to formally found a town under the name of the 
King; rather, he relocated a group that was found a bit further south, brought them here with center 
in this plaza, distributed pieces of land, and gave them an administrative authority, founded the 
cabildo, built the Church, etc. However, it is important to remark that that group of inhabitants 
existed before the foundation; and when they did not have any formal authority, they had to defend 
themselves by themselves of any attempt of invasion, any attempt of burglary. As a result, since 
the origins of the Gualeguaychúenses they learned how to manage themselves. These first 
populations were Spaniards, Mestizos and some Indigenous populations. As timed passed by, 
there was an important incorporation of Basques to our community. Since Basques are 
characterized by a strong temper, that also added to the way Gualeguaychúenses are. But there is 
another component in the way we are. It is the total isolation we used to live in until an Italian 
immigrant, Don David Della Chiesa, decided to conform a neighborhood consortium to build a road 
using communitarian private funds, to connect Gualeguaychú with Buenos Aires through a dense 
rainforest. From that point onwards, Gualeguaychú broke a century long isolation, because water-
based communication was very limited. All of these factors; that is: the way Gualeguaychúenses 
themselves seek solutions to collective problems, on top of the self-government, the Basque 
component and the geographic isolation shaped the character of Gualeguaychúenses (Jurist, 
Lawyer and Journalist, Gualeguaychú).  
 
  
 
  This section shows that the most important critical juncture in Gualeguaychú and 
Concepción del Uruguay’s histories is the fact that political authorities have traditionally neglected 
the former, while governmental figures have contributed in very important ways to the 
development of the latter. These facts have made Gualeguaychú the “mother of her own 
developments” characterized by a vibrant society, where citizens actively engage and participate 
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in communitarian issues and are the principal actors of the town’s political life. In contrast, 
Concepción del Uruguay has developed heavily upon “the heat of her caudillos,” making of this 
city a single family dominated town, where citizens are characterized by a general apathy and low 
levels of engagements and participation, waiting perhaps for the return of Rocamora, Ramirez 
and Urquiza to solve their problems and procure their development. The reminder of this section 
analyzes citizen principals’ attitudes and behaviors in response to local political agents’ actions.   
 
Principals’ Responses to Elite Behaviors 
This section intends to analyze citizen reactions to the effects that political elites have on 
people, taking into account the different trajectories that Gualeguacyhu and Concepción del 
Uruguay have taken with respect to participatory democracy.  Holding decentralization constant, 
the following pages make a comparative analysis of three aspects of participatory democracy: (a) 
Citizen Participation and Social Capital; (b) Accountability; and (c) Political Clientelism and 
Corruption.   
 
Figure V-2: Municipal Government Buildings: Gualeguaychú (Left) and Concepción del Uruguay (Right) 
 
 
Citizen Participation and Social Capital in Concepción del Uruguay. In modern 
Argentina’s history, one of the milestones that mark the point of departure for the divergent 
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directions that citizen participation took in Concepción del Uruguay relative to Gualeguaychú is 
Argentina’s democratic transition in 1983. Several citizen participation opportunities opened after 
the government of the Military Junta, allowing citizens to fully exercise their political rights and 
civil liberties. Even though Concepción del Uruguay was one of the pioneers in terms of 
cooperative organizations, Uruguayenses have been gradually losing this characteristic: 
 
Concepción del Uruguay was one of the pioneers on cooperative movements, but similar to other 
things, the town has been losing real cooperatives and now the city is full of fictitious cooperatives. 
The latter are only formed in order to get tax breaks and file bankruptcies, so a small group can 
take advantage of the cooperative’s profits (Young adult, high SES, Concepción del Uruguay). 
 
One potential reason for the decrease in Concepción del Uruguay’s cooperative 
movements is, perhaps, that there is a belief that the municipal government only supports those 
cooperative movements that are in the best interests of the municipality: 
 
The municipal government is very committed with cooperative movements that serve their 
interests. I could not offer a concrete example on top of my head, but if there is a cooperative that 
is on the best interest of the municipality, then there is large municipal support for this initiative 
everywhere (Young adult, high SES, Concepción del Uruguay). 
 
Thus, instead of forming cooperative movements, some Uruguayenses prefer to engage 
in local organizations of the civil society that do not require the presence or funding of the 
municipal government. These organizations, however, are usually a response to the perception of 
municipal inefficacy, rather than a coordinated effort between citizens and the local government 
to solve community problems. Even though there are citizen initiatives to mitigate collective 
problems (i.e. neighborhood assemblies), people only gather sporadically and those who do not 
participate continue to rely upon municipal solutions for their troubles:   
 
Sporadically, there are neighborhood assemblies to collect money through the organization of 
shows, parades and concerts in order to improve roads and public illumination. These 
neighborhood assemblies get together because we know that the municipality does not work. In the 
case of municipal workers, however, they only get together to organize strikes, cutting the elevator 
so nobody can enter municipal facilities (Young adult, high SES, Concepción del Uruguay). 
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Two other potential reasons for the decrease in citizen participation levels in Concepción 
del Uruguay are people’s perceptions about the legal access they have to approach municipal 
officers and the belief that if they do approach, their voices might not be heard. In terms of 
opportunities, citizens claim that the local government uses all the legal machinery at their 
disposal to restrict their participation, especially if officers feel a potential external threat. This 
causes a generalized state of apathy that translates into low levels of civic engagement in 
municipal affairs. As for voicing their demands, people suggest that municipal officers do not take 
the initiative in inviting citizens to express their needs and concerns, thus individuals feel like if 
they go to a municipal meeting, their opinions may be worthless:   
 
The municipality uses legal barriers to restrict citizen participation because they do things thinking 
about their own benefit instead of thinking about what people want. Hence, this causes a collective 
apathy because we know that municipal officers are untouchable, and if they call you for a 
particular job, such as helping in the organization of a festival, for instance, they will never pay you 
or in the best case scenario they will delay the payment. These attitudes make you think twice 
about participating in events organized by the municipal government (Young adult, high SES, 
Concepción del Uruguay). 
 
I never did anything to participate in municipal affairs, because they never did anything for us; thus 
neither did we… Moreover we are afraid they will say: “no, you just can’t participate and your 
opinion is worthless.” Maybe we are just shy (Young adult, high SES, Concepción del Uruguay). 
 
 
What other factors could be associated with this systematic decrease in citizen 
participation in Concepción del Uruguay? Low levels of civic engagement seem to have triggered 
sentiments of low self-esteem and discomfort with the city. Neighbors not only complain about 
municipal inefficacy, but also about the low commitment that individuals show about public 
spaces. In addition to the “we voted for you, now it is your problem” mentality, Uruguayenses 
seem to favor free-rider attitudes, where those who do not participate expect to enjoy the benefits 
created by those who engage in civic activities: 
 
Nobody cares about this municipality. Here, if you don’t work you won’t eat and you do not expect 
that municipal officers do anything about it. Everybody minds her own business. If you don’t work, 
municipal officers will not come to your house to offer you food for your children. Nobody cares if 
the municipality falls into pieces or if the neighbor loses his house; it is like everybody is closed 
here, everybody has her own world and that is it… It is like there is no sense of ownership in this 
city; it is like nobody cares. People don’t mind about anything, they do not commit with the city. 
Since they are young, they write graffiti on all columns, monuments and city walls. This represents 
a lack of ownership in this town, where people do not take care of their belongings. This forms the 
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city’s identity and what represents us. And this happens not only with young individuals but also 
with adults who throw garbage everywhere. (Young adult, high SES, Concepción del Uruguay).   
 
Just a few Uruguayenses care about municipal affairs; that’s the municipal officers’ business. We 
voted for them, now it’s their problem (Young adult, high SES, Concepción del Uruguay). 
 
People in Concpecion del Uruguay have the comfort to say: They participate and I will get the 
benefits  (Older adult, low SES, Concepción del Uruguay). 
 
 
 
Citizen Participation and Social Capital in Gualeguaychú. At the other side of the 
spectrum, Gualeguaychú’s citizens actively engage in civic duties. They not only demand goods 
and services from the local government, but also get organized to collect funds, distribute 
responsibilities and work together for the progress of the neighborhoods. Instead of waiting for 
the municipal government to take action when there is a social ill, Gualeguaychúenses identify 
the problem and carry out political lobbies to adjust municipal legislations. In turn, when people 
protest the municipal government acts:    
 
I also think that citizens have to mobilize a little. Not that I am in favor of the municipal government, 
but there are lots of things in this town that can be done with support of municipal officers. People 
here demand a lot, but also they do things themselves. For example, I have witnessed that when 
there are problems with alcoholism among teenagers, people mobilize. Three or four years ago, it 
was common to see 14 or 15 years old kids drunk in public; but a law was introduced thanks to 
communitarian pressures restricting the sale of alcohol until midnight (Young adult, low SES, 
Gualeguaychú).     
 
All in all, this municipality is accessible to people’s requests if they start to mobilize. For example, 
people in the Oriental Republic of Uruguay will install a paper plant and citizens started to mobilize 
in order to avoid the pollution of this side of the Uruguay River, and the municipality is helping to 
promote our cause (Young adult, low SES, Gualeguaychú).    
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Figure V-3: Advertisement at Gualeguaychús’ Municipal Building Inviting to a Citizen Protest 
 
 
 
Patterns in focus groups’ responses suggest that citizens in Gualeguaychú have learned 
that working in collaboration with the municipal government to obtain public goods and services 
boosts individuals’ self-esteem and increases their appreciation for and commitment with public 
spaces. Gualeguaychuenses seem to favor the “when you get things for free, you do not value 
them as much as if you had to work for them” mentality. This is a very important difference with 
citizens of Concepción del Uruguay who in general terms expect that paternalist caudillos bring 
about progress and development to the city without their direct involvement. As discussed earlier 
in this section, this behavior may be closely related to the poor levels of self-identification with the 
city.   
 
 
My grandmother participates in neighborhood meetings. The other day, people got together, 
collected signatures, and were able to get sewerage services for 10 blocks. Another example is the 
1,000 houses program in which each family have to work, along with the provincial government, 
certain number of hours a day. In this way, citizens learn to appreciate things. In time of elections, 
government officers take care of everything in other neighborhoods, in order to win some votes. 
These houses built entirely by government officers in electoral times are not really appreciated by 
neighbors. After these houses are built, neighbors sell the doors, handles, etc. In contrast, when 
people contribute in these housing programs, they learn to appreciate the value of their work, they 
meet other neighbors, and they learn to help each other (Young adult, low SES, Gualeguaychú).    
 
The Argentinean, in general, is very lazy and wants to do little work. This is previous governments’ 
fault because they gave them all (Young adult, low SES, Gualeguaychú).  
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The collaboration between the municipal government and citizen groups in 
Gualeguaychú is so high that an organization of local retailers decided to auto-impose an 
additional 15 percent sales tax with the purpose of creating an industrial park. This additional tax 
was collected and administered by the local government, even though it was not mandatory. This 
initiative was so successful that not only one of the most important industrial parks in Argentina 
was created, but also the local government decided to increase this voluntary tax to 30 percent in 
order canalize resources to other areas. Citizen collaboration, however, transcends the municipal 
level: When other public enterprises need funds for public developments, for instance, citizen 
voluntarily assent to pay additional fees, especially when other governmental levels fail to transfer 
economic resources:  
 
For your information, an unprecedented behavior for this country, Gualeguaychu’s retailers decided 
to auto-excise an additional 15 percent sales tax with the sole purpose of creating an institution 
called corporation for development that later established the industrial park. This initiative worked 
very well; they collected money and built the park until the political rascality made some changes: 
They increased the tax from 15 to 30 percent, using the other 15 percent for tourism  (Older adult, 
low SES, Gualeguaychú). 
 
The electric cooperative had large economic problems, due to the emission of federal bonds. 
People had to delay their payments and the bonds did not work. The cooperative had to buy 
machinery but did not have the economic resources to do so. A few months ago, the electric 
cooperative started to charge an additional 10 percent of the electricity bill, but paying this 
increment was voluntary; that is, it was up to you to pay it (Young adult, low SES, Gualeguaychú).  
 
 
Even in the absence of the municipal government, Gualeguaychuenses keep their spirits 
of solidarity. These attitudes are reflected on the more than 400 NGOs that exist in a city of nearly 
80,000 inhabitants. The early custom of organizing raffles, shows and events to collect funds for 
public investments has endured until modern times. In the case of relative deprivation, it is not 
uncommon to encounter citizens exchanging work for food:  
 
 
There are several good will associations and NGO’s. For example, Class 32 helps the town’s 
hospital. They get together and organize raffles to get funds. We also have the friends’ commission 
of the radio electric command. They help policemen with bulletproof jackets, among other things. 
This command sells bonuses in 1 peso. Some other neighbors also organize fashion shows, and 
they exchange food for tickets. There is even a girl that comes to my house and asks me to let her 
clean my sidewalk for a package of noodles. This city has a high solidarity level (Young adult, low 
SES, Gualeguaychú).  
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Finally, the city’s progress is not exempt from problems. Along with the Gualeguaychú’s 
developments, crime rates are also on the rise, especially in commercial and touristic areas. 
Citizens suggest that they are starting to experience social ills they did not have before: 
 
 
This municipality has progressed a lot in 10 years. The carnival helped a lot. It brought things we 
didn’t have before, good and bad. I used to live behind the corsodromo, I was 14 and used to walk 
with no worries. Today everything is different. You see rapes, robberies and assaults. We didn’t 
have this much insecurity (Young adult, low SES, Gualeguaychú).   
 
 
   
Accountability in Concepción del Uruguay. In Concepción del Uruguay, there is a 
generalized complaint among citizens about the low levels of accountability at the local 
government. Individuals claim that there are two main reasons behind phenomenon: First, there 
is little access to public information, especially for opposition parties, groups or political figures. 
Municipal officers in Concepción del Uruguay have been traditionally hiding crucial information to 
the citizenry, thus it is very difficult to discover sources of local corruption. However, there is an 
enormous concern among citizens regarding the regular adjudication of public contracts to two or 
three firms. Second, individual leaders find it difficult to get people organized in order to hold 
public officials accountable, due to the apathy and lack of interest previously mentioned in this 
chapter. Even when people get organized and manage to make formal requests to municipal 
officers, responses usually take long or occur right before elections:  
 
Information in this municipality is not open or transparent. Municipal officers have limited the right of 
access to information, especially to minorities, such as the Socialist Party. This party has 
demanded access to municipal information in several occasions, and even filed formal complaints 
because they were denied access to local public accounts, information about public employees, 
subsidies, among others. Thus, there is no accountability because the municipal government 
denies information every since 1983, when we returned to democracy. This is why it is impossible 
to know whether or not the municipality is corrupt because the lack of information. However, it is 
curious to see that only two or three firms always win public bids (Public Prosecutor, University 
Professor, Concepción del Uruguay).     
 
Today, I spent the entire morning at the municipality knocking at their doors, requesting a public 
service. It seems that I am the only one that worries, because when I organize a neighborhood 
meeting, only two people attend. One day we organized a meeting at the school to talk about the 
necessity of sewerage in our neighborhood. An engineer that works at the municipality told us that 
if we bought the pipes they could come to install them. We bought the pipes, and I had to chase the 
engineer for 15 months in order for him to install them. Three days before municipal elections 
municipal officers went to install the sewerage pipes. Why we as citizens have to beg municipal 
officers to fulfill their obligations?  (Older adult, high SES, Concepción del Uruguay). 
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In my neighborhood, the block went to complain and municipal officers listened to their request; 
however they took 15 or 20 days to replace the street light bulb (Young adult, high SES, 
Concepción del Uruguay). 
 
 
 Local media is an additional player that needs careful attention in order to best 
understand the municipal system of public accountability. As in other cities, the most important 
means of communication in Concepción del Uruguay are newspapers, radios and TV channels. 
The focus groups carried out throughout this study emphasized the triangular relationship among 
citizens, municipal officers, and media, paying particular consideration to local newspapers and 
radios since they are far more accessible to the civil society than TV channels. Two lessons can 
be drawn from the study of access to public information through local media: First, municipal and 
provincial media depend, in important ways, on governmental economic resources to remain in 
business. Both the provincial and municipal governments contribute with large shares of the total 
newspapers’ income, usually through advertisement and official missives to the town. In this 
context, both levels of government could restrict freedom of information, especially if they 
encounter certain types of publications they dislike. In response, local newspapers are also very 
careful in selecting the right clients, especially if they come from emerging political competitors or 
opposition groups:     
 
Municipal and provincial media depend, in general terms, on governmental resources to survive. 
This is why some local newspapers are very restricted in terms of the information they publish. 
They could even be threatened by municipal officers in terms of suspending publicity contracts they 
have with the local government. In Buenos Aires, in contrast, local media have other sources of 
economic support that comes from large enterprises. But here, the reality is different and freedom 
of the press is relatively conditioned to municipal funding (Newspaper Editor, Sports Club 
President, Concepción del Uruguay).    
 
It is evident that if you belong to the incumbent’s party the doors of all news media will be open; 
however, if you belong to an opposition party maybe you won’t even get the smallest coverage. 
Most of the media function a result of the amount of money they receive from the incumbent’s office  
(Councilor, Federal Peronism, Gualeguaychú). 
 
 
These findings, along with the restrictions imposed by the local government to collect 
information, somehow challenge the common held notion that decentralization increases 
accountability. When the size of the winning coalition in local elites is small and closed (i.e. 
single-family politically dominated towns), and municipal governments are one of the most 
 169 
important sources of income for local newspapers, the local system of public accountability tend 
to fail. Moreover, citizens seem to be more concerned about national that local politics. As 
mentioned before, several focus groups’ participants have suggested that citizens elect local 
politicians according to their national preferences; that is, presidential candidates and their parties 
tend to drag votes for their local leaders and not the other way around. Thus, it may be important 
to rethink whether or not all politics is local, as Tip O’Neill once said, or it rather depends on how 
really decentralized a town is and what is the relationship among local politicians, the media and 
the citizenry as a whole:  
 
The electoral will of the citizenry at the local level is strongly linked to what happens in national 
politics. People look for an asymmetry on local, provincial and national politics. (Young adult, High 
SES, Concepción del Uruguay)  
 
 
Local radios, however, appear to be a better channel of communication between the 
citizenry and the local government. There are at least two mechanisms mentioned by individuals 
that are more effective to make their voices heard than going directly to the municipality. On the 
one hand, citizens can go to local radio stations and complain on air about what they perceive to 
be municipal inefficacy. On the other, citizens can leave messages on the radios’ answering 
machines. Radio hosts air individuals’ pre-recorded demands and complaints later. Of course this 
mechanism, that is very similar to that in Gualeguaychú, is more effective in electoral times: 
 
 
When there is a particular need, there is a way to leave a message with your complaint on the 
reporter’s answering machine, and then the reporter airs your message. This is the most effective 
way to make our voices heard, because we know that if we call the municipality, they will not pay 
attention. However, if you leave a message on the reporter’s answering machine about a problem 
with the sewing service, you will surely get the problem fixed. This system is, of course, more 
effective in electoral years (Young adult, high SES, Concepción del Uruguay). 
 
There is a radio station here where people tell the truth and say things the way they are. This Radio 
is called “Vision 98.9” (Young adult, low SES, Concepción del Uruguay). 
 
 
 
 Accountability in Gualeguaychú. As opposed to Concepción del Uruguay, 
Gualeguaychú’s municipal governments have traditionally been more open and transparent in 
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terms of access to information. As citizens mention below, there are important communication 
campaigns carried out by the local government. In some cases, municipal officers inform about 
the public works that they are conducting through local TV channels and other means. In other 
cases, local officials carry out interviews or surveys with individuals that are more likely to be 
affected by future public works. All in all, municipal worries about improving the channels of 
communication with citizens is so strong that some citizens even complain about the lack of 
objectivity due to the large amounts of information at their disposal.    
 
The municipal government also keeps us informed about what they do through a local TV channel. 
The other day I watched a documentary about what they do with organic and inorganic waste. I got 
speechless because I didn’t know that they even compact wastes and separate green from 
transparent PET containers (Young adult, high SES, Gualeguaychú).   
 
Where I work, I received a piece of paper from municipal officers to evaluate the 25th street. I work 
in a private store, a confectionary. They are distributing pieces of paper for you to note how many 
times a day do you cross the 25th street and how can they improve it. When we had the garbage 
problem, they also carried out a campaign to see what people thought and after that they installed 
the garbage cans (Young adult, low SES, Gualeguaychú).     
   
The municipal government provides lots of good information. The problem is that we are not able to 
analyze it all. Due to the large amounts of information, I think it is not objective anymore (Young 
adult, high SES, Gualeguaychú).  
 
 
 In terms of public information through local media, there are two coincidences with 
Concepción del Uruguay that are worth noting. First, local newspapers depend financially on 
municipal advertisements and other types of publications. Second, radios seem to be the most 
effective way to communicate with municipal officers. These facts corroborate the idea about the 
caveats of public accountability as a result of state decentralization: 
 
 
If you read this town’s newspapers, they publish the good things but not the bad things (Young 
adult, low SES, Gualeguaychú).  
 
 
There is another way to express ourselves: When you think something is wrong in this town, there 
is a line in the radio where you can express your concerns. The municipal government pays a lot of 
attention to it (Young adult, high SES, Gualeguaychú).     
 
 
Finally, the statement below also corroborates the fact local media covers more often 
national than local politics:  
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As we said before, the media is another power; and what we see the most is national politics. What 
happens is that the mayor and governor’s actions do not have as big as an impact on the economy 
as the president does (Young adult, low SES, Gualeguaychú).  
 
    
Political Clientelism in Concepción del Uruguay. The final aspect of participatory 
democracy analyzed in this section is people’s reaction to political clientelism. Citizens in 
Concepción del Uruguay seem to be aware of the clientelistic practices that affect this town. A 
recurrent reason identified by subjects is income inequality. In this society, those who are 
relatively deprived and notice that they do not have access to the levels of wealth others enjoy 
are more vulnerable to the exchange of private goods and services for votes. This is the reason 
why political clientelism in more pronounced during periods of electoral campaigns. After 
elections, however, clientelism may be also used as a tool to get sufficient citizen support to 
implement certain public policies. As some of the focus groups’ subjects note:  
 
I think equal opportunities should be included in the concept of democracy, because when there 
are large social injustices it is very difficult to say that democracy exists. When there are large 
social injustices there are large money differences. Thus in these instances, money manages a 
democracy that along with social injustices makes it very easy for those who have the power to buy 
votes to win. Democracy should be able to solve this problem, but unfortunately, the large social 
injustices we live in are stronger than the potential effects of democracy (Young adult, high SES, 
Concepción del Uruguay). 
 
Sometimes you have to do it for necessity. For example, I would vote for a politician who is looking 
for me to get my vote, maybe just in exchange for a pile of food. Often times you just don’t have it, 
so you would do anything for a pile of food. That usually happens during elections; and if you have 
a family and children with necessities, would you miss that chance? (Young adult, low SES, 
Concepción del Uruguay).  
 
In electoral times, politicians even give you a ride home, but afterwards if they cross your way they 
don’t even say hi. They even go to the smallest neighborhoods promising jobs (Young adult, low 
SES, Concepción del Uruguay).  
 
 
Other important source of political clientelism is the provision of public work contracts and 
“jobs for the boys.” Consistent with what was found in the previous section about the political 
survival of local elites, a very important way to ensure reelection is by building a network of clients 
large enough that alternation could threat the stability of jobs and public contracts of a large 
portion of the population:  
 
In previous administrations the municipality used to get full. A municipality like ours had 1,400 
employees, a barbarity. If you were friends with a politician inside, you were a friend of his friends. 
That’s the way they used to hire municipal employees (Older adult, high SES, Concepción del 
Uruguay).  
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Political Clientelism in Gualeguaychú. Gualeguaychú is not free from political clientelism 
either. An important lesson derived from the focus groups transcriptions is that politicians 
principally center on highly populated, low SES neighborhoods to build clientelistic networks. This 
recurrent finding may also challenge the effectiveness of elections as a tool for accountability. In 
other words, voting to replace “bad” politicians may prove ineffective because elected public 
officials know where the most populated areas are, where individuals with low SES reside, and 
how to provide private incentives (i.e. jobs for the boys and the exchange of private gains for 
votes) to regain office over and over again: 
 
The local government is very interested in neighborhoods with high population density, because 
those locations are the best places to find large quantities of votes so they can catapult their 
political careers through the years (Older adult, high SES, Gualeguaychú). 
 
The most important clientelistic mechanisms in this town are job promises, gifts on the Election 
Day, pressure enterprises to make sure that a large share of their employees vote for a particular 
candidate in order to get a break on municipal fees (Councilor, Justicialista Party, Gualeguaychú).  
  
 
Another potential explanation for putting densely populated towns on the spotlight is the 
political retribution for public investments. It may be possible that in poor neighborhoods 
population density is higher than in richer districts. Thus a mile of road built in a poor 
neighborhood will benefit more people than in richer, less densely populated neighborhoods. 
Hence, political leaders working with political agendas may assess the costs and benefits of 
building roads. Overall, it may be more politically profitable to provide goods and services in 
densely populated areas: 
 
These humble neighborhoods have luxury public services, but residents do not pay accordingly. I 
understand that there is a human and sanitary issue, but I think that municipal officers should at 
least charge a small fee for these services. It is likely that no elected public officer has the guts to 
charge a fee because they know they could lose votes; while here, in the city, there are streets that 
still have no pavement  (Older adult, high SES, Gualeguaychú).  
 
  
 Two final statements are important to contextualize how neither Concepción del Uruguay 
nor Gualeguaychú are exempt from cronyism and the retribution of political favors to those who 
remain loyal with the incumbent government and municipal employees: 
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My mom is a friend of the mayor. I was jobless 8 years ago; my old man was a friend of the hospital 
director, thus I started to work as janitor. Two months after I was promoted to receptionist; I used to 
take note of personal facts of people who went to get X-rays, but I had no clue what an X-ray was. I 
resigned one month after because I knew I was doing things wrong  (Young adult, low SES, 
Gualeguaychú).  
 
Theoretically there are contest for the selection of municipal employees. My brother participated in 
that contest and got the employment. However, I am not sure if he got the employment because he 
won the contest or because the municipal secretary was a close friend with my old man (Young 
adult, low SES, Gualeguaychú). 
 
   
 
In sum, this section has shown how citizens behave in response to the actions of local 
political elites. In historical terms, a social construction heavily influenced by local caudillos will 
remain dependent on political clientelism for years to come. In this context, citizen will develop a 
generalized apathy with respect to everything that has to do with public affairs. In contrast, social 
constructions that rely on citizen efforts to develop political capital will more likely consolidate 
more inclusive, participatory democracies.  
 
Conclusion  
  
This chapter has presented some elements to determine when decentralization works, 
when it does not and why. Using the Mill’s Method of Difference (1970), I selected two 
Argentinean towns, Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay, which share remarkably similar 
histories and socioeconomic indicators, and at the same time opposed outcomes with respect to 
their levels of participatory democracy. After, I perused comparative historical evidence, carried 
out semi-structured specialized interviews with local elites, and used focus groups’ transcriptions, 
I was able to establish that the most relevant differences between these twin towns lie on critical 
junctures, local elite behaviors and the relationship between citizen principals and local 
government agents.  
  In terms of critical junctures, the most important evidence found in this chapter is that 
since the foundation of both towns by Don Tomas de Rocamora, Concepción del Uruguay has 
been almost entirely developed by local caudillos and other local political figures without a heavy 
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involvement of the citizenry; in contrast, groups of neighbors have organized generation after 
generation to develop Gualeguaychú themselves, because this town has been traditionally 
neglected by both the founding fathers and provincial authorities. In terms of participatory 
democracy, these opposed social constructions have made of Concepción del Uruguay a town 
where “men are used to receive fish and eat for a day;” while Gualeguaychú has become a town 
where “men learned how to fish themselves and eat for a lifetime.” 
Local political elites, as a result, portray extremely different behaviors in both towns. In 
Concepción del Uruguay, a single family has politically dominated the town for over 50 years. In 
this context, the local political elite is composed by a small, illiberal coalition that most likely will 
continue to govern the town for years to come. As a result, citizens appear to have little or no 
control over the determination of the way democracy functions at the local level. Conversely, the 
local political elite in Gualeguaychú is composed by a larger coalition, where the distinction 
between citizenry and political class is minimal. In this context, today’s neighbor could be 
tomorrow’s mayor or councilor, and former politicians can easily reintegrate to civil society. As a 
result, individuals have higher control over the local political system. 
Finally, three citizen responses to local political elite behaviors are worth noting in the 
context of principal-agent relationships. First, even though Concepción del Uruguay was one of 
the pioneers in terms of citizen participation in cooperative organizations, Uruguayenses have 
been gradually limiting their civic engagement due to both legal restrictions and poor local 
governmental responses. In contrast, citizens in Gualeguaychú continue to get organized, collect 
funds, and distribute responsibilities among neighbors with the purpose of collaborating with the 
municipal government for the town’s development. Second, holding public officials accountable is 
more problematic in Concepción del Uruguay than in Gualeguaychú due to heavy restrictions on 
the access to municipal information. Notwithstanding, citizens in both towns claim that when they 
encounter problems with municipal officers’ responses, they can effectively voice their demands 
and complaints in local radio stations. Local newspapers, however, are less effective as a means 
to communicate with public officers due to their large dependency on governmental funds to 
continue in business. Finally, income inequality seems to be crucial to understand why people 
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would accept the exchange of private gains for votes in both towns. Relative deprivation makes 
those in the lower quintiles of wealth more prone to be victimized by political clientelism, not only 
by receiving “gifts” during electoral periods, but also by becoming recipients of “jobs for the boys.” 
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CHAPTER VI 
  
VI. CONCLUSION: DECENTRALIZATION, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND THE 
POLITICAL SURVIVAL OF LOCAL ELITES 
 
This project has emphasized the fact that even though decentralization reforms in Latin 
America and the Caribbean continue to be widely implemented, their general effects on 
democracies remain rather unclear. More mayors are being elected, more resources are being 
transferred, and more responsibilities are being transmitted to municipal governments today than 
ever before. International development agencies, multilateral donors and NGOs continue to 
heavily invest economic resources and human capital into the decentralization strategy, with the 
main purpose of attaining human development. Similarly, national and intermediate levels of 
government have been decentralizing political, fiscal and economic powers in order to bring the 
government closer to the people. In spite of these efforts, we have very little empirical evidence 
that verifies the supposed benefits of decentralization with respect to the consolidation of 
participatory democracies.  
The main goal of this dissertation project is to offer scientific responses to three research 
questions that I consider essential in order to understand the effects of decentralization reforms 
on Latin American democracies. These questions are: (1) What are the factors that explain 
different degrees of citizen support for decentralization? (2) What are the effects of the different 
levels of municipal decentralization on participatory democracies? (3) Why can two nearly 
identical decentralization policies produce totally opposed political outcomes? In this chapter, I 
offer a summary of the most relevant theoretical postulates and empirical findings that I think best 
respond the questions above. Next, I present several policy relevant insights that arise from the 
findings of this dissertation. Finally, I discuss the future research agenda.  
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Finding Citizen Support for State Decentralization    
Many scholars argue that the success or failure of decentralization depends in important 
ways on the characteristics and predispositions of the target community to support or reject such 
reform (Hiskey 2010; Norris 2008). Thus, if decentralization programs are carried out in contexts 
of low citizen support for such policies, it may very well be the case that most of the efforts of 
governments and cooperation agencies will be illegitimate to citizens and doomed to fail. This 
prospect then begs the question, “What is the degree of citizen support for decentralization 
policies in Latin America and the Caribbean?” In this project, I discover that even though 
decentralization reforms intend to bring the government closer to the people, citizens in Latin 
America and Caribbean do not necessarily want to be closer to the government. This finding 
corroborates, on average, Véliz’s (1980) claims that there is a centralist tradition in Latin America. 
However, this author fails to explain why there is so much variation in citizen support for 
decentralization not only across countries, but also among individuals within countries.   
Results from nearly 37,000 face-to-face interviews show that in 2008, only 35 percent of 
the people living in the 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries selected for this study 
expressed direct support for fiscal and administrative decentralization. The remaining 65 percent 
favors either recentralization or think that public funds and administrative duties and 
responsibilities should be equally distributed among national and local levels of government. This 
light centralist preference amongst Latin Americans uncovers a silent challenge that policy-
makers, international organizations, NGOs and the alleged beneficiaries themselves face if they 
are concerned with the levels of citizen support for this state reform. Nevertheless, there is wide 
variation in the levels of citizen support for decentralization: In a feeling thermometer that goes 
from 0 “Full recentralization” to 100 “Full decentralization,” there is a nearly 30-point spread 
between the country with the lowest support (34.1 in Honduras) and the country with the highest 
support (58.5 in Bolivia). What can explain this variation? 
This question is best answered by looking at both country and individual levels of human 
development. In countries with low levels of health, wealth and education, citizens prefer to invest 
most of their time and efforts in trying to find solutions to their individual basic needs. After 
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rational self-evaluations of their capabilities about fulfilling the duties of decentralization, citizens 
determine that they have no time or are ill equipped for empowerment activities, such as exerting 
more control over public affairs and participating in collective decision-making. The findings at the 
individual level suggest that people are not delusional about this lack of time and/or capabilities, 
because less educated individuals, for instance, are reluctant to take on the responsibilities 
assigned to them by decentralization reforms.  
Therefore, in countries with low human development, people feel less supportive of 
decentralization because they are aware of how poorly endowed most citizen are due to low 
levels of health, wealth and education. In this context, citizens prefer, as a result, letting the 
“experts” at the national level take care of collective decision-making. Thus, in countries with low 
human development, citizens support, on average, recentralization policies. Additionally, these 
individuals perceive that strong central governments should be able to provide most of the 
solutions to their human development problems. The empirical finding that preferences for strong, 
authoritarian governments are related to citizen support for recentralization corroborates this 
claim.   
Traditionally excluded groups, like women and ethnic minorities, should also prefer 
recentralization because they may also feel less capable of carrying out the new duties and 
responsibilities that result from state decentralization, in comparison with dominant groups. 
Alternatively, local political elites and other dominant groups may engage in governmental 
practices that exclude women and ethnic minorities. No matter which of these explanations is 
more appropriate, or a combination of the two, it is certain that the empirical evidence indicates 
that these groups continue to be excluded by local governments, and as a response, they favor 
recentralization over decentralization.   
Conversely, in places where citizens perceive that they have satisfied their basic needs, 
they may feel more capable of carrying out self-government activities, and that is why they 
support decentralization reforms to a greater extent. These reforms should allow individuals to 
have greater control over politicians, public resources and decision-making. In this context, 
citizens signal local level politicians their desire to exert more pressures over intermediate and 
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national levels of government in order to achieve greater decentralization and autonomy, not only 
trough transfers from higher levels of government, but also through keeping taxes and power at 
the local level.  
Empirically, the multilevel models fitted here in order to explain the moderate/low levels of 
support for decentralization corroborate the analysis above: people residing in countries with 
relatively higher levels of human development tend to support decentralization to a greater extent 
than individuals residing in countries where human development is low.  Substantively, people 
living in Costa Rica or Chile express a degree of support for decentralization that is, on average, 
nearly 14 points higher than that reported by people living in Haiti, in a 0 to 100 scale. At the 
individual level, however, there are two exceptions to the story developed above.  
First, wealthier citizens tend to show greater support for fiscal and administrative 
recentralization. This phenomenon may be due to the fact that individuals in higher quintiles of 
wealth may be able (and willing) to exert larger influence over national politics. Bankers, 
presidents and CEOs of large companies and corporations, and owners of the means of 
production in general may have a closer and direct relationship with congressmen and ministers 
at the national level and could even play a important role in decision-making over financial and 
monetary policies. On the other hand richer individuals may perceive decentralization as a tool to 
create more bureaucracy that can lead to an increase of taxes. As for wealthier individuals living 
far away from national capitals and who are not interested in politics, they may perceive 
decentralization as a way to decrease their power over local economies, since their activities may 
be fiscally and administratively controlled by newly empowered local governments. 
Second, people residing in smaller cities and rural areas support decentralization rather 
than recentralization. Assuming that most of the individuals that reside in rural areas in Latin 
America and the Caribbean have lower levels of human development than their counterparts 
residing in larger cities and national capitals, its is plausible to think that their greater support for 
decentralization does not translate into a need for autonomy. Rather, individuals in these 
territories pressure for transfers of more resources, without being willing or able to generate their 
own resources and pay more taxes. This story, once again, fits with the claim that citizens with 
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low levels of human development regard central governments as one of the most important 
providers of solutions to basic needs. 
An alternative explanation for the different levels of citizen support for state 
decentralization is conditional to an intrinsic system of popular evaluation of governmental 
performance. This system is composed by a citizen scheme of incentives and punishments. On 
the one hand, when citizens perceive good performance by the national government, individuals 
have rational incentives to recentralize the provision of goods and services. In contrast, if 
individuals perceive a good performance of the local government, they should have greater 
incentives to favor transfers from national and intermediate levels to local levels of government.   
The mixed citizen support for state decentralization analyzed so far may be contributing 
to the explanations for the divergent outcomes that decentralization policies produce on local 
democracies. In sum, the most important explanation for the divergent degrees of support for 
decentralization policies is that as principals become better equipped (i.e. education) to more 
closely monitor and shape the behavior of their agents, they are more willing to support a move in 
that direction. Principals with lower human development levels are more comfortable letting the 
“experts” in the capital city take care of things. The message is that a key element behind support 
for decentralization is the abilities, and the self-recognition of those abilities, of the principals to 
play the more active political role that decentralization assigns to them. The next section will turn 
to the analysis of the general effects of decentralization in Latin American.  
 
The Effects of State Decentralization on Latin America’s Participatory Democracies  
The impact of decentralization is analyzed in three citizen participation modes: (1) 
Institutionalized modes; (2) Mobilized modes; (3) Participation in local organizations of the civil 
society. Institutionalized modes of participation represent citizen engagement in formal 
institutions, such as political parties, the voting booth and municipal offices. Mobilized modes 
refer to citizen participation in street protests, riots and other forms of public demonstration. 
Finally, citizen participation in local organizations of the civil society includes communitarian 
meetings, parent-teacher associations, religious organizations, etc.  
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The answer to the question about the possible effects of decentralization on citizen 
participation in institutionalized and mobilized modes is based on local political elites’ behaviors 
and citizen responses to both decentralization and local governments’ actions. The theory of 
political survival of local elites developed in this dissertation explains that local authorities behave 
in such a way as to be able to hang on in power the longest. These behaviors vary according to 
the degree of territorial decentralization. In relatively more decentralized territories local elites 
implement stronger actions in order to avoid alternation in power of their preferred local leader. 
This is due to the fact that in more decentralized towns, local agents have higher levels of 
relative power in comparison with both higher levels of government and citizen principals, as long 
as the sequence of the decentralization reform has not been designed in such a way as to 
decrease their relative power with respect to national governments (see Falleti 2010). As a 
consequence, in relatively more decentralized contexts local political elites could place more 
obstacles to citizen participation in institutions that can put the continuity of the local elites’ 
preferred politicians at risk. In democracy, the quintessential institutions of political representation 
meant to replace elected politicians are political parties and movements. As a result, citizen 
participation in political parties should be less frequent in more decentralized territories.  
The empirical evidence corroborates the expectations above. Results from hierarchical 
linear models show that higher degrees of fiscal and administrative decentralization are 
associated with lower levels of citizen participation in political parties. This finding is consistent 
across the 22 Latin American countries and the 46 Argentinean municipalities selected for this 
investigation. This result indicates that empowered local political elites have greater incentives 
and tools to discourage citizen participation in institutions of political representation. These 
incentives and tools that result from decentralization are at the disposal of strong local elites in 
order to prevent the emergence of political competitors who can put them at risk of removal from 
office in the following electoral period.31  
Additionally, the increase of local governments’ administrative and economic resources 
may seem attractive to elected officers to hang on in power, thus dissuading potential political 
                                                      
31 This hypothesis is only valid, of course, in municipalities considered as full electoral democracies.  
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challengers. An alternative explanation to the negative correlation between decentralization and 
participation in political parties is that in decentralized contexts, citizens should be able to find 
more solutions to their collective problems at municipal offices, so they may feel less compelled 
to participate in formal political organizations in order to satisfy their personal and communitarian 
needs. 
Another finding that corroborates the theory of the political survival of local elites is that 
decentralization reforms are negatively related to voter turnout in the 47 municipalities 
investigated in Argentina. Specifically, in those municipalities where organic charters bind citizens 
and politicians, the likelihood of voter turnout is smaller than in municipalities without these sort of 
municipal constitutions. The explanation for this phenomenon is that these charters, as designed 
by local political elites, leave so little room for political maneuvers to elected public officials, that 
citizens regard voting as meaningless. Another potential explanation is that organic charters 
condition the electoral structure in such a way as to make it difficult for individuals to vote. All in 
all, this is an association that requires further research in order to best comprehend the negative 
effect of written sub-national constitutions on voter turnout.  
In terms of citizen principal actions, they can offer at least two other possible responses 
to decentralization and local governments’ actions. First, since decentralization transfers political, 
fiscal and administrative powers from higher to lower levels of government, it is expected that 
newly empowered municipal officers are responsible for the provision of goods and services, 
such as health, education, sewerage, garbage collection, etc., depending upon the level and 
depth of the reform. Also, local governments in decentralized settings are responsible for the 
provision of licenses, permits, patents, and so on. For this reason, citizens should carry out 
dealings more frequently at the municipal offices of relatively more decentralized territories.  
The empirical evidence also corroborates the hypothesis above. The fiscal dimension of 
decentralization is positively associated with the frequency citizens carry out dealings at 
municipal governments. In other words, the likelihood of demand-making at the local government 
is higher in municipalities that tax their citizens in comparison to those municipalities that do not 
posses a local taxation structure. It is worth noting, however, that this association was only found 
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in the models carried out with data for the 46 Argentinean municipalities. This relationship was 
not statistically significant in the models fitted with LAPOP data, although variables were 
operationalized differently.  
An additional explanation for the positive association between fiscal decentralization and 
demand-making is that once individuals contribute directly to the fiscal income of local 
governments, citizens become more interested in either controlling municipal officers or extracting 
back resources in terms of goods and services from local government offices. Hence, municipal 
taxation may be used as a tool to increase local officials’ accountability, and at the same time, 
recognize with greater efficiency territorially specific needs and demands. Moreover, citizens 
paying taxes to municipal governments should be interested in recognizing with more exactitude 
which governmental level is responsible for the provision of specific goods and services.  
The second citizen response analyzed here is related to the impediment to participate in 
political parties and a sense of local government inefficacy in the provision of goods and services. 
When the government is closer to people, citizens can more easily observe what is going on with 
politics, but they may not necessarily have more control or agency over local officials. One of the 
most often publicized benefits of state decentralization is the fact that public officials are more 
accountable, and individuals can reward them with reelection or punish them with replacement in 
the next electoral period. Replacing a leader, however, is an inefficient way to exercise political 
accountability because citizens may have to wait several years until the following electoral 
contest, voting may be subject to political clientelism, and political elites may exert great 
pressures to dissuade open participation in political parties. In this context, the only way out for 
citizens is to engage in mobilized form of participation, such as public protests, demonstrations 
and riots.  
The empirical analyses carried out in Latin America and the Caribbean yield a positive 
association between decentralization and the odds of participating in public protests and 
manifestations. This finding indicates that in decentralized contexts, individuals face incentives to 
turn to mobilized modes of participation in order to voice their demands. In other words, state 
decentralization produces an unintended deinstitutionalization of citizen participation in 
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organizations of political representation in Latin America and the Caribbean, and fomenting at the 
same time public demonstrations, protests and riots. Thus, the efforts that international 
organizations and policy-makers have been carrying out to decentralize seem to have produced a 
decline on citizen participation in institutions of political representation, and at the same time, 
fomenting solicitudes at local governments. However, if individuals perceive that local officials are 
not hearing their needs and complaints, citizens may be more inclined to protest in the streets 
instead of engaging in institutionalized forms of participation. 
Finally, based on the theory of social capital (Putnam 1994), this dissertation project 
claims that the levels of citizen participation in local organizations of the civil society are 
independent from the levels of state decentralization. Rather, the degree of citizen engagement in 
these modes of participation depend upon the levels of social capital; that is, civic traditions and 
social, economic and cultural historical contexts. The empirical evidence in this study finds no 
association between the degree of state decentralization and citizen participation in labor unions, 
professional associations, community activities, and teacher-parent associations. In sum, while I 
have been able to find mixed effects of state decentralization on institutionalized and mobilized 
modes of participation, there is no impact of these reforms on citizen participation in local 
organizations of the civil society. 
  
Similar Decentralization Policies can Produce Opposed Political Outcomes 
 The answer to the final research question put forward in this dissertation assesses why 
two remarkably similar decentralization packages can produce dramatically different outcomes 
with respect to participatory democracy. By using the Mill’s Method of Difference (1970), I 
selected two Argentinean towns, Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay, which share 
similar histories and socioeconomic indicators, and at the same time opposed democracy 
outcomes. After, I perused comparative historical evidence, carried out semi-structured 
specialized interviews with local elites, and used focus groups’ transcriptions, I was able to 
establish that the most relevant differences between these twin towns lie on critical junctures, 
local elite behaviors and the relationship between citizen principals and local government agents.  
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The critical juncture found in this project suggests that the less successful town was 
almost entirely developed by local caudillos and other political figures without a heavy 
involvement of the citizenry. Conversely, groups of neighbors have organized generation after 
generation to develop the more successful town themselves, because founding fathers and 
provincial authorities have traditionally neglected it. In terms of participatory democracy, these 
opposed social constructions have made of the less democratic town a place where “men are 
used to receive fish and eat for a day;” while the more democratic town has become a place 
where “men learned how to fish themselves and eat for a lifetime.” As a result, local political elites 
portray extremely different behaviors in both towns. In one town, a single family has politically 
dominated the municipality for over 50 years. In this context, the local political elite is composed 
by a small, illiberal coalition that most likely will continue to govern the town for years to come. In 
this context, citizens appear to have less control over the determination of the way democracy 
functions at the local level. Conversely, the other town’s local political elite is composed by a 
larger coalition, where the distinction between citizenry and political class is minimal. There, 
today’s neighbor could be tomorrow’s mayor or councilor, and former politicians can easily 
reintegrate to civil society. Consequently, individuals seem to have higher control over the local 
political system. 
Finally, three citizen responses to local political elite behaviors are worth noting in the 
context of principal-agent relationships. First, even though the less democratic town was one of 
the pioneers in terms of citizen participation in cooperative organizations, individuals have been 
gradually limiting their civic engagement due to legal restrictions and poor local governmental 
responses. In contrast, citizens in the more democratic town continue to get organized, collect 
funds, and distribute responsibilities among neighbors with the purpose of collaborating with the 
municipal government for the town’s development. Second, holding public officials accountable is 
more problematic in the less democratic town due to large restrictions on the access to municipal 
information. Notwithstanding, citizens in both towns claim that when they encounter problems 
with municipal officers’ responses, they can effectively voice their demands and complaints in 
local radio stations. Local newspapers, however, are less effective as a means to communicate 
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with public officers due to their large dependency on governmental funds to continue in business. 
Lastly, income inequality seems to be crucial to understand why people would accept the 
exchange of private gains for votes in both towns. Relative deprivation makes those in the lower 
quintiles of wealth more prone to be victimized by political clientelism, not only by receiving “gifts” 
during electoral periods, but also by becoming recipients of “jobs for the boys.” 
In conclusion, these findings suggest that the success or failure of decentralization 
packages depend on who exerts the most significant pressures to decentralize. In contexts where 
the citizenry and strongly organized local groups demand political, fiscal and administrative 
relocation of power from national, intermediate and local levels of government to the community, 
participatory democracies are likely to function in a more inclusive manner. In contrast, those 
communities who are recipients of decentralization reforms initiated by strong local elites seem to 
favor exclusionary politics, where citizen participation is far more limited. In short, decentralization 
seems to work better when it empowers citizens more so than local governments. 
 
Policy Implications 
Four policy-relevant lessons derive from the theoretical postulates and the empirical 
evidence of this dissertation: 
• Before decentralizing, it is necessary to carry out qualitative and quantitative studies 
in the selected territories, and design the decentralization programs according to the 
results of these studies and the objectives aimed to achieve. Thus, decentralization 
reforms should be designed and implemented according to the particular 
characteristics and needs of each context and not as a one-size-fits-all strategy. 
• For decentralization to thrive, it is necessary to identify in advance how local political 
elites are going to implement the decentralization strategy. In other words, policy-
makers should interpret if local political elites are going to use the political, fiscal, and 
administrative powers granted to them as a tool to increase participatory democracy 
or only as a mechanism to guarantee their political survival. 
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• Policy-makers and international organizations should work hand-in-hand with citizen 
groups and let them take initiatives in the formulation and implementation of 
decentralization reforms. This practice should allow citizens to promote their own 
development instead of resting upon the actions of a few strong leaders. 
• After decentralization, reformers should be aware about public demonstrations, riots 
and protests on the one hand, and citizen participation in political parties on the 
other. These citizen actions can be an effective thermometer of how well or bad 
decentralization is working at the local level. 
 
Future Research Agenda 
An important future research agenda to complement this project should focus on the 
effects of municipal regulations on citizen perceptions about local democratic governance. These 
municipal regulations, such as local constitutions, norms, ordinances and laws, should shape 
citizens and local elites behaviors in such a way as to modify the functioning of democracy at the 
local level. In this context, one could expect to find better citizen evaluations and perceptions of 
municipal performance where municipal regulations allow for mechanisms of direct democracy on 
the one hand (i.e. referenda, public audiences and/or mandate recall); and accountability on the 
other (i.e. mechanisms for municipal evaluation, complaint registries and/or access to public 
information). These municipal regulations should serve as pressing mechanisms for local officials 
to be more responsive to citizens, since in this context, people are better endowed to monitor and 
control municipal decision-making.  
A preliminary empirical assessment of the hypotheses advanced above show interesting 
results. Using PAC data from public opinion surveys in 46 Argentinean municipalities, three 
groups of variables are used to form indexes to operationalize the concept of democratic 
governance. First, an Index of Perceptions of Municipal Performance32 that includes questions 
related to evaluations of the municipality’s political situation, satisfaction with performance of local 
                                                      
32 The Scale Reliability Coefficient for this index is 0.787.  
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democracy, evaluations of authorities’ respect for citizen rights, evaluations of performance of 
municipal institutions and a general evaluation of municipal employees shows a positive 
correlation with the variables age and wealth at the individual level, and recall at the municipal 
level. These results suggest that as individuals grow older and wealthier on the one hand, and 
those municipalities that possess a normative provision allowing recalls of elected public officials 
on the other, tend to provide better evaluations of municipal performance. In contrast people 
residing in municipalities that count with plebiscitary mechanisms tend to provide lower 
evaluations of municipal performance.  
Second, an Index of Perceptions of Administrative Efficacy33 that includes questions 
associated with municipal employees’ responses to citizen demand-making, such as long queues 
at the municipal government, unnecessary dealings, costly or denied information, disrespectful 
and impolite employees, discriminative and humiliating public officers shows, once again, that the 
variables age and wealth are positively associated with perceptions of administrative efficacy. 
That is to say that, as individuals grow older and become wealthier, they tend to perceive that the 
local government is relatively more efficacious. However, variables such as sex, public audience 
and mechanisms for municipal evaluation are negatively associated with citizen perceptions of 
administrative efficacy. In other words, women as opposed to men at the individual level and 
those municipalities that have municipal regulations allowing evaluations to municipal officers at 
the municipal level tend to have lower evaluations of municipal administrative efficacy.  
Finally, an Index of Perceptions about Freedom from Corruption at the Municipal 
Government34 that includes assessments of how often citizens have to pay bribes to get things 
done, frequency of bribe solicitation by municipal employees and general evaluations of municipal 
corruption shows that the variable age at the individual level and the variables initiative, recall, 
and access to municipal information are positively related to citizen evaluations of municipal 
transparency. In other words, as individuals grow older and people residing in those 
municipalities that have direct democracy mechanisms such as initiative and recall, and have 
                                                      
33 The Scale Reliability Coefficient for this Index is 0.707. 
34 The Scale Reliability Coefficient for this Index is 0.710. 
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access to municipal information, tend to believe that the local government is relatively freer from 
corruption. In contrast, people living in municipalities that have normative mechanisms for public 
audiences and municipal evaluations tend to think that municipalities are more corrupt. The 
regression outputs of these multilevel models are depicted in Appendix A11.   
These results confirm the hypothesis that municipal regulations –as designed by political 
authorities-, do have an impact on how citizen evaluate municipal performance, efficacy and 
freedom from corruption. In general terms, direct democracy mechanisms such as recalls of 
elected public officials increase the positive evaluations individuals have regarding municipal 
performance, maybe because local officers know that if they do not fulfill citizens’ expectations 
they may be easily replaced, or maybe because individuals perceive that due to this municipal 
regulations municipal officers should be required to improve their performance. Additionally, direct 
democracy provisions such as citizen initiatives and recalls are positively related to municipal 
transparency. These results suggest that these normative mechanisms could be helpful as a tool 
to reduce corruption at the local level. 
However, plebiscitary mechanisms are associated with lower evaluations of municipal 
performance and public audiences are negatively associated with perceptions of administrative 
efficacy. A potential explanation for these findings is that local authorities may have to rely on 
plebiscites and public audiences in contexts of high levels of conflict and dissension within the 
local government. Individuals, as a result, may perceive that in these contexts there are problems 
with municipal performance and administrative efficacy. In terms of municipal regulations for 
accountability, the existence of mechanisms to evaluate the work of municipal officers is 
negatively related to both perceptions of administrative efficacy and municipal transparency. 
However, the direction of these relationships could also work the other way around: In order to 
solve problems of corruption and municipal inefficacy, lawmakers at the local level may have 
implemented evaluation mechanisms to include citizen accountability and oversight. Further 
research is necessary not only to solve this endogeneity problem, but also to test and verify with 
more precision the hypotheses put forward in the conclusions of this dissertation.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A1: LAPOP Questionnaire (AmericasBarometer 2008) 
 
LAPOP DIMS 2008 Master Core, Spanish Versión # 15   IRB Approval:  #071086 
 
INSERTAR AQUI EL LOGO DE LA INSTITUCION 
LOCAL 
 
 
  
LA CULTURA POLÍTICA DE LA  DEMOCRACIA: Nombre del País, 2008 
 
© Vanderbilt University 2008. Derechos reservados.  All rights reserved. 
1. Sections in yellow are ones that require customization for each country, generally the insertion of the country name in 
place of the word “país.”  
2. Sections in grey indicate optional questions that each country team may wish to include or exclude.  
3.  Each country team may, of course, propose to add individual country-specific questions not included in this draft version.  
  
País: 1. México  2. Guatemala  3. El Salvador  4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua   6. Costa Rica  7. Panamá  8. 
Colombia 9.  Ecuador  10. Bolivia 11. Perú  12. Paraguay  13. Chile  14. Uruguay  15. Brasil.  16.  Venezuela 
17. Argentina  21. República Dominicana  22. Haití  23. Jamaica  24.Guyana  25. Trinidad 40. Estados Unidos 
41. Canadá 
PAIS   
IDNUM.  Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina]__________________ IDNUM   
ESTRATOPRI: INSERTAR AQUÍ CODIGO DEL PAIS Y LOS NOMBRES DE LOS 
ESTRATOS ESTRATOPRI  
UPM.____________________________________________________________ UPM  
Provincia (o departamento) :_________________________________________ PROV   
Cantón (o municipio):  
_________________________________________________________________ MUNICIPIO   
DISTRITO (o parroquia, etc.): _________________________________________ DISTRITO   
SEGMENTO CENSAL_______________________________________________ SEGMENTO   
Sector___________________________________________________________ SEC   
CLUSTER. (Punto muestral)[Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales] CLUSTER  
UR     1. Urbano 2. Rural [Usar definición censal del país] UR   
Tamaño del lugar: 1. Capital nacional (área metropolitana) 2. Ciudad grande 
3. Ciudad mediana 4. Ciudad pequeña 5. Área rural TAMANO  
Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español INSERTAR OTROS IDIOMAS USADAS IDIOMAQ   
Hora de inicio: _____:_____  [no digitar]  ------------ 
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Fecha de la entrevista día: ____    mes:_______    año: 2008 FECHA  
ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR 
 
Q1.  Género (anotar, no pregunte): (1) Hombre (2) Mujer Q1  
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A4 [COA4]. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el 
país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS;  SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN] 
A4   
Agua, falta de 19 Inflación, altos precios   02 
Caminos/vías en mal estado  18 Los políticos  59 
Conflicto armado    30 Mal gobierno    15 
Corrupción    13 Medio ambiente   10 
Crédito, falta de    09 Migración    16 
Delincuencia, crimen  05 Narcotráfico    12 
Derechos humanos, violaciones de 56 Pandillas    14 
Desempleo/falta de empleo  03 Pobreza     04 
Desigualdad 58 Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre  
de carreteras, paros, etc.) 
06 
Desnutrición    23 Salud, falta de servicio   22 
Desplazamiento forzado   32 Secuestro   31 
Deuda Externa    26 Seguridad (falta de)   27 
Discriminación    25 Terrorismo    33 
Drogadicción    11 Tierra para cultivar, falta de 07 
Economía, problemas con, crisis de  01 Transporte, problemas con el 60 
Educación, falta de, mala calidad  21 Violencia 57 
Electricidad, falta de   24 Vivienda    55 
Explosión demográfica   20 Otro 70 
Guerra contra terrorismo   17 NS/NR 88 
 
Ahora, cambiando de tema…[Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir “todos los días”, “una o dos veces por 
semana”, “rara vez”, o “nunca” para ayudar el entrevistado] 
Con qué frecuencia … Todos los días Una o dos veces 
por semana 
Rara vez Nunca NS 
    
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio 1 2 3 4 8 A1   
A2. Mira noticias en la TV 1 2 3 4 8 A2   
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos 1 2 3 4 8 A3   
A4i. Lee o escucha noticias vía 
Internet 
1 2 3 4 8 A4i   
 
SOCT1.  Ahora, hablando de la economía…. ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país?  ¿Diría 
usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?  
(1) Muy buena   (2)  Buena   (3)  Ni buena, ni mala (regular)   (4)  Mala    (5)  Muy mala (pésima)   (8) NS/NR  
SOCT1   
SOCT2.  ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce 
meses?  
(1) Mejor  (2) Igual     (3)  Peor      (8) NS/NR  
SOCT2   
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica?  ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni 
buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? 
(1)  Muy buena    (2)  Buena     (3)  Ni buena, ni mala (regular)    (4)  Mala    (5)  Muy mala (pésima)   
(8)  NS/NR  
IDIO1   
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce 
meses? 
(1)  Mejor  (2) Igual    (3)  Peor     (8)  NS/NR  
IDIO2   
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Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí 
mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno. 
¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o 
cooperación ...  
Sí No NS/NR     
CP2. A algún diputado del Congreso/Asamblea/Parlamento? 1 2 8 CP2   
CP4A. A alguna autoridad local (alcalde, municipalidad, prefecto, intendente)? 1 2 8 CP4A   
CP4. A algún ministerio/secretario, institución pública, u oficina del  estado? 1 2 8 CP4   
 
  Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio... 
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o  una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses?                                                                                                                                                 
(1) Sí    (2) No   (8) NS/NR  
NP1  
NP1B.  ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los funcionarios de la municipalidad hacen caso a lo que pide la 
gente en estas reuniones?  Le hacen caso (1) Mucho  (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada  (8) NS/NR 
NP1B  
NP2 . ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de 
la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses?            
(1) Sí        (2) No    (8) NS/NR 
NP2  
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son: [Leer alternativas]                                                                                                                                                                                   
(1) Muy buenos  (2) Buenos  (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares)     (4) Malos        (5) Muy malos (pésimos)  
(8) NS/NR 
SGL1 
SGL2. ¿Cómo considera que le han tratado a usted o a sus vecinos cuando han ido a la municipalidad para 
hacer trámites? ¿Le han tratado muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal?                                                                                                                                                         
(1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular)   (4) Mal  (5) Muy mal  (8) NS/NR 
SGL2  
LGL2. En su opinión, ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a la municipalidad, o se debe dejar 
que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
(1) Más al municipio   
(2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios 
(3) No cambiar nada   [NO LEER]  
(4) Más al municipio si da mejores servicios [NO LEER]          
(8) NS/NR    
LGL2  
LGL2A. Tomando en cuenta los servicios públicos existentes en el país, ¿A quién se le debería dar más 
responsabilidades? [Leer alternativas] 
(1) Mucho más al gobierno central 
(2) Algo más al gobierno central 
(3) La misma cantidad al gobierno central y a la municipalidad 
(4) Algo más a la municipalidad 
(5) Mucho más a la municipalidad 
(88) NS/NR     
LGL2A  
LGL2B.  Y tomando en cuenta los recursos económicos existentes en el país ¿Quién debería administrar 
más dinero? [Leer alternativas] 
(1)   Mucho más el gobierno central 
(2)   Algo más el gobierno central 
(3)   La misma cantidad el gobierno central y la municipalidad 
(4)   Algo más la municipalidad 
(5)   Mucho más la municipalidad  
     (88)  NS/NR 
LGL2B  
LGL3. ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos a la municipalidad para que pueda prestar mejores 
servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos a la municipalidad?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
(1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos  (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos   
(8) NS/NR  
LGL3  
MUNI5. ¿Ha participado usted en la elaboración del presupuesto del municipio?                                                                                                                                                                                               
(1) Sí ha participado  (0) No ha participado        (8)  NS/NR 
MUNI5
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MUNI6. ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene usted en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte del municipio? 
[Leer alternativas]           
3) Mucha confianza  (2) Algo de confianza   (1) Poca confianza  (0) Ninguna confianza   
(8) NS/NR 
MUNI6   
MUNI8. ¿Ha realizado usted algún trámite o solicitado algún documento en el municipio durante los últimos 
doce meses?  (1) Sí [siga]       (0) No [pase a MUNI11]      (8) NS/NR [Pase a MUNI11] 
MUNI8   
MUNI9. ¿Cómo fue atendido? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bien      (2) Bien      (3) Ni bien, ni mal (Regular)     
(4) Mal (5) Muy mal (Pésimo)  (8) NS/NR    (9) Inap. 
MUNI9   
MUNI10. ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición?      (1) Sí       (0) No      (8)  NS/NR      (9) Inap MUNI10   
MUNI11.  ¿Qué tanta influencia cree que tiene usted en lo que hace la municipalidad?   ¿Diría que tiene 
mucha, algo, poca, o nada de influencia?  
1. Mucha   2. Algo  3. Poca   4. Nada   8. NS/NR 
MUN11   
MUNI15. ¿Qué tan interesado cree usted que está el alcalde en la participación de la gente en el trabajo del 
municipio? [Leer alternativas     (3) Muy interesado (2) Algo interesado  (1) Poco interesado  (0) Nada 
interesado  (8) NS/NR 
MUNI15   
 
 Una 
vez a la 
semana 
Una o 
dos 
veces al 
mes 
Una o 
dos 
veces 
al año 
Nunca NS/NR   
CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿En los 
últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido 
para la solución de algún problema de su 
comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio o 
colonia? Por favor, dígame si  lo hizo por lo 
menos una vez a la semana, una o dos 
veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o 
nunca. 
1 2 3 4 8 CP5  
 
Voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones.  Por favor, dígame si asiste a reuniones de las siguientes organizaciones  
por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. [Repetir “una vez a la 
semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca”  para ayudar al entrevistado] 
 Una 
vez a la 
semana 
Una o 
dos 
veces al 
mes 
Una o 
dos 
veces 
al año 
Nunca NS/NR   
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización 
religiosa? Asiste… 
1 2 3 4 8 CP6  
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de 
padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? 
Asiste…. 
1 2 3 4 8 CP7  
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de 
mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste… 
1 2 3 4 8 CP8  
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de 
profesionales, comerciantes, productores, 
y/o organizaciones campesinas? Asiste… 
1 2 3 4 8 CP9  
CP10. ¿Reuniones de un sindicato? 
Asiste… 
1 2 3 4 8 CP10  
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o 
movimiento político? Asiste… 
1 2 3 4 8 CP13  
CP20. [Solo mujeres] ¿De asociaciones o 
grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? 
Asiste… 
1 2 3 4 8 9 
(HOMBRE) 
CP21  
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LS3. Hablando  de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría 
usted que se encuentra: [Leer alternativas] 
(1) Muy satisfecho    (2) Algo satisfecho     (3) Algo insatisfecho    (4) Muy insatisfecho  (8) NS/NR  
LS3   
IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es:    [Leer alternativas]                                                                                                                                                
(1) Muy confiable    (2) Algo confiable    (3) Poco confiable     (4) Nada confiable       (8) NS/NR 
IT1
 
IT1A. ¿Cuánto confía usted en la gente que conoce por primera vez?  ¿Diría usted que:    [Leer alternativas]                                                                                                                                                 
(1) Confía plenamente    (2) Confía algo    (3) Confía poco     (4) No confía nada   (8) NS/NR 
IT1A 
IT1B.  Hablando en general, ¿Diría Ud. que se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas o que uno tiene 
que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás? 
(1) Se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas 
(2) Uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás 
(8) NS/NR 
IT1B  
[ENTREGAR TARJETA # A 
 
L1. (Escala Izquierda-Derecha)  En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha 
gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de gente que simpatiza más con la  izquierda y de gente que 
simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha"  cuando piensa 
sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría usted en esta escala? Indique la casilla que se aproxima más a su 
propia posición.  
 
      
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 L1 
Izquierda Derecha (NS/NR=88) 
  
 
[RECOGER TARJETA  # A] 
 
IMMIG1.  ¿Qué tan de acuerdo está usted con que el gobierno (país) ofrezca servicios sociales, como 
por ejemplo asistencia de salud, educación, vivienda, a los extranjeros que vienen a vivir o trabajar en el 
país? [Leer alternativas] 
(1) Muy de acuerdo 
(2) Algo de acuerdo      
(3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo    
(4) Algo en desacuerdo      
(5) Muy en desacuerdo        
(8) NS/NR 
IMMIG1   
IMMIG2.  ¿Usted diría que la gente de otro país que viene a vivir aquí hace los trabajos que los 
(nacionales)  no quieren, o que les quitan el trabajo a los (nacionales)? 
(1) Hacen los trabajos que los (nacionales) ya no quieren 
(2) Le quitan el trabajo a los (nacionales) 
(8) NS/NR 
IMMIG2   
 
PROT1.  Alguna vez en su vida, ¿ha participado usted en 
una manifestación o protesta pública?  ¿Lo ha hecho 
algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca? [Si contestó 
“nunca” o “NS/NR”,  marcar 9 en PROT2  y pasar a 
CP5] 
(1) algunas 
veces 
(2) 
casi 
nunca 
(3) 
nunca 
(8) 
NS/NR 
 PROT1  
PROT2. ¿En los  últimos doce meses, ha participado en 
una manifestación o protesta pública?  ¿Lo ha hecho 
algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca? 
(1) algunas 
veces 
(2) 
casi 
nunca 
(3) 
nunca 
(8) 
NS/NR 
9 
Inap 
PROT2  
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Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el 
poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las 
siguientes circunstancias [Leer alternativas después de cada pregunta]: 
JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto. (1) Se justificaría 
que los militares 
tomen el poder 
(2) No se justificaría que 
los militares tomen el 
poder 
(8) NS/NR JC1   
JC4. Frente a muchas protestas sociales. (1) Se justificaría  (2) No se justificaría  (8) NS/NR JC4   
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia. (1) Se justificaría (2) No se justificaría (8) NS/NR JC10   
JC12. Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento 
excesivo de precios. 
(1) Se justificaría (2) No se justificaría (8) NS/NR JC12   
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción. (1) Se justificaría (2) No se justificaría (8) NS/NR JC13   
 
JC15. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente 
para que el presidente cierre el Congreso/Asamblea, o cree que no 
puede existir razón suficiente para eso? 
SI puede 
haber razón 
(1) 
NO puede 
haber razón 
(2) 
NS/NR 
 
(8) 
JC15  
JC16. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente 
para que el presidente disuelva la Corte Suprema de 
Justicia/Tribunal Constitucional, ADAPTAR ESTO A CADA PAÍS 
etc. o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso? 
SI puede 
haber razón 
(1) 
NO puede 
haber razón 
(2) 
NS/NR 
 
(8) 
JC16  
 
VIC1. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los 
últimos 12 meses?   
(1) Sí [siga]   
(2) No [pasar a VIC20]     
(8) NS/NR [pasar a VIC20]  
VIC1   
VIC10. [SOLO SI FUE VICTIMA DE ALGUN DELITO] ¿El delincuente o los delincuentes 
usaron violencia en contra de usted?       
(1) Sí              (2) No         (9) Inap 
VIC10  
AOJ1. ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución?  
(1) Sí [pasar a VIC20] (2) No lo denunció [Seguir]   
 (8) NS/NR [pasar a VIC20]  (9) Inap (no víctima) [pasar  a VIC20] 
AOJ1  
AOJ1B. ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? [No leer alternativas] 
(1) No sirve de nada    
(2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias    
(3) No tenía pruebas     
(4) No fue grave 
(5) No sabe en dónde denunciar          
 (8) NS/NR           
(9) INAP   
AOJ1B  
 
[PREGUNTAR A TODOS]: Ahora por favor piense en lo que le pasó en los últimos doce 
meses para responder las siguientes preguntas 
¿Cuántas 
veces? 
NO = 0, 
NS/NR=88 
 
VIC20. ¿Alguien le robó a mano armada algo que no sea su vehículo en los últimos doce 
meses? ¿Cuántas veces? 
 VIC20  
VIC21. ¿Se le metieron a robar en su casa en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces_  VIC21  
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VIC27. ¿En los últimos doce meses algún policía lo maltrató verbalmente, físicamente o lo 
golpeó? ¿Cuántas veces? 
 VIC27  
 
AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las 
leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley?                                                                                                                                                                    
(1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre        (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen       (8)NS/NR 
AOJ8   
AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio/colonia donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima 
de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro?                                                                       
(1) Muy seguro    (2) Algo seguro    (3) Algo inseguro    (4) Muy inseguro       (8) NS/NR  
AOJ11   
 
AOJ11A.  Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos 
ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro?  [Leer alternativas] 
 (1) Mucho  (2) Algo  (3) Poco (4) Nada  (8) NS/NR   
AOJ11A  
VIC11. ¿Si tuviera que denunciar un delito o hecho de violencia, donde lo denunciaría? [No leer] 
[Si dice “a la autoridad competente” sondee: ¿A qué autoridad? ¿Cuál sería?] 
(0) No denunciaria 
(1) Alcaldía, muncipalidad, autoridad local 
(2) Policía 
(3) Justicia (Fiscalía, Procuraduría etc) 
(4) Iglesia 
(5) Medio de comunicación  
(6) Otros 
(8) NS/NR 
VIC11  
AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al 
culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría…(1) Mucho  (2) Algo  (3) Poco (4) Nada  (8) NS/NR 
AOJ12   
AOJ12a. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que la policía capturaría al 
culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría…(1) Mucho  (2) Algo  (3) Poco (4) Nada  (8) NS/NR 
AOJ12a  
AOJ16A.  En su barrio, ¿ha visto a alguien vendiendo drogas en los últimos doce meses? 
(1) Sí  (2) No    (8) NS/NR 
AOJ16A  
AOJ17.  ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas/maras?  ¿Diría mucho, algo, 
poco o nada? 
(1) Mucho  (2) Algo  (3) Poco  (4) Nada   (8) NS/NR 
AOJ17   
AOJ18.  Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los 
delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia.  ¿Qué opina 
usted? [Leer alternativas] 
(1) Policía protege     
(2) Policía involucrada con delincuencia 
(3) [No leer] No protege, no involucrada con la delincuencia  
(4) [No leer] Las dos cosas: la policía protege y está involucrada con la delincuencia 
(8) NS/NR 
AOJ18  
 
De los trámites que usted o alguien de su familia haya hecho alguna vez con las siguientes entidades, ¿se siente 
muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho, o muy insatisfecho? (REPETIR LAS ALTERNATIVAS DE 
RESPUESTA EN CADA PREGUNTA) 
 Muy 
satisfecho 
Algo 
satisfecho 
Algo 
insatisfecho 
Muy 
Insatisfecho 
[No leer] 
No hizo 
trámites 
NS/NR   
ST1. La policía   
nacional  
1 2 3 4 9 8 ST1  
ST2. Los juzgados o 
tribunales de justicia 
1 2 3 4 9 8 ST2  
ST3. La fiscalía 1 2 3 4 9 8 ST3  
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 Muy 
satisfecho 
Algo 
satisfecho 
Algo 
insatisfecho 
Muy 
Insatisfecho 
[No leer] 
No hizo 
trámites 
NS/NR   
ST4. La alcaldía 1 2 3 4 9 8 ST4  
[ENTREGAR TARJETA B] 
Esta nueva tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por 
ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si 
por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje 
intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. [Asegúrese que el entrevistado 
entienda correctamente]. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7   8 
Nada Mucho NS/NR 
 
 Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR  
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de (país) garantizan un juicio justo? 
(Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree 
que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio ) 
  
B1   
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de (país)?   B2   
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el 
sistema político (país)?   
B3   
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político (país)?   B4   
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político (país)?   B6   
B10A.  ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?  B10A  
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el (Tribunal Supremo Electoral)?   B11   
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las (Fuerzas Armadas [o Ejército])? [ No usar en Costa 
Rica,  Panamá, o Haití]   
B12   
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?   B13   
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?   B14   
B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Fiscalía General de la Nación [o Defensor Penal]?    B15   
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la (Policía Nacional)?   B18  
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?   B20   
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?   B21   
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la (Corte Suprema de Justicia)?   B31   
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su (municipalidad)?    B32   
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser (país)?   B43   
B16. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Procuraduría General del Estado o Abogado del Estado?  B16  
B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Defensoría del Pueblo?   B17   
B19. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Contraloría?  B19  
B33 . ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la prefectura provincial?   B33   
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?   B37  
B40. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los movimientos  indígenas?   B40   
B42. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Servicio de Rentas Internas (SRI)?   B42   
B50. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Tribunal Constitucional?   B50   
B46 [b45]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Comisión de Control Cívico Contra la 
Corrupción?  
B46  
B47.  ¿Hasta que punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?  B47  
B48.  ¿Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los tratados de libre comercio ayudarán a mejorar la economía?  B48  
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Usando la misma escala…                                                NADA 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 MUCHO 
Anotar 1-
7, 8 = 
NS/NR 
N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza?  N1  
N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?  N3  
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?  N9  
N10. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos.  N10  
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?  N11  
N12. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo?  N12  
 
[RECOGER TARJETA B 
 
M1. Y hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente 
NOMBRE PRESIDENTE ACTUAL es: [Leer alternativas] 
(1) Muy bueno  (2) Bueno  (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular)  (4) Malo  (5) Muy malo (pésimo)   (8) NS/NR  
M1   
M2. Y hablando del Congreso. Pensando en todos los diputados en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos 
políticos a los que pertenecen, usted cree que los diputados del Congreso (pais) están haciendo su trabajo muy 
bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal? 
1) Muy  bien       2) Bien             3) Ni bien ni mal               4) Mal            5) Muy Mal             8) NSNR 
 
M2  
 
[ENTREGAR TARJETA C] 
Ahora, vamos a usar una  tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el punto 7 representa “muy de 
acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que 
me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones. 
Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7   8 
Muy en desacuerdo                                                                                 Muy de acuerdo                          NS/NR 
  Anotar Número 1-7, y 
8 para los que NS/NR 
 
EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como yo. ¿Hasta qué punto 
está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
 EFF1  
EFF2. Siento que entiendo bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto 
está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
 EFF2  
 
ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de 
gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?  
  ING4    
PN2.  A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los (nacionales)  tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos 
unen como país.  ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? 
  PN2   
DEM23. Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de 
acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? 
 DEM23  
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Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre el rol del estado. Seguimos usando la misma escala de 1 a 7.         NS/NR = 8 
ROS1.  El Estado (país), en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e 
industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta 
frase? 
 ROS1  
ROS2. El Estado (país), más que los individuos, es el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar 
de la gente. 
 ROS2  
ROS3. El Estado (país), más que la empresa privada, es el principal responsable de crear empleos.  ROS3  
ROS4. El Estado ( país) debe implementar politicas para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre 
ricos y pobres, aun cuando esto castigue el esfuerzo individual. 
 ROS4  
 
Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga siempre usando la tarjeta  hasta 
qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones.. 
 
POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes/prime ministers limiten la 
voz y  el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
8. NS/NR 
  
 
 
POP101 
  
POP102. Cuando el Congreso  estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar 
sin el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
 
8. NS/NR 
 POP102   
POP103. Cuando a la Corte Suprema/Tribunal Constitucional  estorba el trabajo del gobierno, debe 
ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
8. NS/NR 
 POP103   
POP106. Los presidentes/prime ministers tienen que seguir la voluntad del pueblo, porque lo que el 
pueblo quiere es siempre lo correcto. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
 
8. NS/NR 
 POP106  
POP107.  El pueblo debe gobernar directamente, y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta 
qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
(8) NS/NR 
 POP107  
POP109. En el mundo de hoy, hay una lucha entre el bien y el mal, y la gente tiene que escoger entre 
uno de los dos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
 (8) NS/NR 
 POP109  
POP110.  Una vez que el pueblo decide qué es lo correcto, debemos impedir que una minoría se 
oponga. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
8) NS/NR 
 POP110  
POP112. El mayor obstáculo para el progreso de nuestro país es que los ricos se aprovechan del 
pueblo. ¿Hasta qué punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
8. NS/NR 
 POP112  
POP113. Aquellos que no concuerdan con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta 
qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
(8) NS/NR 
 POP113  
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Ahora voy a leer una serie de frases sobre el funcionamiento de los partidos políticos y el congreso de (pais) y voy a 
pedirle que me indique qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está con que esas frases describen adecuadamente la 
realidad de los partidos y el congreso.  
 
[RECOGER TARJETA C] 
 
PN4. En general, ¿Usted diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la  
forma en que la democracia funciona en (País)? 
(1) Muy satisfecho        (2) Satisfecho                 (3) Insatisfecho       (4) Muy insatisfecho  (8) NS/NR 
PN4   
PN5. En su opinión, ¿(País) es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada 
democrático? 
(1) Muy democrático   (2)  Algo democrático      (3) Poco democrático      (4) Nada democrático     (8) NS/NR 
PN5  
 
EPP1. Los partidos políticos (pais) hacen bien su trabajo. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en 
desacuerdo? 
8. NS/NR 
 EPP1  
EPP2. Los partidos políticos representan bien a sus votantes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo 
o en desacuerdo?  
8. NS/NR 
 EPP2  
EPP3. Los partidos políticos ayudan a sus votantes a lidiar con la burocracia  y a resolver sus 
problemas. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
 EPP3  
EPP4. Los partidos políticos ayudan a los ciudadanos a entender mejor la política. ¿Hasta qué 
punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
8. NS/NR 
 EPP4  
ECR4 Y pensando ahora en el Congreso. En su conjunto, los diputados del Congreso 
representan bien los intereses de los (nacionales). ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en 
desacuerdo? 
8. NS/NR 
 ECR4  
ECD1.  El trabajo del Congreso es importante porque impide que el presidente tenga demasiado 
poder. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
8. NS/NR 
 ECD1  
ECD2. Los diputados del Congreso dedican demasiado tiempo a debatir y discutir. ¿Hasta qué 
punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
8. NS/NR 
 ECD2  
ECR3. El Congreso aprueba leyes y políticas que son importantes para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto 
está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
8. NS/NR 
 ECR3  
ECP1 Los diputados del Congreso gastan demasiados recursos en sus oficinas y en sus 
ayudantes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
8. NS/NR 
 ECP1  
ECR1 A la hora de aprobar las leyes, los diputados del Congreso prestan más atención a los 
grupos de poder que a sus votantes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
8. NS/NR 
 ECR1  
ECR2 Los diputados del Congreso están demasiado lejos de la gente como uno. ¿Hasta qué 
punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 
8. NS/NR 
 ECR2  
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[ENTREGAR TARJETA D] 
Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala que va de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que usted 
desaprueba firmemente y el 10 indicando que usted aprueba firmemente. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas 
que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza 
usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   88 
Desaprueba  firmemente                         Aprueba firmemente         NS/NR 
 
  1-10, 88  
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o 
desaprueba? 
  
E5 
  
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de 
las comunidades. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba? 
  
E8 
  
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta 
que punto aprueba o desaprueba? 
  
E11 
  
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras. Siempre usando la 
misma escala, ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba? 
  
E15 
  
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o 
desaprueba? 
  
E14 
  
E2. Que las personas ocupen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o 
desaprueba? 
  
E2 
  
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno 
elegido. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba? 
  
E3 
  
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. 
¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba? 
  
E16 
  
 
Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Favor 
de usar otra vez la tarjeta C. En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   88 
Desaprueba  firmemente                                                                Aprueba firmemente                  NS/NR 
 
 1-10, 88   
D32.  ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba las protestas públicas?   D32   
D33. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier grupo que 
critique el sistema político país?  
 D33  
D34. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure programas de televisión?  D34  
D36. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure libros que están en las bibliotecas 
de las escuelas públicas? 
 D36  
D37. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que 
lo critican?  
  D37   
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Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven 
en (país). Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   88 
Desaprueba  firmemente Aprueba firmemente                   NS/NR 
 
 1-10, 88    
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de (país), no sólo del gobierno de 
turno, sino de la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de 
votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?] 
  D1   
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo 
manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el 
número. 
  D2   
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de (país) ¿Con qué firmeza 
aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos? 
  D3   
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para 
dar un discurso? 
  D4   
D5.  Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o 
desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos? 
 D5  
[RECOGER TARJETA D] 
Ahora cambiando de tema… 
DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo: 
(1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático, o 
(2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, o 
(3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático 
(8) NS/NR 
DEM2   
DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los 
problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos?  
(1) Mano dura   (2) Participación de todos  (8) No responde  
DEM11  
AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. 
Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre 
lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa usted? [Leer alternativas] 
(1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o 
(2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor              
(8) NS/NR   
AUT1  
AUT2. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está Usted más de acuerdo? [Leer alternativas] 
(1) Como ciudadanos deberíamos ser más activos en cuestionar a nuestros líderes o  
(2) Como ciudadanos deberíamos mostrar más respeto por la autoridad de nuestros líderes 
(8)  NS/NR 
AUT2  
 
 
PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o 
candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o 
candidato? [Leer alternativas]  
(1) Frecuentemente      (2) De vez en cuando        (3) Rara vez         (4) Nunca         (8) NS/NR 
PP1   PP2. Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2002? 
 (1) Sí trabajó       (2) No trabajó        (8) NS/NR      
PP2   
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Ahora, me gustaría que me indique si usted considera las siguientes actuaciones 1) corruptas y que deben ser castigadas; 
2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; o 3) no corruptas.     
DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos.  Para no 
perder tiempo esperando, ella paga  [equivalente de $5 U.S. en moneda local] de más al empleado público 
municipal.  Cree usted que:: [Leer alternativas] 
1) Lo que hizo la señora es corrupto y ella debe ser castigada 
2) Lo que hizo la señora es corrupto pero se justifica 
3) Lo que hizo la señora no es  corrupto 
8) NS/NR 
 
DC10 
 
 
 
 DC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para 
conseguirle un empleo público. Cree usted que:  : [Leer alternativas] 
1)Lo que hizo el político es corrupto y él debe ser castigado 
2) Lo que hizo el político es corrupto pero justificado  
3) Lo que hizo el político no es corrupto         
8) NS/NR=8 
 
DC13 
 
 
 
 INAP 
No trató 
o tuvo 
contacto 
No Sí NS/NR   
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan 
en la vida... 
      
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida 
(o soborno) en el último año? 
 0 1 8 EXC2  
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida (o soborno) en 
el último año? 
 0 1 8 EXC6  
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio/ delegación en el último año? 
No !  Marcar 9 
Sí  !  Preguntar: 
Para tramitar algo en el municipio/delegación (como un permiso, por 
ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma 
además de lo exigido por la ley?  
9 
 
0 
  
1 
  
8 
  
EXC11  
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja?  
No !  Marcar 9 
Sí  !  Preguntar: 
En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida (coima) en el último año? 
9 
 
0 
  
1 
  
8 
  
EXC13  
EXC14. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados?  
No !  Marcar 9 
Sí  !  Preguntar: 
¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida (coima) en los juzgados en el último 
año? 
9 
 
0 
  
1 
  
8 
  
EXC14  
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año?  
No !  Marcar 9 
Sí  !  Preguntar: 
 Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último 
año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno)? 
9 
 
0 
  
1 
  
8 
  
EXC15  
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? 
No !  Marcar 9 
Sí  !  Preguntar: 
En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna 
mordida (o soborno)?  
9 0 1 8 EXC16  
EXC17.¿Alguien le pidió una mordida (o soborno) para evitar el corte de la 
luz eléctrica? 
  0 1 8 EXC17  
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 INAP 
No trató 
o tuvo 
contacto 
No Sí NS/NR   
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una 
mordida (o soborno)? 
  0 1 8 EXC18  
 
Ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y sobre el país se le transmite a la gente… 
GI1. ¿Cuál es el nombre del actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? [NO LEER: George Bush] 
(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe  (9) No Responde 
GI1  
GI2. ¿Cómo se llama el Presidente del  Congreso/Asamblea de país? [NO LEER: insertar nombre ] 
 (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe  (9) No Responde GI2  
GI3. ¿Cuántas provincias/departamentos/estados tiene el país? [NO LEER: insertar número] 
(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe  (9) No Responde 
NICARAGUA Y PANAMÁ  ACEPTA CON Y SIN COMARCAS 
GI3   
GI4. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en país? [NO LEER: insertar número de años] 
(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe  (9) No Responde 
GI4   
GI5. ¿Cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? [NO LEER: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, aceptar también 
“Lula”] 
 (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde 
GI5   
 
 
 
EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los 
funcionarios públicos está: [LEER]  (1) Muy generalizada  (2) Algo generalizada  (3) Poco 
generalizada (4) Nada generalizada  (8) NS/NR 
  EXC7   
 
VB1. Para hablar de otra cosa...¿Está empadronando para votar? [Costa Rica, Panamá, Perú: ¿Tiene 
usted cédula de identidad?  o [En El  Salvador] Documento Unico de Identidad (DUI) ?](1) Sí      (2) No   
(3) En trámite  (8) NS/NR  
VB1  
VB2.  ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de (año última elección presidencial)?  (1)  Sí 
votó [Siga]  
 (2) No votó [Pasar a VB10]   
 (8) NS/NR [Pasar a VB10] 
VB2  
VB3. ¿Por quien votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2000? [NO LEER 
LISTA] 
      0.  Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejo boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto) 
1. INSERTAR NOMBRE DE CANDIDATO Y  NOMBRE DEL  PARTIDO O ALIANZA   
2.   
3.  
 77. Otro  
88. NS/NR [Pasar a VB8] 
99. Inap (No votó) 
VB3  
VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?  
(1) Sí  [Siga]    
(2) No [Pase a POL1]    
(8) NS/NR [Pase a POL1] 
VB10  
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Ahora cambiando de tema, ¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su apariencia física o 
su forma de hablar en los siguientes lugares: 
DIS2.  En las oficinas del gobierno (juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías) 
(1) Sí     (2) No (8) NS/NR 
DIS2  
DIS4. En reuniones o eventos sociales 
(1) Sí     (2) No (8) NS/NR 
DIS4  
DIS5. En lugares públicos (como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado) 
(1) Sí     (2) No (8) NS/NR 
DIS5  
 
VBL1. Durante la semana en la que transcurrieron las últimas elecciones presidenciales de [insertar 
última fecha de elecciones presidenciales]. ¿Estaba usted trabajando?   
(1) Sí [Siga]      
(2) No [Pasar a VBL5]          
(8) NS/NR [Pasar a VB20]              
VBL1   
VBL2. ¿En ese trabajo se desempeñaba usted como: [Leer alternativas]  
(1) Campesino o agricultor? 
(2) Asalariado del sector público? 
(3) Asalariado del sector privado? 
(4) Trabajador  por cuenta propia? 
(5) Trabajador familiar no remunerado? 
(6) Patrono o socio de empresa? 
      (8) NS/NR 
      (9) INAP 
VBL2   
VBL3. ¿Estaba contribuyendo al seguro social a través de ese trabajo?  
     (1) Sí                   (2) No                                (8) NS/NR         (9) INAP 
VBL3  
VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted ? [NO LEER LISTA].  
1. (ESCRIBIR NOMBRES DE LOS PARTIDOS POLITICOS ACTUALES) 
2. 
3. 
4. 
88. NS/NR [Pase A POL1] 
99. INAP [Pase A POL1] 
VB11  
VB12 Y Usted diría que esa simpatía por el partido [partido que mencionó en VB11] es muy 
débil, débil, ni débil ni fuerte, fuerte o muy fuerte? 
1) Muy débil          2) Débil              3) Ni débil ni fuerte       4) Fuerte    5) Muy fuerte  8)NS/NR 
9) INAP 
 VB12  
POL1.  ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?  
1) Mucho        2) Algo               3) Poco                   4) Nada              8) NS/NR 
 POL1  
POL2.  ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? [Leer alternativas] 
1) A diario    2) Algunas veces por semana    3) Algunas veces por mes  4) Rara vez     5) Nunca 
8) NS/NR 
 POL2  
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VBL4. Siempre pensando en el empleo que tenía durante la semana previa a las últimas elecciones ¿En 
ese empleo, cuáles eran sus ingresos mensuales netos? [ENTREGAR TARJETA F] 
[10 déciles basados en la moneda y distribución del país] 
(00)  Ningún ingreso 
(01)  Menos de $25 
(02)  Entre $26- $50 
(03)  $51-$100 
(04)  $101-$150 
(05)  $151-$200 
(06)  $201-$300 
(07) $301-$400 
(08) $401-500 
(09) $501-$750  
(10)$751-y mas 
 (88) NS/NR   
 (99) INAP 
[RECOGER TARJETA F Anotar ingreso y pasar a VB20]  
VBL4  
VBL5. [Sólo para los que contestaron “No” en VBL1] ¿Cuál era la causa por la que usted no estaba 
trabajando en esa fecha? 
(1) Estaba inactivo (estudiante, labores domésticas, jubilado) [Pase a VB20] 
(2) Fin de empleo temporal [Pasar a pregunta VBL7] 
(3) Dejó voluntariamente su último empleo [Pasar a pregunta VBL7] 
(4) Cierre de la empresa donde trabajaba anteriormente [Pase a VBL7] 
(5) Despido o cese [Siga] 
(6) Otra razón 
(8) NS/NR [Pasar a pregunta VBL7] 
(9) IINAP (Estaba trabajando) [Pasar a VB20] 
VBL5  
VBL6. [Solo para los que contestaron “despido o cese” en VBL5]¿En esa ocasión, recibió algún pago 
en concepto de cesantía por parte de la empresa donde usted trabajaba?    
(1) Sí                   (2) No                                (8) NS/NR       (9) INAP 
[En todo caso pase a VBL7] 
VBL6  
VBL7.¿En esa fecha, se encontraba usted disponible para trabajar y activamente buscando empleo?            
(1) Sí [Siga]                   
(2) No [Pase a VB20]                                
(8) NS/NR  [Pase a VB20] 
(9) INAP[Pase a VB20] 
VBL7  
VBL8.  [Solo para los que contestaron “si” en VBL7] Y siempre pensando en su situación la semana 
previa a las últimas elecciones ¿Cuánto tiempo llevaba buscando un empleo? 
(1) Menos de un mes 
(2) Entre un mes y tres meses 
(3) Entre tres y seis meses 
      (4) Más de seis meses 
      (8) NS/NR 
      (9) INAP 
VBL8  
VB20. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Si este domingo fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, por qué 
partido votaría usted?  
(0) Ninguno (votaría en blanco o anularía el voto) 
(1) No votaría 
(2) [Insertar lista de partidos de cada país] 
     (88) NS/NR 
VB20  
VB21. ¿Cuál es la forma en que usted cree que puede influir más para cambiar las cosas? [Leer 
alternativas] 
(1) Votar para elegir a los que defienden su posición 
(2) Participar en movimientos de protesta y exigir los cambios directamente 
(3) Influir de otras maneras 
(4) No es posible influir para que las cosas cambien, da igual lo que uno haga 
       (8) NS/NR 
VB21  
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[ENTREGAR TARJETA G] 
LS6. Por favor imagine una escalera con los escalones numerados del cero al diez, donde cero es el escalón de abajo y 
diez el más alto. Suponga que yo le digo que el escalón más alto representa la mejor vida posible para usted y el escalón 
más bajo representa la peor vida posible para usted. 
...si el de arriba es 10 y el de abajo es 0, ¿en qué escalón de la escalera se siente usted en estos 
momentos?(RESPUESTA ÚNICA / ESPONTÁNEA) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  88  
Peor  vida posible                         Mejor vida posible         NS/NR 
[RECOGER TARJETA G] 
 
En esta ciudad/ área donde usted vive, está satisfecho(a) o insatisfecho(a) con… [Repetir “satisfecho” e “insatisfecho” 
después de cada pregunta para ayudar al entrevistado]  
 Satisfecho(a) Insatisfecho(a) NS/NR 
o No 
Utiliza 
  
SD1. El sistema de transporte público 1 2 8 SD1   
SD2. Las vías, carreteras y autopistas 1 2 8 SD2   
SD3. El sistema educativo y las escuelas 1 2 8 SD3   
SD4. La calidad del aire  1 2 8 SD4   
SD5. La calidad del agua 1 2 8 SD5   
SD6. La disponibilidad de servicios médicos y de salud de 
calidad 
1 2 8 SD6   
SD7. La disponibilidad de viviendas buenas y a precios 
accesibles 
1 2 8 SD7   
SD8. La belleza física del lugar 1 2 8 SD8   
SD9. El flujo del tráfico  1 2 8 SD9   
SD10. Las aceras o vías peatonales (suplidor favor adaptar) 1 2 8 SD10   
SD11. La disponibilidad de parques, plazas y áreas verdes  1 2 8 SD11   
SD12. La disponibilidad de sitios públicos adecuados para 
que la gente pueda practicar deportes  
1 2 8 SD12   
 
LS4. Considerando todo lo que hemos hablado de esta ciudad/zona, usted diría que se encuentra 
satisfecho o  insatisfecho con el lugar donde vive? 
 (1) Satisfecho  (2) insatisfecho   (8) NS/NR  
LS4   
 
 
Note: insert country-specific USAID Mission items, if any, beginning here. 
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Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos... 
ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted completó o aprobó? 
_____ Año de ___________________ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = ________ años 
total [Usar tabla abajo para código] 
 
 10 20 30 40 50 60   
Ninguno 0           
Primaria 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Secundaria  7 8 9 10 11 12 
Universitaria 13 14 15 16 17 18+ 
Superior no universitaria 13 14 15 16   
NS/NR/ 88           
ED   
 
Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? __________ años  (0= NS/NR) Q2   
 
Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión? [No leer alternativas] 
(1) Católica 
(2)  Protestante tradicional o protestante no evangélico (Adventista, Bautista, Calvinista, Ejército de 
Salvación, Luterano, Metodista, Nazareno, Presbiteriano). 
(3) Otra no cristiana (Judíos, Musulmanes, Budistas, Hinduistas, Taoistas) 
(5)  Evangélico y pentecostal (Pentecostal, Carismático no católico, Luz del Mundo). 
(6) Mormón, Testigo de Jehová, Espiritualista y Adventista del Séptimo Día 
(7) Religiones tradicionales o nativas (Candomble, Vodoo, Rastafarian, Religiones Mayas). 
(4) Ninguna  
(8) NS/NR  
Q3  
Q5A¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? [Leer alternativas] 
1. Más de una vez por semana  
2. Una vez por semana  
3. Una vez al mes  
4. Una o dos veces al año  
5. Nunca o casi nunca   8. NS/NR  
Q5  
 
[ENTREGAR TARJETA F] 
Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar,  
incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?  
[Si no entiende, pregunte: Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa por mes?]_ 
  [10 déciles basados en la moneda y distribución del país] 
(00)  Ningún ingreso 
(01)  Menos de $25 
(02)  Entre $26- $50 
(03)  $51-$100 
(04)  $101-$150 
(05)  $151-$200 
(06)  $201-$300 
(07) $301-$400 
(08) $401-500 
(09) $501-$750  
(10)$751-y mas 
 (88) NS/NR 
[RECOGER TARJETA F] 
Q10  
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Q10A. ¿ Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas (dinero) del exterior? 
No !  marcar 99 y pasar a Q10C               99. Inap 
Sí !  preguntar: 
¿Cuánto recibe por mes?  [usar códigos de pregunta Q10 si dijo cantidad en moneda nacional; si dijo la 
cantidad en moneda extranjera, escribir cantidad y especificar moneda] 
Q10A  
Q10A1. ¿En que utiliza generalmente el dinero de las remesas? [No leer] 
1. Consumo (alimento, vestido) 
2. Vivienda (construcción, reparación) 
3. Gastos en educación 
4. Comunidad (reparación de escuela, reconstrucción iglesia/templo, fiestas comunitarias)  
5. Gastos médicos 
6. Ahorro 
7. Otro 
8. NS/NR 
Q10a1  
Q10B. ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? 
(1) Mucho   (2) Algo   (3) Poco   (4) Nada      (8) NS/NR   (9) Inap 
Q10B  
Q10C. ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el 
exterior? [Si dijo Sí, preguntar dónde] 
(1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente  
(2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países 
(3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos) 
(4) No [Pase a Q14] 
(8) NS/NR [Pase a Q14] 
Q10C  
Q16. [Sólo para los que contestaron Sí en Q10C] Con que frecuencia  se comunica con ellos? 
(1) Todos los días  
(2) Una o dos veces por semana  
(3) Una o dos veces por mes  
(4) Rara vez  
(5) Nunca   
(8) NS/NR  
(9) INAP 
Q16  
Q14.  ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años?  
1) Sí    2)  No   8) NS/NR 
Q14  
Q10D.  El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso familiar: [Leer alternativas] 
1. Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar                               
2. Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades                
3. No les alcanza, tienen dificultades                            
4. No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades              
8. [No leer] NS/NR                                                                
Q10D  
Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [No leer alternativas]    
(1) Soltero  (2) Casado  (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado  (5) Separado  (6) Viudo  
 (8) NS/NR 
Q11  
Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos?  _________ (00= ninguno !  Pase a ETID)    NS/NR 88.   Q12 |___|___| 
Q12A. [Si tiene hijos] ¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento?  ___________ 
00 = ninguno, 99 INAP (no tiene hijos) 
Q12A |___|___| 
 
ETID.  ¿Usted considera que es una persona  blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra o Afro-país, mulata, u otra? 
(1) Blanca   (2) Mestiza   (3) Indígena    (4) Negra o Afro-país  (5) Mulata  (7) Otra (8) NS/NR 
ETID  
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 [OJO: ESCRIBIR LAS PRIMERAS TRES INICIALES DEL PAIS EN EL CODIGO DE ESTA PREGUNTA. 
Por ejemplo, para Costa Rica debe de ser COSETIDA.] 
ETIDA. Considera que su madre es o era una persona blanca, mestiza,  indígena, negra o mulata? 
(1) Blanca  (2) Mestiza  (3) Indígena  (4) Negra  (5) Mulata     (7) Otra (8) NS/NR  
ETIDA  
[OJO: ESCRIBIR LAS PRIMERAS TRES INICIALES DEL PAIS EN EL CODIGO DE ESTA PREGUNTA. 
Por ejemplo, para Perú debe de ser PERLENG1.] 
LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que ha hablado de pequeño en su casa? 
[acepte una alternativa] 
(1) Castellano  (2) Nativo indígena [OJO: liste el nombre de los idiomas indígenas más comunes] (4) 
Otro (nativo)  (5) Otro extranjero  (8) NS/NR 
LENG1  
[OJO: ESCRIBIR LAS PRIMERAS TRES INICIALES DEL PAIS EN EL CODIGO DE ESTA PREGUNTA. 
Por ejemplo, para Perú debe de ser PERLENG1A.] 
 [Solo se usa en México, Guatemala, y Perú] LENG1A. ¿Se hablaba otro idioma más en su casa 
cuando usted era niño? Cuál? (Acepte una alternativa) 
(1) Castellano (2) Nativo indígena [OJO: liste el nombre de los idiomas indígenas más comunes]  (4) 
Otro (nativo)  (5) Otro extranjero     (7)  Ningún otro    NS/NR [8]     
LENG1
A 
 
[Solo se usa en México, Guatemala, y Perú] LENG4.  Hablando del idioma que sus padres conocían, 
¿sus padres hablan o hablaban [Leer alternativas]: 
(Encuestador: si uno de los padres hablaba sólo un idioma y el otro más de uno, anotar 2.) 
Sólo castellano [1] Castellano e idioma nativo [2]         Sólo idioma nativo [3]      Castellano 
e idioma extranjero [4]          NS/NR [8] 
LENG4  
 
WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿Qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet? [Leer alternativas] 
1. Todos los días o casi todos los días  
2. Por lo menos una vez por semana  
3. Por lo menos una vez al mes   
4.Varias veces al año  
5. Rara vez   
6. Nunca    
8. NS/NR [No leer] 
WWW1  
 
Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: [Leer todos] 
R1. Televisor  (0) No (1) Sí R1   
R3. Refrigeradora (nevera) (0) No (1) Sí R3   
R4. Teléfono convencional 
(no celular) 
(0) No (1) Sí R4   
R4A. Teléfono celular (0) No (1) Sí R4A   
R5.  Vehículo. Cuántos? (0) No (1) Uno (2) Dos (3) Tres o más R5   
R6. Lavadora de ropa (0) No (1) Sí R6   
R7. Microondas (0) No (1) Sí R7   
R8. Motocicleta (0) No (1) Sí R8   
R12. Agua potable dentro 
de la casa 
(0) No (1) Sí R12   
R14. Cuarto de baño 
dentro de la casa 
(0) No (1) Sí R14   
R15. Computadora (0) No (1) Sí R15  
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OCUP4A . A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: [Leer 
alternativas] 
1. Trabajando? [Siga]   
2. No  está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? [Siga] 
3. Está buscando trabajo activamente? [Pase a DESOC2] 
4. Es estudiante? [Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA] 
5. Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? [Pase a MIG1/ TERMINA] 
6. Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? [Pase a MIG1/ 
TERMINA] 
7. No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? [Pase a DESOC2] 
8. NS/NR  
OCUP4  
 
OCUP1. ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realiza? [No leer alternativas] 
1. Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogados, profesores universitarios, médicos, 
contadores, arquitectos, ingenieros, etc.) 
2. Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor)  
3. Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnicos en computación, maestros de primaria y 
secundaria, artistas, deportistas, etc.)  
4. Trabajador especializado (operadores de maquinaria, albañiles, mecánicos, carpinteros, 
electricistas, etc.) 
5. Funcionarios del gobierno (miembros de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y 
personal directivo de la administración pública) 
6 Oficinista (secretarias, operadores de maquina de oficina, cajeros, recepcionistas, servicio 
de atención al cliente, etc.) 
7. Comerciante (vendedores ambulantes, propietarios de establecimientos comerciales o 
puestos en el mercado, etc.) 
8. Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados 
9. Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajadores en hoteles, restaurantes, 
taxistas, etc.)  
10. Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra) 
11. Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros) 
12. Artesano  
13. Servicio doméstico 
14.  Obrero 
15. Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad ( 
policía, bomberos, vigilantes, etc.)  
88. NS/NR 
99. INAP 
OCUP1 |__|__| 
 
 
OCUP1A.  En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas] 
  1. Asalariado del gobierno? 
  2. Asalariado en el sector privado? 
  3. Patrono o socio de empresa? 
  4. Trabajador por cuenta propia? 
  5. Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago? 
  8. NS/NR 
   9. INAP 
OCUP1A   
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OCUP1B1. ¿En total cuántos empleados hay en la empresa o en el lugar donde usted trabaja? 
 [Leer alternativas] [Considere total de la empresa, no sólo la división o dpto donde 
trabaja el entrevistado] 
1. Menos de 5 empleados 
2. De 5 a 9 empleados 
3. De 10 a 19 empleados 
4. De 20 a 100 empleados 
5. Más de 100 empleados 
8. NS/NR 
9. INAP 
OCUP1B1  
OCUP1C. ¿Tiene seguro de salud a través de su empresa o su empleador? 
 (1) Sí      (2) No     (8) NS/NR    (9) INAP 
OCUP1C  
 
OCUP1D. Hasta qué punto  está usted  satisfecho con su trabajo?  
¿Diría usted que se siente ..?  
(1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR  (9) INAP  
OCUP1D  
DESOC2. [SÓLO SI RESPONDIÓ QUE NO TRABAJA O ESTÁ BUSCANDO TRABAJO EN OCUP4A] 
¿Por cuántas semanas durante los últimos doce meses no ha tenido trabajo?  ______ semanas  
    (88) NS/NR   (99) Inap  
DESOC2   
 
MIG1.  Durante su niñez, ¿dónde vivió usted principalmente? en el campo? en un pueblo? O en una ciudad?:  
   1.    En el campo  2.    En un pueblo  3. En una ciudad  8. NS/NR  
MIG1  
MIG2.  Hace 5 años, ¿donde residía usted? [Leer alternativas] 
 1.  En este mismo municipio [Pase a TI] 2. En otro municipio en el país [Siga] 3.  En otro país [Pase a TI] 8. 
NS/NR [Pase a TI] 
MIG2  
MIG3. El lugar donde vivía hace 5 años era: [Leer alternativas] 
(1) Un pueblo o una ciudad más pequeño que este 
(2) Un pueblo o una ciudad más grande que este 
(3) Un pueblo o ciudad igual que este 
(8) NS/NR 
(9) INAP 
 
MIG3 
 
 
Hora terminada la entrevista _______ : ______ !
TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1]  _____________ 
TI    
 
Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su 
colaboración.   
Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada. 
Firma del entrevistador__________________ Fecha  ____ /_____ /_____  
 Firma del supervisor de campo _________________ 
Comentarios: 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Firma de la persona que digitó los datos __________________________________ 
Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _______________________________ 
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Tarjeta C 
 
 
 
 
 
Muy de 
Acuerdo 
 
7 
  6 
  5 
  4 
  3 
  2 
Muy en 
Desacuerdo 
 
1 
 
 
 217 
 
 Tarjeta D 
 
 
!"#$%&'(
)*#+%+%,-%(
 
10 
  9 
  8 
  7 
  6 
  5 
 
 
4 
 
 
3 
 
 
2 
.%/'"#$%&'(
)*#+%+%,-%(
 
1 
 
 218 
Tarjeta “E 
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(00) Ningún ingreso 
(01) Menos de $25 
(02) Entre $26- $50 
(03) $51-$100 
(04) $101-$150 
(05) $151-$200 
(06) $201-$300 
(07) $301-$400 
(08) $401-500 
(09) $501-$750  
(10) $751-y más 
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Appendix A2: Largest Possible Effect of Citizen Support for Decentralization Coefficients 
Variable 
Support for 
Administrative 
Decentralization 
Support for Fiscal 
Decentralization 
Support for 
Decentralization Index 
Individual-Level 
Socioeconomics and Demographics 
 Education 5.26 3.06 4.32 
 Female -1.64 -1.10 -1.31 
 Quintiles of Wealth n.s.* -1.75 -1.28 
 Size of City/Town of Residence n.s. -3.32 -2.18 
 Race (Base category: White)    
 Mestizo  n.s. -1.40 n.s. 
 Indigenous n.s. -3.77 -2.34 
 Support for Democracy    
 Preference for Authoritarian Leader -2.49 n.s. n.s. 
Social Capital 
 Municipal Meetings Attendance 1.80 n.s. 1.50 
 Demand-making on Municipal Government 2.10 1.40 1.70 
 Communitarian Participation 2.10 n.s. 1.66 
Governance Indicators 
 Satisfaction with Local Services n.s. 4.50 n.s. 
 Trust in the Municipal Government 5.60 9.80 7.60 
 Efficacy of National Government -5.40 -15.10 -10.20 
 Role of the State in the Economy    
 Role of the State Index -2.90 -3.10 -3.00 
Country-Level  
  Human Development Index (2007) 14.88 12.24 13.55 
* Not Significant p>.1 
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Appendix A3: Probabilities of Hierarchical Model for Multinomial Support for Decentralization 
  
Probability of Support 
for Recentralization 
(relative to 
decentralization)  
Probability of Equal 
Distribution (relative to 
support for decentralization) 
Individual-Level 
Socioeconomics and Demographics   
     Education 0.496 0.498 
     Age n.s. 0.500 
     Female 0.529 0.555 
     Quintiles of Wealth 0.506 n.s. 
     Size of City/Town of Residence 0.512 0.510 
Race (Base category: White)   
Indigenous 0.534 n.s. 
Support for Democracy   
Churchillian Democracy n.s. 0.500 
Preference for Authoritarian Leader 0.531 n.s. 
Social Capital   
Municipal Meetings Attendance 0.500 n.s. 
Demand-making on Municipal 
Government 0.500 0.500 
Communitarian Participation 0.500 n.s. 
Governance Indicators   
Trust in the Municipal Government 0.498 0.499 
     Efficacy of National Government 0.502 0.501 
Role of the State in the Economy   
Role of the State Index 0.500 n.s. 
Country-Level  
            Human Development Index 
(2007) 0.057 n.s. 
* Not Significant p>.1   
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Appendix A4: Largest Possible Effects of Participation in Political Parties Coefficients 
Variable Model I Model II 
Individual-Level   
Socioeconomics and Demographics   
     Education 6.048 5.994 
     Age 2.720 2.640 
     Female -2.057 -2.434 
     Quintiles of Wealth -1.380 -1.376 
     Size of City/Town of Residence -3.424 -3.468 
Ethnicity (Base category: White)   
Mestizo  n.s.* n.s. 
Indigenous 1.086 1.040 
Black 1.683 1.760 
Other n.s. n.s. 
Governance Indicators   
     Crime Victimization 2.300 2.200 
     Satisfaction with Municipal Services n.s. n.s. 
     Municipal Bribe 4.500 4.400 
     Efficacy of National Government 1.100 1.000 
Political Trust Indicators   
Trust in Political Parties 8.200 8.300 
Trust in the Municipal Government n.s. n.s. 
Trust in Elections 1.900 1.900 
Support for Direct Democracy   
     Support for Direct Democracy 1.300 1.300 
Country-Level    
Means as Outcomes   
     Human Development Index (2007) n.s. n.s. 
     Federal System n.s. n.s. 
     Index of Fiscal and Administrative Decentralization -8.566 -8.480 
    Trust in Political Parties x Index of Fiscal and Administrative 
Decentralization 
-- -8.842 
*n.s.: Not significant p>0.1 
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 Appendix A5: Probabilities of Hierarchical Model for Multinomial Participation in Protests 
Variable Sometimes Almost Never 
Intercept 0.072 0.047 
Individual-Level   
Socioeconomics and Demographics   
     Education 0.523 0.513 
     Age n.s.* n.s. 
     Female 0.439 0.440 
     Quintiles of Wealth n.s. n.s. 
     Size of City/Town of Residence n.s. 0.487 
Ethnicity (Base category: White)   
Mestizo  0.538 n.s. 
Indigenous 0.639 n.s. 
Black 0.568 n.s. 
Other n.s. n.s. 
Governance Indicators   
     Crime Victimization 0.501 0.501 
     Satisfaction with Municipal Services n.s. n.s. 
     Municipal Bribe 0.501 0.501 
     Efficacy of National Government 0.499 n.s. 
Political Trust Indicators   
Trust in Political Parties 0.501 0.501 
Trust in the Municipal Government n.s. n.s. 
Trust in Elections n.s. n.s. 
Support for Direct Democracy   
     Support for Direct Democracy 0.501 0.504 
Country-Level    
Means as Outcomes   
     Human Development Index (2007) n.s. n.s. 
     Federal System  n.s. n.s. 
     Index of Fiscal and Administrative    Decentralization 0.502 n.s. 
*n.s.: Not significant p>0.1   
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Appendix A6: PAC Questionnaire  
 
 
!"#$%&''()$&*%+"!,"&$
Córdoba 883  -  Piso 12 – Bs. As. – Argentina 
C1054AAH - TEL: 5-218-2000 – FAX: 5-218-2032 
Tnsgallup.argentina@tns-gallup.com.ar 
www.tns-gallup.com.ar  
 
+"-(+#!&.$/01202$3$456789:$/001$  N° FORMULARIO  
 
“PROYECTO PNUD AARG.04007 AUDITORIA CIUDADANA DE LA 
CALIDAD DE LAS PRÁCTICAS DEMOCRÁTICAS EN MUNICIPIOS” 
CUESTIONARIO 
 
INTRODUCCIÓN:  
Buenos días. Mi nombre es (……………) y represento a……………... Actualmente estamos realizando un estudio para conocer la opinión de la 
ciudadanía sobre la democracia en el municipio de …. (MENCIONAR MUNICIPIO). Este estudio se aplicará a una gran cantidad de personas 
en 8 municipios de todo el país. Usted ha salido sorteado entre ellas. Su identidad permanecerá en el anonimato, sus respuestas serán 
confidenciales y se sumarán para un análisis estadístico con las demás personas que estamos entrevistando. ¡Muchas gracias por su 
colaboración! 
 
PREGUNTAS FILTRO 
 
PF1.  ¿Tiene Ud. más de 17 años de edad? 
 
Si 1  
No 2  
Ns/Nc 0  
 
(SI SI EN PREGUNTA ANTERIOR CONTINUAR. SI NO EN ALGUNA DE LAS DOS OPCIONES,  TERMINAR)  
 
PF2 ¿Podría decirme cuál es su edad exactamente? (ANOTAR EDAD)  
 
PF3.  Cuánto hace que Ud. reside en  (MENCIONAR MUNICIPIO)? 
 
Menos de un año 1  "  TERMINAR 
Más de un año  2  "  CONTINUAR 
Ns/Nc 0   
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MÓDULO 1: CULTURA CÍVICA DEMOCRÁTICA 
 
P01. Para comenzar, ¿Cómo evalúa usted la actual situación política del país? Diría que es… 
 
Muy buena Buena Ni buena ni mala Mala Muy mala No sabe No responde 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
 
P02 Si tuviera que resumir el significado de la democracia en una palabra... cuáles serían las TRES primeras palabras que se le ocurrirían? 
(RESPUESTA ESPONTÁNEA - ACEPTAR HASTA TRES MENCIONES - ANOTAR EN EL ORDEN EN QUE EL ENTREVISTADO LAS 
MENCIONE) 
 
P03.  De estas tres cuál considera que es la más importante? (MARCAR CODIGO, EN COLUMNA P03) 
 
 P03 
P02.1 1  
P02.2 2  
P02.3 3  
 
P04.  Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo… 
 
La democracia es un régimen de gobierno en el cual la gente elige periódicamente a sus gobernantes a través del 
voto. 1  
La democracia es una forma de vida en la cual la gente tiene derecho a participar en todas las decisiones que 
afectan su vida cotidiana 2  
No sabe 8  
No responde 9  
 
P05.  Y entre estas 2 afirmaciones ¿Cuál se acerca más a su forma de pensar?  
 
Una cosa es la democracia y otra el bienestar económico y social de la población. Por eso, para que haya 
democracia BASTA con que sean respetados el voto y las libertades públicas. 1  
El bienestar económico y social de la población es una precondición de la democracia y por eso, para que ésta 
exista, NO BASTA con que sean respetados el voto y las libertades públicas. 2  
NO LEER Ambas 3  
NO LEER Ninguno 4  
NO LEER No sabe 8  
NO LEER No responde 9  
P06.  Y pensando en  estas tres afirmaciones ¿Cuál se acerca más a su forma de pensar? LEER OPCIONES 
 
La democracia es 
preferible a cualquier otra 
forma de gobierno 
En algunas circunstancias, un 
gobierno autoritario puede ser 
preferible a uno democrático 
No tengo preferencia entre 
un gobierno democrático y 
uno no democrático 
NO LEER 
No sabe 
NO LEER 
No 
responde 
1  2  3  8  9  
 
P07.  ¿Usted está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con la siguiente frase “Personalmente no me importaría que llegara al poder un gobierno 
autoritario, si pudiera resolver los problemas del país en lo que hace a  seguridad, economía, etc.”? LEER OPCIONES 
 
Acuerdo Desacuerdo NO LEER No sabe NO LEER No responde 
1  2  8  9  
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P08.  Supongamos que el país atravesara una muy seria crisis económica y/o social. Estaría usted de acuerdo, en ese caso con … (LEER 
FRASES UNA POR UNA)  
 
 SI No Ns/Nc 
1.  Estaría de acuerdo con que el presidente ordene reprimir para reestablecer el orden 1  2  3  
2. Estaría de acuerdo con que el presidente controle los medios de comunicación hasta que 
termine la crisis 1  2  3  
3. Estaría de acuerdo con que el presidente viole algunas leyes para combatir la crisis 1  2  3  
4. Estaría de acuerdo con que el presidente deje de lado al Congreso hasta que termine la crisis 1  2  3  
 
P09.  Hay gente que dice que sin Congreso Nacional no puede haber democracia, mientras que otra gente dice que la democracia puede 
funcionar sin Congreso Nacional. ¿Cuál frase está más cerca de su manera de pensar? LEER OPCIONES 
 
Sin Congreso Nacional no puede haber 
democracia 
La democracia puede funcionar  sin 
Congreso Nacional 
NO LEER 
No sabe 
NO LEER 
No responde 
1  2  8  9  
 
P10.  También hay gente que dice que sin partidos políticos no puede haber democracia, mientras que hay otra gente que dice que la 
democracia puede funcionar sin partidos. ¿Cuál frase está más cerca de su manera de pensar? LEER OPCIONES 
 
Sin partidos políticos no puede 
haber democracia 
La democracia puede funcionar 
sin partidos 
NO LEER 
No sabe 
NO LEER 
No responde 
1  2  8  9  
 
P11.  ¿En qué medida cree usted que es necesario mejorar la calidad de la política y de las instituciones en la Argentina…? LEER OPCIONES 
 
Mucho Bastante Poco Nada NO LEER No sabe 
NO LEER 
No responde 
1  2  3  4  8  9  
CONTINUAR IR A P14 
 
P12. (SI DIJO MUCHO BASTANTE O POCO) Y en su opinión ¿Usted cree que es posible hacerlo? 
 
Si " 1  Ir a P13 
No  "  2  P12a ¿Por qué? 
No sabe 8  
No responde 9  
 
 
 
P13. A LOS QUE CONTESTAN SI: ¿Cómo cree Ud. que podría mejorarse la calidad de la política y de los políticos? 
 
 Si No No sabe No responde 
1. Participando en un partido político 1  2  8  9  
2. Participando en una organización de la sociedad civil 1  2  8  9  
3. Exigiendo periódicamente rendición de cuentas a los gobernantes 1  2  8  9  
4. Educando cívicamente a los ciudadanos 1  2  8  9  
5. ¿Piensa que existe otra forma de mejorar la calidad de la política y de los 
políticos? (REGISTRAR y PROFUNDIZAR) 1  2  8  9  
     
 
P14 A TODOS ¿Cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones se acerca más a su forma de pensar? 
 
Voto en las elecciones porque creo 
que es importante y de esta manera se 
pueden cambiar las cosas. 
Voto en las elecciones porque es 
obligatorio, pero creo que con el voto 
las cosas se cambian poco o nada 
En general no 
voto en las 
elecciones. 
NO LEER 
No sabe 
NO LEER 
No 
responde 
1  2  3  8  9  
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P15. ¿Ud. cree que la democracia ayuda mucho, bastante, poco o nada a mejorar la calidad de vida de la gente? 
 
Ayuda mucho 1  
Ayuda bastante 2  
Ayuda poco 3  
No ayuda nada 4  
No sabe 8  
No responde 9  
 
P16.  Y pensando específicamente en (MUNICIPIO), Usted diría que esta muy, bastante, poco o nada satisfecho con el funcionamiento de la 
democracia en esta ciudad... 
 
Muy satisfecho Bastante Satisfecho Poco satisfecho Nada satisfecho 
NO LEER 
No sabe 
NO LEER 
No responde 
1  2  3  4  8  9  
 
P17.  En su opinión ¿En qué ámbito funciona mejor la democracia? Diría que en el país, o aquí en… (MUNICIPIO)? 
 
Nacional Local/Municipal NO LEER Ambos por Igual 
NO LEER 
Ninguno 
NO LEER 
No sabe 
NO LEER 
No responde 
1  2  3  4  8  9  
 
P18. ¿Por qué? (RESPUESTA ESPONTÁNEA, REGISTRAR ABAJO) 
 
 
 
MÓDULO 2: DERECHOS Y RESPONSABILIDADES 
 
P19.  ¿Cuáles diría usted que son sus derechos como ciudadano que vive en una democracia?  Por favor dígame todos los que recuerde o 
piense que son sus derechos  (ESPONTANEA - REGISTRAR ABAJO)  Y qué más? (PROFUNDIZAR) 
 
 
 
P20.  En general, ¿Usted diría que los habitantes de… (MUNICIPIO) conocen mucho, bastante, poco o nada cuáles son sus derechos? 
 
Mucho Bastante Poco Nada NO LEER No sabe 
NO LEER 
No responde 
1  2  3  4  8  9  
IR A P23 CONTINUAR – P21 IR A P23 
 
P21. (SOLO A LOS QUE CONTESTARON POCO O NADA EN LA PREGUNTA ANTERIOR) ¿Cuál diría usted que es la principal razón por 
la cual la gente en esta ciudad no conoce o conoce poco sus derechos? LEER OPCIONES 
 
La pobreza de la 
gente 
La falta de 
educación de la 
gente 
El desinterés de la 
gente por conocer 
sus derechos 
Dirigentes que no 
quieren que la gente 
conozca sus derechos 
NO 
LEER 
Otra  
NO LEER 
Todas 
NO 
LEER 
No 
sabe 
NO LEER 
No 
responde 
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1  2  3  4  5  6  8  9  
 
P22  ¿Quién o quiénes son responsables de que los habitantes de… (MUNICIPIO) no conozcan o conozcan poco sus derechos? 
(ESPONTÁNEA, REGISTRAR ABAJO) 
 
 
 
A TODOS 
 
P23.  ¿En qué medida diría usted que los derechos de los habitantes de… (MUNICIPIO) son respetados por las autoridades? Diría que… 
 
Mucho Bastante Poco Nada NO LEER No sabe 
NO LEER 
No responde 
1  2  3  4  8  9  
 
P24.  ¿Y en qué medida diría usted que los habitantes de… (MUNICIPIO) exigen y se aseguran que sus derechos sean respetados por las 
autoridades... 
 
Mucho Bastante Poco Nada NO LEER No sabe 
NO LEER 
No responde 
1  2  3  4  8  9  
 
P25.  En lo personal ¿Usted ha sentido alguna vez que alguno de sus derechos no fue respetado debido a...  (PREGUNTAR UNO POR UNO ) 
 
 SI No Ns/Nc 
1. su situación económica 1  2  3  
2. su sexo (por ser hombre / por ser   mujer) 1  2  3  
3. su nivel educativo 1  2  3  
4. el barrio o el lugar donde vive 1  2  3  
5. el color de su piel 1  2  3  
6. su edad 1  2  3  
7. sus creencias religiosas 1  2  3  
8. su preferencia u orientación sexual 1  2  3  
9. su aspecto físico/ apariencia 1  2  3  
10. su país de origen 1  2  3  
11. Otra causa (ESPECIFICAR) 1  2  3  
 
   
 
P26.  ¿Y cuáles diría que son sus deberes como ciudadano?  Por favor dígame todas las que recuerda que son sus responsabilidades como 
ciudadano (ESPONTÁNEA Y MÚLTIPLE) Y que más ? (PROFUNDIZAR) 
 
 
 
P27. ¿Usted diría que los habitantes de… (MUNICIPIO) conocen sus deberes mucho, bastante, poco o nada?  
 
P28. ¿Y cumplen con sus deberes mucho, bastante, poco o nada? 
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 Mucho Bastante Poco Nada NO LEER No sabe 
NO LEER 
No responde 
P27 - Conocen 1  2  3  4  8  9  
P28 - Cumplen 1  2  3  4  8  9  
 
P29.  En su opinión, cuanta gente en (MUNICIPIO) paga sus impuestos?  
 
Todos La mayoría Algunos Nadie NO LEER No sabe 
NO LEER 
No responde 
1  2  3  4  8  9  
 
P30. En general, ¿Usted diría que los habitantes de… (MUNICIPIO) respetan mucho, bastante, poco o nada las normas? 
 
Mucho Bastante Poco Nada NO LEER No sabe 
NO LEER 
No responde 
1  2  3  4  8  9  
   
 
P31. En general, ¿Usted diría que los habitantes de… (MUNICIPIO) valoran y cuidan  mucho, bastante, poco o nada los bienes públicos, 
como por ejemplo plazas, tachos de basura, semáforos, alumbrado público, etc.? 
 
Mucho Bastante Poco Nada NO LEER No sabe 
NO LEER 
No responde 
1  2  3  4  8  9  
   
 
P32. ¿En qué medida cree usted que las instituciones educativas contribuyen mucho, bastante, poco o nada a formar ciudadanos 
democráticos? 
 
Mucho Bastante Poco Nada NO LEER No sabe 
NO LEER 
No responde 
1  2  3  4  8  9  
   
 
P33.  Ahora le voy a leer una serie de servicios  y responsabilidades, y en cada caso, quisiera que me diga quién cree usted que es 
responsable de prestar estos servicios, si el Gobierno Nacional, el Provincial o el Municipal. Para comenzar ¿Quién es responsable de 
asegurar o garantizar a los habitantes de … (MUNICIPIO)…OPCIONES MÚLTIPLES 
 
 
 Gobierno 
Nacional 
Gobierno 
Provincial 
Gobierno 
Municipal No sabe 
No 
responde 
1.   Salud pública 1  2  3  4  5  
2.   Educación pública 1  2  3  4  5  
3.   Seguridad 1  2  3  4  5  
4.   Administración de Justicia 1  2  3  4  5  
5.   Estado de las calles y veredas 1  2  3  4  5  
6.   Limpieza urbana 1  2  3  4  5  
7.   Iluminación pública 1  2  3  4  5  
8.   Jubilaciones y pensiones 1  2  3  4  5  
9.   Planes Sociales 1  2  3  4  5  
10.   Protección del medio ambiente 1  2  3  4  5  
11. Obras de infraestructura  1  2  3  4  5  
12. Cobro de impuestos 1  2  3  4  5  
13. Relación con otros países o grupos de 
países 1  2  3  4  5  
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MODULO 3:  EVALUACION INSTITUCIONES MUNICIPALES 
 
P34. En términos generales, ¿Cuál es su opinión sobre el funcionamiento de las instituciones municipales aquí en... (MUNICIPIO) ¿Ud. diría que funcionan muy 
bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal?  
P34.2.  ¿Y cuál su opinión sobre el desempeño del intendente de ......... ¿Ud. diría que se desempeña muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal? 
P34.3.  ¿Y cuál es su opinión sobre el desempeño de los Concejales de ..........¿Ud. diría que se desempeñan muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, 
mal o muy mal? 
 
 Muy bien Bien Ni bien ni mal Mal Muy mal 
NO LEER 
No sabe 
NO LEER 
No responde 
P34.1 Instituciones 
municipales en general 1  2  3  4  5  8  9  
P34.2 Intendente 1  2  3  4  5  8  9  
P34.3 Concejales 1  2  3  4  5  8  9  
 
P35. ¿En los últimos doce meses ha acudido a alguna dependencia municipal para…?  (LEER OPCIONES) 
 
 Hacer un trámite Pedir información Hacer un reclamo Otro: No acudió 
Sí 1  1  1  1  
No 2  2  2  2  
0  
IR a p43 
 
P36. (SÓLO A QUIENES HAN ACUDIDO) Quisiera saber sobre su experiencia en esa(s) visita(s). En términos generales cómo evalúa la 
atención que recibió?. Diría que fue… 
 
Muy buena Buena Ni buena ni mala Mala Muy Mala No sabe No responde 
1  2  3  4  5  8  9  
 
P37. Por favor dígame si…LEER FRASES UNA A UNA Y ESPERAR RESPUESTA 
 
 Si No 
1. Tuvo que hacer largas filas para ser atendido 1  2  
2. Su turno no fue respetado y atendieron a otras personas antes que a Ud. 1  2  
3. Le hicieron realizar trámites innecesarios 1  2  
4. Le negaron información o le costó mucho obtenerla 1  2  
5. Fueron descorteses  e irrespetuosos en el trato 1  2  
6. Se sintió discriminado o humillado 1  2  
7. Le pidieron directa o indirectamente propina o coima 1  2  
 
(SI CONTESTO QUE “NO” EN TODAS PASA A P43) 
 
P38. (SÓLO A LOS QUE LES NEGARON INFORMACIÓN, ITEM 4 EN PREGUNTA ANTERIOR) ¿Podría decirme sobre qué tema fue usted 
a buscar información y se la negaron? (ABIERTA, ESPONTÁNEA Y MÚLTIPLE) 
 
 
 
P39. (A LOS QUE CONTESTARON “SI” EN ALGUNA DE LOS ITEMS DE P37) ¿Realizó alguna queja o reclamo? 
 
Si No No sabe No responde 
1  2  8  9  
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IR A P41 Y P42 CONTINUAR – P40 A P43 
 
P40. (SI NO REALIZÓ UNA QUEJA O RECLAMO) ¿Por qué no hizo ninguna queja o reclamo? (ABIERTA) 
 
 
 
P41 (SI REALIZÓ ALGUNA QUEJA O RECLAMO) ¿A quién le presentó la queja o reclamo? (ABIERTA) 
 
 
 
P42. (SI REALIZÓ ALGUNA QUEJA O RECLAMO) La respuesta que obtuvo fue… 
 
Muy satisfactoria Bastante Satisfactoria 
Ni satisfactoria 
ni insatisfactoria 
Poco 
satisfactoria 
Nada 
Satisfactoria No sabe 
No 
responde 
1  2  3  4  5  8  9  
 
A TODOS 
 
P43 ¿Cómo evalúa usted, en general, a los empleados del Municipio de… (MUNICIPIO)? Diría que se desempeñan… 
 
Muy bien Bien Ni bien ni mal Mal Muy mal No sabe No responde 
1  2  3  4  5  8  9  
 
P44. Por lo que usted sabe o escuchó ¿el Municipio capacita a sus empleados para que puedan desarrollar mejor sus tareas…? 
 
Si No No sabe No responde 
1  2  8  9  
 
P45 ¿En que medida considera usted que el Municipio de… (MUNICIPIO) contrata a sus empleados en función de la experiencia y/o 
capacidades que demuestran para realizar las tareas que deben hacer? 
 
Siempre Casi siempre Bastantes veces Pocas veces Casi nunca Nunca No sabe No responde 
1  2  3  4  5  6  8  9  
 
P46  Le parece que en los nombramientos de empleados y funcionarios municipales suelen incidir… 
 
 Siempre Casi siempre 
Algunas 
veces 
Raramen-
te Nunca Ns/Nc 
1. las relaciones de parentesco 1  2  3  4  5  8  
2. la influencia política 1  2  3  4  5  8  
3. la presión de alguna/ s empresa/ s 1  2  3  4  5  8  
4. la presión de algún/ os sindicato/s 1  2  3  4  5  8  
 
MODULO 4: ACCESO A LA INFORMACION 
P47.  En términos generales ¿Cuán satisfecho está con la información que brinda a los ciudadanos el Municipio de… (MUNICIPIO) sobre sus 
servicios y actos de gobierno? Diría que está… 
 
Muy satisfecho Bastante satisfecho 
Ni satisfecho ni 
insatisfecho 
Poco 
satisfecho 
Nada 
satisfecho No sabe No responde 
1  2  3  4  5  8  9  
  232 
 
P48.  También en términos generales. ¿Cómo evaluaría la cantidad de información que brinda el Municipio? Diría que esta información es… 
 
Suficiente – en el sentido que usted NO necesita o no quiere más información 1  "  IR A P50 
Insuficiente – usted SI necesita o quiere más información 2  "  CONTINUAR – P49 
No sabe 8  
No responde 9  
"  IR A P50 
 
P49 (SÓLO A LOS QUE CONTESTAN INSUFICIENTE) ¿Sobre qué servicios o actos de gobierno quisiera usted tener más información? 
(ABIERTA, ESPONTÁNEA Y MÚLTIPLE) 
 
 
 
A TODOS 
 
P50. Y pensando en la calidad de la información que el Municipio brinda, sea suficiente o insuficiente, diría que es..LEER OPCIONES 
 
Información cierta Falsa NO LEER No sabe NO LEER No responde 
1  2  8  9  
P51. Y diría que es información…? LEER OPCIONES 
 
Completa Incompleta NO LEER No sabe NO LEER No responde 
1  2  8  9  
 
P52. (SÓLO A LOS QUE CONTESTAN FALSA (Cód. 2 en P50) O INCOMPLETA (cód. 2 en P51)) ¿La información sobre qué servicios o 
actos de gobierno cree usted que es falsa o incompleta? (ABIERTA, ESPONTÁNEA Y MÚLTIPLE) 
 
 
 
A TODOS 
 
P53.  Ahora le voy a pedir que evalúe la información que recibe del Municipio sobre ciertos temas o áreas muy específicos. Empecemos por el 
Presupuesto Municipal…¿la información que brinda el Municipio sobre el presupuesto municipal es, en términos de cantidad, completa o 
incompleta? Y en términos de calidad, es veraz o falsa? 
 
Cantidad de información Calidad información  
Completa Incom-pleta 
No 
sabe Veraz Falsa 
No 
sabe 
1. Presupuesto municipal 1  2  3  1  2  3  
2. Compras, contrataciones, licitaciones 1  2  3  1  2  3  
3. Acceso a información sobre servicios selectivos 
(vivienda, planes sociales, becas)  1  2  3  1  2  3  
4. Proyectos y obras pasadas/presentes/ 1  2  3  1  2  3  
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futuras(instalaciones, parques, etc.) 
5. Sueldos de los empleados municipales 1  2  3  1  2  3  
6. Declaraciones juradas patrimoniales de los 
funcionarios jerárquicos del gobierno 1  2  3  1  2  3  
 
P54.  ¿Qué campañas de comunicación y/o información sobre los servicios públicos que brinda recuerda usted que haya realizado el Municipio 
en los últimos seis meses? (ABIERTA Y MULTIPLE, ACLARAR TEMA SOBRE EL QUE TRATABA LA CAMPAÑA) 
 
 
No recuerda Ninguna 98  
 
Ns/Nc 99  
 
P55. (SÓLO A LOS QUE RECUERDAN UNA O MÁS CAMPAÑAS) Esas campañas le resultaron a usted…LEER OPCIONES 
 
Muy útiles Bastante útiles Poco útiles Nada útiles No sabe No contesta 
1  2  3  4  8  9  
 
A TODOS 
 
P56  ¿Se informa Ud. sobre la gestión del Gobierno Municipal? 
 
Si " 1  Sigue P56b 
No  "  2  Pasa a P 57 
 
P56b. ¿A través de qué medios o canales se informa usted sobre los servicios que brinda el Municipio? MOSTRAR TARJETA 1 
 
 Si No 
01 Publicidad del Municipio en los medios de comunicación y en vía pública 1  2  
02 Información en diarios locales 1  2  
03 Información de radios locales 1  2  
04 Información en señales de TV local 1  2  
05 Publicaciones periódicas del Municipio / boletines 1  2  
06 Sitio web del Municipio 1  2  
07 Concurre directamente al Municipio y ahí le informan 1  2  
08 Informalmente por amigos / conocidos que trabajan en el Municipio 1  2  
09 Por lo que observa cotidianamente en su municipio 1  2  
10 Comisiones barriales 1  2  
11 Campañas  electorales 1  2  
99 Otro: 1  2  
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P57. ¿Y cuál de todos estos canales o medios cree usted que sería el mejor / el más eficaz para informarse sobre los servicios y actos de 
gobierno del municipio? MOSTRAR TARJETA 1 
 
Publicidad del Municipio en diario / radio / TV / vía pública 01  
Información en diarios locales 02  
Información de radio locales 03  
Información en señales de TV local 04  
Publicaciones periódicas del Municipio / boletines 05  
Sitio web del Municipio 06  
Concurre directamente al Municipio y ahí le informan 07  
Informalmente por amigos / conocidos que trabajan en el Municipio 08  
Por lo que observa cotidianamente en su municipio 09  
Comisiones barriales 10  
Campañas  electorales 11  
Otro:…. 99  
 
 
 
MODULO 5: RENDICION DE CUENTAS 
 
A TODOS. ENTREGAR TARJETA 2 Y LEER: Algunas personas sostienen que “Los funcionarios del gobierno municipal deben informarle 
periódicamente a la gente sobre qué temas estuvieron trabajando y qué hicieron por la comunidad. De esta manera la gente común puede 
controlar lo que hacen los funcionarios y exigirles que hagan bien o mejor su trabajo. A esto le llaman ‘rendición de cuentas’”.  
 
P58.  En su municipio ¿cree que se informa a la gente lo suficiente sobre lo que hacen los funcionarios del gobierno municipal? 
 
Sí No No sabe No responde 
1  2  8  9  
 
P59.  Usted personalmente ¿quiere o necesita estar informado sobre lo que hacen los funcionarios del gobierno municipal? 
 
Sí No No sabe No responde 
1  2  8  9  
 
P60.  Y en qué medida considera que tener esta información le permitirá a usted controlar que los funcionarios hagan bien o mejor su trabajo. 
Diría que lo ayudaría… 
 
Mucho Bastante Poco Nada No sabe No responde 
1  2  3  4  8  9  
 
P61. ¿Cuán importante diría que les resulta a los funcionarios la evaluación que gente como Ud. pueda hacer sobre su desempeño laboral?  
Les importa… 
 
Mucho bastante Poco Nada No sabe No responde 
1  2  3  4  8  9  
 
P62.  ¿Cuán eficaz es su voto para lograr que los funcionarios rindan cuentas de sus decisiones y actos de gobierno a la gente como usted? 
Diría que su voto es una herramienta… 
 
Muy eficaz Bastante eficaz Poco eficaz Nada eficaz No sabe No responde 
1  2  3  4  8  9  
 
P63. ¿Conoce usted de qué otras maneras puede exigirle a los funcionarios del gobierno municipal que le informen sobre sus actos y 
decisiones de gobierno? 
 
Si No No sabe No responde 
1  2  8  9  
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IR A P64 IR A68 
 
P64. (SI CONTESTA AFIRMATIVAMENTE) ¿Qué otras formas o procedimientos  para exigir la rendición de cuentas conoce usted? 
(ABIERTA) 
 
 
 
P65. ¿Utiliza Ud. estas formas de rendición de cuentas? 
 
Si No No sabe No responde 
1  2  8  9  
IR A P66 IR A 67 IR A  P68 
 
66.  ¿Con qué frecuencia las utiliza? 
 
Casi siempre Frecuentemente A veces Casi nunca No sabe No responde 
1  2  3  4  8  9  
 
P67  ¿Por qué no las Utiliza (ABIERTA) 
 
 
 
P68. (A TODOS) Por lo que sabe o escuchó ¿Existe aquí en… (MUNICIPIO) alguna organización que se dedique a explicarle a la gente como 
puede hacer para lograr que los funcionarios del gobierno municipal le informen periódicamente a la gente sobre qué temas estuvieron 
trabajando y qué hicieron por la comunidad? 
 
Si No No sabe No responde 
1  2  8  9  
 
P69. (SI CONTESTA AFIRMATIVAMENTE) ¿Cuál o cuáles conoce? (ABIERTA – REGISTRAR DOS RESPUESTAS) 
 
 
 
MODULO 6: PERCEPCION DE CLIENTELISMO Y CORRUPCION 
 
P70. ¿Con qué frecuencia Ud. cree que la gente de (MUNICIPIO) cuando solicita algo a las autoridades municipales (servicios, subsidios, 
participación en planes sociales, etc.),  tiene que hacer algo a cambio para lograr respuesta?  
 
Siempre Casi siempre Bastantes veces Pocas veces Casi nunca Nunca No sabe No responde 
1  2  3  4  5  6  8  9  
 
P71. ¿Usted ha sabido de casos o situaciones en las que algunas personas que usted conozca personalmente tuvieron que hacer algo a 
cambio para obtener lo que necesitaban? 
 
Si No No sabe No responde 
1  2  8  9  
 
P72.  ¿Y a usted personalmente le sucedió que algún funcionario municipal le solicitara realizar alguna tarea especial para así obtener lo que 
usted necesitaba? 
 
Si No No sabe No responde 
1  2  8  9  
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P73.  Cuando Ud. piensa en la palabra “corrupción” ¿con qué la asocia? NO LEER, RESPUESTA ESPONTÁNEA, PRECODIFICADA Y 
MÚLTIPLE 
 
Cuestiones 
económicas 
Cuestiones 
políticas 
Tráfico de 
influencias 
Intercambio 
de favores 
Comportamientos 
mafiosos 
Otros: 
 Ns-Nc 
1  2  3  4  5  6  99  
 
P74.  Pensando en los servicios que brinda el Municipio, podría decirme con qué frecuencia ud. piensa que los ciudadanos 
tienen que hacer algunos “pagos irregulares” para lograr las cosas que necesitan? 
 
Siempre Casi siempre Bastantes veces Pocas veces Casi nunca Nunca No sabe No responde 
1  2  3  4  5  6  8  9  
 
P75.  Ahora algunas preguntas sobre los posibles contactos que haya tenido usted con funcionarios de gobierno municipal: MOSTRAR 
TARJETA 3 
 
Pensando en el último año: SI NO No responde 
a ¿Ha sido testigo del pago de un soborno/ coima a funcionario 
municipal? 1  2  3  
b. ¿Le han pedido que pague un soborno / coima a un funcionario 
público?  1  2  3  
 
P76.  A LOS QUE CONTESTAN QUE SI ¿Hizo la denuncia correspondiente? 
 
a. SI 1  
Ante quién hizo la denuncia? 
b. NO 2  
Por qué no la hizo? 
 
A TODOS 
 
P77  ¿Cuánta corrupción diría usted que hay en el Gobierno Municipal? Por favor, para contestarme utilice esta escala de 7 puntos. Si usted 
considera que el Gobierno Municipal aquí en… (MUNICIPIO) “es un gobierno  corrupto” dígame 1, si usted considera que el Gobierno 
Municipal aquí en… (MUNICIPIO) “NO es un gobierno  corrupto” dígame 7. Los números 2 a 6 puede utilizarlos para indicar una posición 
intermedia que se acerque a alguno de los extremos. 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Es un gobierno corrupto 2 3 4 5 6 No es un gobierno corrupto 
 
P78.  A LOS QUE CONTESTAN 1, 2 o 3 EN P77 ¿En qué áreas de gobierno Usted cree que se llevan a cabo prácticas corruptas? (ABIERTA 
Y MULTIPLE) 
 
 
 
MODULO 7: PARTICIPACION CIUDADANA 
 
P80.  ¿Cuánto interés tiene en reunirse con otras personas que no sean de su familia o amigos más cercanos para buscar soluciones a los 
problemas de su comunidad ? Ud. diría que está... 
 
Muy 
interesado 
Bastante 
interesado 
Poco 
interesado 
Nada 
interesado 
NO LEER No 
sabe 
NO LEER No 
responde 
1  2  3  4  8  9  
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P81. En términos generales con cuál de estas frases está Ud. más de acuerdo: 
 
La participación de personas como Ud. 
pueden servir para cambiar las cosas 
La participación de personas como Ud. es una 
pérdida de tiempo porque las cosas se 
deciden habitualmente en otro lado 
No sabe No responde 
1  2  8  9  
 
P82. ¿Conoce qué mecanismos o espacios de participación el  Municipio de ................... pone a disposición de los ciudadanos?  
 
Si " 1  82a. ¿Qué mecanismos conoce? (ESPONTÁNEA) 
 
No  "  2  "  IR A P84  
Ns/Nc " 9  "  IR A P84  
 
P83. PARA LOS QUE CONTESTAN QUE SI ¿Ud. cree que son útiles?  
 
Si " 1  
83a. ¿ Por qué cree que esos 
mecanismos son útiles? 
(ESPONTÁNEA) 
 
No  "  2  
83a. ¿ Por qué cree que esos 
mecanismos no son útiles? 
(ESPONTÁNEA) 
 
Ns/Nc  9    
 
P84.  ¿Ud. cree que las opiniones, sugerencias y proyectos presentados a través de los espacios y mecanismos de participación ciudadana 
inciden efectivamente en la gestión del gobierno municipal?  
 
SI NO NS/NC 
1  2  9  
 
P85. ¿Participa usted actualmente en alguna de las siguientes organizaciones? (MOSTRAR TARJETA 4) y consignar si participa / no 
participa 
 
 Participa No participa 
01. Sindicato 1  2  
02. Partido político 1  2  
03. Junta de vecinos 1  2  
04. Cooperadora escolar 1  2  
05. Club de barrio 1  2  
06. Club de interés (hobbies, pasatiempos) 1  2  
07. Cooperativas 1  2  
08. Grupo de auto-ayuda 1  2  
09. Organización ecologista 1  2  
10. Grupo de jóvenes  1  2  
11. Club deportivo 1  2  
12. Centro de estudiantes 1  2  
13. Organización religiosa 1  2  
14. Organizaciones de ayuda voluntaria  1  2  
15. Otra (especificar) 1  2  
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P86.  SOLO SI NO PARTICIPA EN NINGUNA ORGANIZACIÓN De las siguientes razones que puede leer en esta tarjeta (MOSTRAR 
TARJETA 5) ¿Cuál diría usted que es la principal razón por la cual no participa en ninguna organización? ¿Y en segundo lugar? (UNA 
SOLA RESPUESTA POR COLUMNA) 
 
 1ERO 2DO 
01 Prefiero dedicar el tiempo a mi familia y amigos 1  1  
02 Aunque me interesa, no tengo tiempo libre para dedicarle 2  2  
03 No encuentro la organización o grupo que me interesa o me sirva 3  3  
04 No sé que beneficio obtendría de participar 4  4  
05 No tengo la seguridad de que mi esfuerzo valga la pena 5  5  
97 Otra (especificar) 6  6  
 
  
98 No sabe 7  7  
99 No responde 8  8  
 
P87.  SOLO SI PARTICIPA EN ALGUNA ORGANIZACIÓN  (SI EN CUALQUIERA DE LOS CASOS DE P85) ¿Y cuán útil le parece a usted  
participar en alguna organización como las que le acabo de mencionar o parecida? Diría que es... 
 
Muy útil Bastante útil Poco útil Nada útil NO LEER No sabe 
NO LEER No 
contesta 
1  2  3  4  8  9  
 
(PREGUNTAS P88 Y P89 SOLO A LOS QUE  PARTICIPAN EN PARTIDOS POLÍTICOS 
P88.¿Alguna vez participó de algún partido político? 
 
Sí No No sabe No responde 
1  2  8  9  
 
P89. En términos generales usted diría que no participa en un partido político porque... (LEER LAS OPCIONES Y MARCAR SÓLO UNA) 
 
No le 
interesa 
Le interesa 
pero no tiene 
tiempo 
Le interesa pero no 
encontró el partido 
que le gusta 
Le interesa pero no tiene 
confianza en los partidos 
ni en los políticos 
Otra 
(ESPONTÁNEA) 
NO 
LEER 
No sabe 
NO LEER 
No 
responde 
1  2  3  4  5  8  9  
 
A TODOS 
 
P90. Teniendo en cuenta su edad y las elecciones en las que pudo haber participado, usted diría que… 
 
Votó en todas las 
elecciones 
Votó en la 
mayoría 
Votó sólo en 
algunas 
No votó en 
ninguna elección No sabe No responde 
1  2  3  4  8  9  
 
MODULO 8 - CONOCIMIENTO DE DATOS ESPECIFICOS DEL MUNICIPIO 
 
P91.  Para terminar, querría preguntarle algunos datos sobre su municipio. ¿Podría Usted indicarme aproximadamente, según su 
conocimiento, cuántos habitantes hay en este municipio? (ANOTAR CIFRA QUE DIGA EL ENTREVISTADO)  
 
CIFRA MENCIONADA POR EL ENTREVISTADO No sabe No responde 
 8  9  
 
P92. ¿Conoce Ud. aproximadamente, cuál es el presupuesto anual de su municipio, esto es, de cuanto dinero por año dispone actualmente la 
municipalidad para llevar a cabo sus tareas? (ANOTAR CIFRA QUE DIGA EL ENTREVISTADO) 
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CIFRA MENCIONADA POR EL ENTREVISTADO No sabe No responde 
 8   9  
 IR P94 IR A P94 
 
P93.  (SOLO A LOS QUE HAYAN DICHO UNA CIFRA) ¿Y en su opinión, esta cantidad de dinero es suficiente o insuficiente para llevar a cabo 
todas las tareas que son necesarias para el buen funcionamiento de este municipio? 
 
Es suficiente Es insuficiente No sabe No responde 
1  2  8  9  
 
A TODOS 
P94.  ¿Podría decirme los nombres de los principales funcionarios del Gobierno local que usted recuerde? (ABIERTA Y MULTIPLE – 
REGISTRAR TODAS LAS RESPUESTAS) 
 
 
 
P95.  ¿Podría decirme cuáles son los partidos políticos que tienen representación en el Concejo Deliberante de esta Ciudad? (ABIERTA Y 
MULTIPLE – REGISTRAR TODAS LAS RESPUESTAS) 
 
 
 
SECCION DE DATOS SOCIODEMOGRAFICOS (TODOS LOS ENTREVISTADOS) 
 
S. Sexo Masculino Femenino 
 1  2  
 
A.  Necesitaría que me indique si el PSH (Principal Sostén del Hogar), la persona que más aporta para el sostén de este hogar, vive en esta 
casa. 
 
Si 1  "  Referir todas las preguntas para determinar NSE al PSH 
No 2  "  IR A B 
 
B. ¿Podría decirme quién es el Jefe de este hogar? (Una vez identificado el Jefe, referir todas las preguntas para determinar NSE al Jefe) 
 
EDUCACIÓN DEL PSH 
(Jefe si PSH no vive en el hogar) 
N1. ¿Cuál es el máximo nivel alcanzado por el PSH (Jefe si PSH 
no vive en el hogar)? 
Hasta Primario incompleto 1  
Primario completo 2  
Secundario incompleto 3  
Secundario completo 4  
Terciario incompleto 5  
Terciario completo 6  
Universitario incompleto 7  
Universitario completo 8  
Postgrado 9  
 
CONDICIÓN DE OCUPACIÓN DEL PSH 
(Jefe si PSH no vive en el hogar) 
N2. Necesitaría que me indique si el PSH (Jefe si PSH no vive en el hogar) 
actualmente: trabaja, es jubilado/a o pensionado/a, está desocupado/a o es 
inactivo/a 
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Trabaja  1  
Jubilado / pensionado 2  
Desocupado 3  
Ama de casa 4  
Estudiante 5  
 
Si PSH (Jefe si PSH no vive en el hogar) es: Jubilado/ Pensionado (cod. 2), desocupado (cod. 3), o inactivo (cod. 4 o 5) no hacer 
bloque de preguntas 3. 
 
CARACTERÍSTICAS OCUPACIONALES DEL PSH (Jefe si PSH no vive en el hogar) 
SOLO PARA PSH (Jefe si PSH no vive en el hogar) QUE TRABAJA 
N3. ¿El PSH (Jefe si PSH no vive en el hogar) tiene una ocupación o más de una? (SI MÁS DE UNA REFERIRSE A OCUPACIÓN 
QUE MÁS INGRESOS LE GENERA) 
 
Una ocupación                1  
Más de una ocupación    2  
N3a. ¿El PSH (Jefe si PSH no vive en el hogar) trabaja en relación de dependencia o por cuenta propia? 
En relación de dependencia 1  Cuántas personas tiene a cargo?             "  
Por cuenta propia 2  Cuántos empleados tiene?                       "  
N3.b Por favor, ¿me podría describir con máximo detalle la ocupación del PSH (Jefe si PSH no vive en el hogar)? ¿Podría 
describirme cuál es su tarea? ¿Cuál es su cargo? 
 
 
6$,-'1%(
Nivel ocupacional  
32  Dueño, Socio Empresas de más de 50 empleados-Alta Dirección 
28  Dueño, Socio Empresas de 6 a 50 empleados-Alta Gerencia 
22  Dueño, Socio Empresas de 1a 5 empleados-Gerencia 
16  Profesionales independientes sin empleados a cargo- Jefes intermedios 
12  Técnicos Independientes-Técnicos en relación de dependencia 
10  Comerciantes sin personal, Artesanos-Empleados especializados, supervisores, capataces 
7  Autónomos especializados- Empleados sin jerarquía 
6  Obreros calificados 
4  Autónomo no calificado- Personal no calificado 
2  Ocupación informal 
4  Pasivos- Inactivos 
2  Desocupados 
 
APORTANTES AL INGRESO TOTAL DEL HOGAR 
N4.Sin contar al PSH, ¿cuántas personas de las que viven en este hogar aportan dinero para afrontar 
los gastos de esta casa (ya sea a través de sueldos, honorarios, tickets, subsidios, jubilaciones, 
pensiones, ayudas de familiares que no viven en la casa, changas, rentas o cualquier otra forma de 
ingreso)? 
(POR PROCESAMIENTO SE SUMA SIEMPRE 1 MÁS A LOS APORTANTES INFORMADOS POR EL 
ENTREVISTADO)  
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TIPO DE COBERTURA DE SALUD DE QUE DISPONE EL HOGAR 
N5 ¿El PSH (Jefe si PSH no vive en el hogar) o el cónyuge/ 
pareja tiene alguna cobertura médica, ya sea obra social, 
medicina prepaga o plan de salud? 
N5a SI RESPONDE NO TIENE NINGUNA COBERTURA 5a. 
¿Se atienden mayoritariamente en hospital público o a través de 
consultas particulares? 
Tiene cobertura medica 1  Hospital público 3  
Ninguna cobertura médica 2  Consulta/Atención particular 4  
 
POSESIÓN/ USO DE BIENES Y SERVICIOS 
N6 ¿Poseen en su casa? N6a ¿El PSH (Jefe si PSH no vive en el hogar) o el 
cónyuge/ pareja tiene, ya sea como titular, cotitular o 
adicional... 
Computadora personal 1  Tarjeta de débito bancaria 3  
Conexión a Internet (gratis o paga 2   
 
 
POSESIÓN DE AUTOMOTOR 
N7 ¿Poseen en su casa algún auto o utilitario para uso familiar, modelo 87 en adelante? 
No  posee Posee 1 Posee 2 o más 
1  2  3  
 
PUNTAJE DE NES 
Alto 1 Alto 2 Medio alto Medio Típico Bajo superior Bajo Inferior Marginal 
De 57 a 100 
puntos 
De 48 a 56 
puntos 
De 37 a 47 
puntos 
De 29 a 36 
puntos 
De 17 a 28 
puntos 
De 12 a 16 
puntos 
De 0 a 11 
puntos 
       
 
GRACIAS POR SU TIEMPO- LA ENTREVISTA HA FINALIZADO 
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RESUMEN DE EDICION 
CODIGO RESPONSABLE DE EDICION: 
FECHA DE EDICION : 
CODIGO DE ENCUESTADOR : 
ERRORES DE EDICION 
 Cantidad Detalle 
DATOS FALTANTES :   
PROBLEMAS DE PASES:    
ERRORES DE INTERPRETACIÓN:   
ERRORES CRITICOS:   
FORMULARIOS EN TINTA ROJA / VERDE / LAPIZ:   
CUESTIONARIO FOTOCOPIADO:   
ERRORES DE EDICION  PARA ESCANEO 
 Cantidad Detalle 
CALIGRAFIA :   
FORMULARIOS TACHADOS :   
FORMULARIOS SIN NUMERO:   
CODIGO DE ENCUESTADOR FALTANTE :   
PROBLEMAS DE PASES:    
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ERRORES DE INTERPRETACIÓN:   
EDICION INCOMPLETA :   
FORMULARIOS EN TINTA ROJA / VERDE / LAPIZ:   
AJUSTES MARCADOS/ TACHADOS/ ESCRITOS 
CERCANOS:   
HACE LAS X PEQUEÑAS / CONFUSA   
HACE LAS X FUERA DEL CUADRADITO   
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 Appendix A7: Probabilities of Hierarchical Model for Dichotomous Participation in Political 
Parties 
Variable Probability 
Intercept 0.175 
Individual-Level  
Socioeconomics and Demographics  
     Education 0.534 
     Age Cohort 0.547 
     Female 0.413 
     Socioeconomic Level 0.490 
Governance Indicators  
     Evaluation of Municipal Employees 0.501 
     Performance of Municipal Institutions 0.499 
     Municipal Bribe 0.694 
     Satisfaction with Democracy at Municipality n.s.* 
     Quality of National Politics and Institutions need Improvement 0.501 
Support for Political Parties  
     Support for Political Parties 0.557 
Country-Level   
Means as Outcomes  
     Human Development Proxy (2001) 0.492 
     Municipal Population (Thousands) 0.500 
     Organic charter n.s. 
     Municipal Tax n.s. 
     Municipal Expenditure Ratio 0.424 
*n.s.: Not significant p>0.1  
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 Appendix A8: Largest Possible Effects of Voter Turnout Coefficients 
Variable Largest Possible Effect 
Socioeconomics and Demographics  
     Education 8.816 
     Age Cohort 19.31 
     Female 1.722 
     Socioeconomic Level 3.984 
Governance Indicators  
     Evaluation of Municipal Employees n.s.* 
     Performance of Municipal Institutions 2.3 
     Municipal Bribe n.s. 
     Satisfaction with Democracy at Municipality n.s. 
     Quality of National Politics and Institutions need Improvement 3.8 
Support for Political Parties  
     Support for Political Parties 2.521 
Country-Level   
Means as Outcomes  
     Human Development Proxy (2001) n.s. 
     Municipal Population (Thousands) n.s. 
     Organic charter -4.357 
     Municipal Tax n.s. 
     Municipal Expenditure Ratio n.s. 
*n.s.: Not significant p>0.1 
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 Appendix A9: Probabilities of Hierarchical Model for Dichotomous Dealings at Municipality 
Variable Probability 
Intercept 0.342 
Individual-Level  
Socioeconomics and Demographics  
     Education 0.531 
     Age Cohort 0.515 
     Female n.s.* 
     Socioeconomic Level 0.519 
Governance Indicators  
     Evaluation of Municipal Employees 0.502 
     Performance of Municipal Institutions n.s. 
     Municipal Bribe 0.605 
     Satisfaction with Democracy at Municipality n.s. 
     Quality of National Politics and Institutions need Improvement 0.501 
Support for Political Parties  
     Support for Political Parties n.s. 
Country-Level   
Means as Outcomes  
     Human Development Proxy (2001) n.s. 
     Municipal Population (Thousands) n.s. 
     Organic charter n.s. 
     Municipal Tax 0.578 
     Municipal Expenditure Ratio n.s. 
*n.s.: Not significant p>0.1 
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Appendix A10: Master Questionnaire for Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
ON POLITICAL RIGHTS: 
 
1. In general terms, could you please tell me what is your opinion about the elections for 
mayor and councilmen at this municipality?  
 
2. What is your opinion about the electoral legislation that rules the elections at this 
municipality?  
 
3. What do you think about the opportunities the opposition has at this municipality to 
exercise public office?  
 
4. How do you evaluate the exercise of citizen voting in your municipality?  
 
5. To what extent do you think that cultural, ethnic, religious or other minority groups enjoy 
of political rights and electoral opportunities?  
 
6. Do you think that municipal employees are accountable and work with openness and 
transparency?  
 
ON CIVIL LIBERTIES: 
 
7. What is your opinion about the freedom of press at this municipality?  
 
8. What is your opinion about the academic freedom of this municipality?  
 
9. To what extent there is freedom of association, demonstration and open public 
discussions at this municipality?  
 
10. What do you think about the existing mechanisms at this municipality to form labor 
unions, peasant and professional organizations?  
 
11. To what extent do you think that there is equal opportunity at this municipality?  
 
ON LOCAL POLITICAL ELITES: 
 
12. Who do you think are the most important individuals in the decision-making process at 
this municipality?  
 
GENERAL INFORMATION: 
 
13. What is your current position at your job?  
14. How long have you been living in this municipality? 
15. Which political party do you identify with?  
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Appendix A11: Results from Multilevel Regressions for Democratic Governance 
 
 
 
The outcome variable is Municipal Performance Perception Index 
                                       Standard             Approx. 
    Fixed Effect         Coefficient   Error      T-ratio   d.f.     P-value 
 
LEVEL-1 
  
         SEX, G10          -0.320552   0.341339    -0.939     13868    0.348 
         AGE, G20           0.977378   0.116885     8.362     13868    0.000 
   EDUCATION, G30           0.136597   0.125676     1.087     13868    0.278 
      WEALTH, G40           0.472917   0.121796     3.883     13868    0.000 
 
LEVEL-2 
 
   INTERCEPT, G00          56.867432   2.336491    24.339        25    0.000 
ORGANIC CHAR, G01          -1.981030   3.693769    -0.536        25    0.596 
ADM.DECENTR., G02          -0.065422   2.431276    -0.027        25    0.979 
  REFERENDUM, G03          -7.079049   2.043331    -3.464        25    0.002 
  PLEBISCITE, G04           1.801912   2.971314     0.606        25    0.549 
    AUDIENCE, G05          -3.845110   2.191947    -1.754        25    0.091 
  INITIATIVE, G06           2.828380   2.394793     1.181        25    0.249 
      RECALL, G07           6.069670   2.841943     2.136        25    0.042 
  REGISTRIES, G08          -0.560430   2.252949    -0.249        25    0.806 
  EVALUATION, G09          -3.263254   2.405563    -1.357        25    0.187 
 INFORMATION, G01           1.359561   1.040236     1.307        25    0.203 
 
 
 Final estimation of variance components: 
 
  
 Random Effect           Standard      Variance     df    Chi-square  P-value 
                         Deviation     Component 
  
 INTRCPT1,       U0        6.46946      41.85390    25    1708.51805    0.000 
  level-1,       R        15.50331     240.35256 
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The outcome variable is Administrative Efficacy Index 
                                       Standard             Approx. 
    Fixed Effect         Coefficient   Error      T-ratio   d.f.     P-value 
 
 
LEVEL-1 
 
         SEX, G10          -0.022193   0.005973    -3.716      6778    0.000 
         AGE, G20           0.021859   0.002853     7.662      6778    0.000 
   EDUCATION, G30          -0.000628   0.002073    -0.303      6778    0.762 
      WEALTH, G40           0.010245   0.002194     4.669      6778    0.000 
 
 LEVEL-2 
 
   INTERCEPT, G00           0.852500   0.013063    65.261        25    0.000 
ORGANIC CHAR, G01          -0.044041   0.032554    -1.353        25    0.188 
ADM.DECENTR., G02          -0.022964   0.017398    -1.320        25    0.199 
  REFERENDUM, G03          -0.007103   0.022270    -0.319        25    0.752 
  PLEBISCITE, G04           0.013932   0.020908     0.666        25    0.511 
    AUDIENCE, G05          -0.047425   0.018147    -2.613        25    0.015 
  INITIATIVE, G06           0.020845   0.017391     1.199        25    0.242 
      RECALL, G07           0.013017   0.026336     0.494        25    0.625 
  REGISTRIES, G08           0.023794   0.015634     1.522        25    0.140 
  EVALUATION, G09          -0.037666   0.016745    -2.249        25    0.033 
INFORMATION, G010           0.007911   0.006103     1.296        25    0.207 
 
 
 Final estimation of variance components: 
 
 
 Random Effect           Standard      Variance     df    Chi-square  P-value 
                         Deviation     Component 
 
 
 INTRCPT1,       U0        0.04173       0.00174    25     156.18907    0.000 
  level-1,       R         0.23393       0.05473 
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The outcome variable is Municipality is Free From Corruption  
                                       Standard             Approx. 
    Fixed Effect         Coefficient   Error      T-ratio   d.f.     P-value 
 
  
LEVEL-1 
 
         SEX, G10          -0.201659   0.439228    -0.459     14067    0.646  
         AGE, G20           3.143472   0.261320    12.029     14067    0.000 
   EDUCATION, G30          -0.084746   0.163030    -0.520     14067    0.603 
      WEALTH, G40           0.045435   0.160747     0.283     14067    0.777  
 
LEVEL-2 
 
   INTERCEPT, G00          60.342179   2.500739    24.130        25    0.000 
ORGANIC CHAR, G01          -3.939874   3.784942    -1.041        25    0.308 
ADM.DECENTR., G02           7.205661   4.814746     1.497        25    0.147 
  REFERENDUM, G03          -5.543834   4.403124    -1.259        25    0.22 
  PLEBISCITE, G04           5.032031   4.126050     1.220        25    0.234 
    AUDIENCE, G05          -6.222382   2.669673    -2.331        25    0.028 
  INITIATIVE, G06           5.971850   3.504368     1.704        25    0.100 
      RECALL, G07           8.222236   4.824667     1.704        25    0.100 
  REGISTRIES, G08           1.833771   2.498626     0.734        25    0.470 
  EVALUATION, G09          -7.530768   3.017825    -2.495        25    0.020 
INFORMATION, G010           2.971151   1.412140     2.104        25    0.045 
 
  
Final estimation of variance components: 
 
 
 Random Effect           Standard      Variance     df    Chi-square  P-value 
                        Deviation     Component 
 
  
 INTRCPT1,       U0        8.56321      73.32860    25    1282.13597    0.000 
  level-1,       R        23.89665     571.04969 
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